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Abstract 
Using the theory of deinstitutionalization, this paper illustrates the NHL’s evolution from 
an entity comprised of singular owner interests whereby players were exploited to a 
cooperative organization in which players have received significant employment gains. A 
historical analysis was done using the sports league as the unit of study. In comparing the 
NHL to the NFL, NBA and MLB, and using several studies in the sports literature, the 
paper found that increased cooperation among owners as well as a certain amount of 
liberality for players has enhanced the competitive balance and financial stability of some 
sports leagues. The findings were then applied to the NHL’s situation using change 
dynamic insights from deinstitutionalization theory to suggest a new business structure 
for the league. 
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Deinstitutionalization In Major Sports Leagues: Analyzing the NHL’s Path to 
Competitive Balance and Financial Stability Including Ideas for Implementation 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The mid-late 1990’s were not good times for Canadian hockey fans. At the 
beginning of the 1995/96 season, the Quebec Nordiques, unable to sustain themselves in 
Quebec City, relocated to Colorado. Two years later, at the inception of the 1997/98 
campaign, the Winnipeg Jets would also give up the ghost and move to Phoenix. Now, 
other so-called ‘small-market’ teams (Ottawa, for example) face similar challenges. This 
paper asks what we might learn from these and other stories of failed teams; what we 
might learn from other sports leagues about the sustainability of small-market teams and 
how that learning could be transferred to the NHL.    
 The Winnipeg Jets were sold to Minneapolis businessman Richard Burke for an 
estimated $65 million USD, played their last game in April of 1997 and left for Phoenix 
the following season (Duhatschek, 2000). Appendix A (Silver, 1996) outlines the demise 
of the Winnipeg franchise from an economic standpoint and although the NHL’s business 
structure played a small part in the downfall of the Jets, the bottom line is that none of the 
corporate businesses in Winnipeg, the smallest of all the NHL markets at the time, were 
willing to invest their money into the hockey team nor did the City or Province want to 
increase their financial commitment to the team by publicly funding a new arena (Silver, 
1996).  
 On July 1, 1995, after two years of bickering political negotiations, the Quebec 
Nordiques were sold to Ascent Entertainment for $75 million USD (Duhatschek, 2000). 
The team was bought in 1988 for $14.8 million CAD and while there is no question 
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Aubut made a healthy business decision for his own good, he and his partners could no 
longer afford to operate the team in Canada. In Aubut’s words, ‘“The new realities of the 
hockey industry, the size of the Quebec City market, and the absence of adequate 
government help have sounded the death knell for the Nordiques.”’ (Duhatschek, 2000, p. 
245) Appendix B (Diamond, 2000; Double overtime: Hockey fans in Winnipeg and 
Quebec City fight to save their teams, 1995; Duhatschek, 2000; Nordiques deny 
government made bid to acquire part of franchise, 1995; Talks extended on Nords future, 
1995) outlines the demise of the Quebec franchise from an economic standpoint. 
 The Quebec Nordiques were sold less than eight months after the new NHL 
collective bargaining agreement was ratified. Throughout negotiations, Aubut was a 
strong voice for small market teams. One reason he could not afford to operate his team 
in such a small market was the fact that some owners who want to win badly enough 
sometimes make bad business decisions which are a direct result of the current NHL 
economic system and not necessarily bad management. To avoid the impact these types 
of decisions would have on cash strapped small market teams, Aubut was a strong 
advocate for some kind of financial mechanism that would control costs (Double 
overtime: The NHL’s season skates onto thin ice, 1994). For the purposes of possibly 
obtaining government funding for a new arena, he could not guarantee that labour costs 
would be controlled. This was due in large part to the fact that the majority of owners 
were willing to operate under the agreement that was negotiated which did not include a 
salary cap - something that Aubut was strongly hoping for (NHLPA player reps 
unanimously reject owners’ counter-offer, 1995). Aubut said himself that a small market 
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like Quebec City would find it difficult to accept the status quo (Hockey night is back: 
With the lockout over, the NHL prepares for a short, sweet season, 1995).    
In the end, both the Jets and the Nordiques left their respective cities for similar 
reasons with the only difference being that taxpayer money was not lost in Quebec City 
to the extent it was in Winnipeg. There is no telling what impact a salary cap or revenue 
sharing plan would have had on keeping these teams in Canada. However, if the issues 
remain unresolved throughout the next round of negotiations, the impact it will have on 
other current Canadian teams, which are doing everything they can to stay financially 
viable, will become apparent. These individual efforts, past and present, are explained 
below.  
 Hockey is part of Canadian culture. It is hard to fault the fans of these NHL 
franchises for the eventual departure of their beloved teams. The die-hard fans in 
Winnipeg fought tooth and nail to save their franchise, managing to raise $13 million of 
their own money. Young children broke open their piggy banks and donated a life’s 
worth of change (Silver, 1996). The average attendance in Winnipeg over sixteen of their 
last seventeen years of existence in the NHL was close to 90% of arena capacity. In 
Quebec City attendance was 96% of capacity over the last fourteen years (Attendance 
Figures, 2002). In both cases the attendance was constant each and every year; quite a 
feat considering the teams played in two of the NHL’s smallest markets. And in one 
Canadian City that vied for an NHL franchise, there was an average attendance of over 
18,000 season ticket holders before the team even existed! However, Bill Hunter’s dream 
for an NHL franchise in Saskatoon was not to be.   
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 Through a lot of hard work, Hunter and his staff obtained 18,694 season ticket 
pledges for a team that didn’t exist to play in a building that was only a pile of drawings 
(Hunter & Weber, 2000). Towards the end of 1982 though, the dream of big league 
hockey in Saskatoon was becoming a reality. Hunter struck a deal with Ralston Purina 
who was no longer interested in owning the St. Louis Blues. The agreement included the 
Blues, their farm team and all the player contracts with Hunter’s intention of moving the 
Blues to Saskatoon. He even obtained control of arena concessions, a feat that many 
future NHL owners could not conquer (Hunter & Weber, 2000). Of course, he would 
own the building and several tax breaks had already been negotiated. Many of these 
issues still plague Canadian teams but Bill Hunter was ahead of his time with 18,694 
season ticket holders along with plans to build 126 skyboxes! Hunter had already booked 
196 other events for nights when the building was not being used by his new team and 
had plans to televise the games on pay per view for those who couldn’t get tickets 
(Hunter & Weber, 2000). What could possibly stop Saskatchewan from having its own 
NHL franchise? 
Well, the NHL made it quite clear that they did not want any more teams in 
Canada (Hunter & Weber, 2000). This could have had a lot to do with the fact that 
Canadian teams were poor box office draws in American cities. Of the league’s eight 
worst road draws in the 1983-84 season (the season after the bid), four were Canadian 
teams and three others were non-playoff contenders. It seemed as though American fans 
put Canadian teams and poor performing teams on the same scale of enjoyment 
(Strachan, 2000).   
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 The City of Hamilton also made attempts to get an NHL franchise but was passed 
over several times. The Board of Governors did not want to take a chance on another 
poor road draw (Strachan, 2000).  
 Nine years after Bill Hunter’s bid was denied, the NHL finally introduced another 
Canadian team into the league. The Ottawa Senators made their debut in 1992. 2002-
2003’s attendance figures illustrate that Canadian teams are no longer a poor road draw. 
In fact, out of the top ten poorest draws at the box office, only one is a Canadian team 
(NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003). Ironically, the Senators are on the poorest road draws 
list but at home have drawn an average crowd of 17,238 over the last five seasons 
equaling 93% of arena capacity (Attendance Figures, 2002).   
The Senators ran into financial difficulty due in large part to the debt load carried 
by the Corel Centre, which is the building that houses the Ottawa team. In fact, the 
company that financed the construction of the Corel Centre, at one time, was owed nearly 
$300 million. The previous owner of the Ottawa franchise, Rod Bryden, filed for 
bankruptcy protection (which did not include the arena) and then saw his bid to buy the 
team back fail (Naylor & Waldie, 2003, April 12). While Hunter made his bid for the St. 
Louis Blues with all his finances seemingly under control, the ownership group in Ottawa 
brought on the previous owner, Rod Bryden, to search for investors after they made their 
bid (Diamond, 2000). In fact, the main reason Ottawa was awarded an NHL franchise 
was because they were one of only two bids out of nine who did not question the NHL’s 
asking price of $50 million (Stein, 1997). Ten years later, Bryden lost the team, however, 
unlike the situations in Winnipeg and Quebec a white knight by the name of Eugene 
Melnyk swooped into Ottawa and bought the team with the intention of keeping it in 
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Ottawa (Naylor & Waldie, 2003, April 12). He also bought the Corel Center, which could 
signal the end of Ottawa’s money woes. And even though Ottawa’s situation is unique, 
the financial market they were forced to operate in made it harder to pay down the debt  
(MacDonald, 2003). In the words of NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman, the Senators are 
one of the best-managed franchises in the league (Friedman, 2003). They also finished 
this past season first overall in the standings (Mackie, 2003).    
 Professional hockey is as strong as ever in Canada. Gary Bettman has been to the 
Canadian cities to watch games and sees the excitement and passion it generates. He 
realizes that Canada produces over 50% of the hockey players in the league and that it 
would be a real disservice to the league if NHL hockey did not exist here (Sullivan, 
2003). He understands how important hockey is to Canada and how important Canada is 
to hockey and wants the Canadian clubs to not only survive, but also remain fully stable 
and competitive. Franchise relocation from any city is heartbreaking as teams produce a 
vibrancy and connection with their community. Teams form a bond with the city and 
many charities come to depend on professional athletes to act as spokespeople (Friedman, 
2003).    
 On the other side of the bargaining table, Bob Goodenow, Executive Director of 
the National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA), echoes the players’ 
sentiments in explaining that he does not want to see professional teams leave Canada 
either. Hockey north of the 49th parallel is very important to the players’ union and so are 
six viable Canadian franchises. There is no question that the interest for the game is not 
equaled anywhere as it is in Canada (Sullivan, 2003).    
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 Kevin Lowe, the general manager of the Edmonton Oilers, truly believes that 
because his organization is run so well and has exhausted every revenue source they can 
think of, the team has managed to remain fairly competitive. However, Lowe fears that if 
the issues of financial and competitive instability are not addressed, the NHL could see a 
phenomenon where the same teams continually succeed while the basement dwellers 
remain in the basement or just leave altogether (Sullivan, 2003).  Bob Clarke, the general 
manager of the large payroll Philadelphia Flyers states that the Canadian cities housing 
NHL franchises are great hockey towns and the league cannot afford to lose them. More 
television sets in the United States is not a good enough reason to relocate Canadian 
teams. He also believes that the owner of the Flyers wants to be part of a league that 
includes six Canadian franchises and most other owners are also happy to support a 
system that will keep Canada financially viable in professional hockey (MacDonald, 
2003). 
 Finally, from an economic standpoint, the NHL in Canada accounts for 30,000 
jobs and $1 billion in tax revenue over five years. The Vancouver Canucks alone will pay 
$30 million to the government this year. However, as important as the industry is, until 
the NHLPA and NHL can negotiate a different system that will solve some of the 
league’s economic problems, the government will not financially support Canadian teams 
any more than they already have (MacDonald, 2003).   
Helping Out the Cause 
Certain stakeholders of Canadian small market teams, over the last number of 
years, have designed solutions to help maintain some competitive and financial stability 
among these franchises. Governments, the league, and even the teams themselves have 
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contributed revenue or reduced expenses in one way or another to curb some of the losses 
of money and players. Most of the parties involved are adamant they have done 
everything they can to help their teams succeed and insist that it is time for the economic 
system of the NHL to change. 
Governments at the local level in Edmonton and Calgary have reduced the Oilers’ 
and the Flames’ property taxes in an effort to help keep their respective teams financially 
viable. The City of Edmonton also spent $10 million CAD (Public Policy Forum, 1999) 
out of a total renovation cost of $14 million CAD (Kagan, 2001b) upgrading the 
Edmonton Oilers’ venue, Skyreach Centre. Calgary’s building, now known as the 
Pengrowth Saddledome, was constructed in 1983 by the City of Calgary and was 100% 
publicly financed. Renovations by the City in 1995 amounted to $37 million CAD 
(Kagan, 2001b). The other four Canadian teams recently built new venues using 100% 
private funds with the exception of the Senators, the third smallest Canadian city to house 
an NHL franchise. Their building, the Corel Centre, was publicly financed to the tune of 
21% by way of a provincial loan and a federal grant (Kagan, 2001b). Finally, Montreal, 
according to the Commissioner, was paying three times more in property tax than the rest 
of the league combined. In 2001, the owner at the time, Molson, accepted a tax cut from 
the City retroactive to 1996 in the amount of $1.5 million per year for a total of $11 
million, which covered extra taxes plus interest (Kagan, 2001b).    
At the provincial level, Alberta also leads the way and has reduced the provincial 
taxes on the Flames and Oilers to what they say is the lowest possible level (Public Policy 
Forum, 1999). Ontario helped the Senators somewhat in funding the Corel Centre 
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(Kagan, 2001b) and is in the process of relieving the Senators of the $21 million 
outstanding (Waldie, 2003, April 29). 
The Province of British Columbia and the City of Vancouver are reluctant to 
support the Canucks through direct funding or tax concessions (Public Policy Forum, 
1999), while the Province of Quebec decided, at the time of the Public Policy Forum in 
1999, to work closely with the City of Montreal and the team itself in deriving some 
financial solutions (Public Policy Forum, 1999). As mentioned above, the City of 
Montreal did decide in 2001 to reduce the property tax the Canadiens were paying. 
This leaves Toronto, which is the most financially viable team in Canada (Kagan, 
2001b). The Maple Leafs are at an advantage with the City of Toronto’s current tax 
structure and the municipal government does not believe any tax concessions are 
necessary (Public Policy Forum, 1999).   
The federal government in Canada requires shared participation between the NHL 
and the NHLPA before it will contribute any type of direct funding or tax concessions. 
This is ultimately the voice of many different governments across various levels in 
Canada. They want to see a firm commitment by the NHL and NHLPA to adopt a viable 
economic system that will keep Canadian small market teams financially stable (Public 
Policy Forum, 1999). Of course negotiations for a new CBA will not take place until 
2004. In saying this though, the federal government did propose the development of 
provincial sport lotteries (Public Policy Forum, 1999) and Alberta has done so. This is 
addressed below when discussing team revenue generating strategies.  
The league has helped Canadian teams by providing assistance to weaken the 
impact of the struggling Canadian dollar. The Group II Equalization Plan developed by 
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the NHL allows Canadian clubs to match offers submitted by American teams to 
restricted free agents in the Group II class. It basically helps to make up for the currency 
difference (Public Policy Forum, 1999). For example if a restricted Group II Edmonton 
player is offered $6 million per year to play in Chicago, Edmonton can match Chicago’s 
offer in Canadian funds and the equalization plan will make up the difference between $6 
million CAD and $6 million USD. Eligible Canadian clubs are those ranked in the 
bottom two-thirds of the league in terms of team revenues (Public Policy Forum, 1999).   
The Supplemental Currency Assistance Plan provides subsidies to Canadian 
teams as long as the team has demonstrated that their revenues fall below the league 
median and, at a minimum, are 80% of the league average. In other words, it is up to the 
team to demonstrate that they have local support through ticket, suite and dasherboard 
sales. Alternative to the Group II Equalization Plan, where each NHL team contributes 
equally, the Supplemental Currency Assistance Plan allows each team to contribute on a 
sliding scale depending on where they rank in the league in terms of revenues. As league 
revenues have increased annually, so has the assistance under this program (Public Policy 
Forum, 1999). The Calgary Flames received $2.3 million in 1999-00 and then $2.4 
million in 2000-01. The Edmonton Oilers, Ottawa Senators and Vancouver Canucks each 
received $2.3 and $3.0 million in the above two years respectively. And the Toronto 
Maple Leafs along with the Montreal Canadians did not qualify as their revenues were 
above the league median (Kagan, 2001b).  
League subsidies do not totally address the extreme effect the currency issue has 
on Canadian teams. The Edmonton Oilers lost a difference of $17.2 million in 2002 
(MacDonald, 2003, January 27) strictly because of currency imbalance. However, league 
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equalization payments are the start to hopefully better solutions, some of which are talked 
about in chapter four of this paper.   
The Edmonton Oilers and Calgary Flames have also learned how to create 
revenue themselves. The Oilers teamed up with Molson Breweries in February of 2003 in 
designing a promotion that saw the brewery donate one dollar out of every case of beer 
sold in the Edmonton area to the Oilers. The team was hoping for a $200,000 financial 
windfall (Flames, Oilers Battle Together for Survival, 2003, February 21).  
The two teams have also been working together over the past couple of seasons 
on promoting a provincial lottery that provided each team with about $250,000 in 
revenue in 2001-02. And along with Vancouver, all three Western Canadian franchises 
hope that their current pay-per-view television deal will pick up some extra and much 
needed income (Flames, Oilers Battle Together for Survival, 2003, February 21). 
Finally, the Government of Alberta, much to the chagrin of the players on the two 
Alberta teams, imposed a 12.5% salary tax that each NHL player has to pay when in 
Alberta. Of course, players on the other 28 teams are not affected as much as the players 
on each Alberta team who play over half their games in the province. This tax produces 
about an extra $6 million in annual revenue and most of it goes to the Calgary and 
Edmonton owners (Maki, 2003, March 6). 
One other source of revenue that reduced the losses of many teams in the NHL 
during the 1990s and into the new century was the distribution of expansion payments 
paid by new teams. Each team, with the exception of the expanding teams (Atlanta, 
Nashville, Minnesota and Columbus) received $3.1 million in 1998-99 and 1999-00 
along with $6.2 million in 2000-01 (Kagan, 2001b). However, with the NHL at 30 teams 
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now, it is unlikely that any more teams will enter the league in the near future, which 
means no more expansion payments are forthcoming. Had these payments not been 
distributed throughout the league in 2000-01, not including playoff revenue, a total of 15 
teams would have lost money including the Detroit Red Wings, New York Rangers and 
Colorado Avalanche (Kagan, 2001b)!  
The NHL finished its 2002-03 season with at least two small market Canadian 
teams in the red. Even with the new player tax, the lottery revenue, the tax cuts and the 
pay-per-view deal, Edmonton recorded about a $2.5 million loss and Calgary lost around 
two to three times that amount. While the Oilers played three home playoff games, 
Calgary did not make the post season and each team continues to lose money (Flames, 
Oilers Battle Together for Survival, 2003, February 21). Vancouver, who managed eight 
home playoff games this year otherwise they would have barely broken even as per their 
general manager, Brian Burke (MacDonald, 2003, January 17), finished with a profit 
(Sullivan, 2003, May 16). Ottawa is now under new ownership with the ability to 
generate more revenue through their venue however financial details for 2002-03 were 
unavailable.  The Canadian dollar has picked up and currently sits at about $0.70 
(Ireland, 2003, February 28) however it made its biggest jump during the off-season. 
Hopefully it can stay strong into October of 2003.  
As discussed above, probably the biggest obstacle facing Canadian teams is the 
currency issue. The relative strength of the Canadian and US dollars is out of the hands of 
either the NHL or the NHLPA, however, any financial solutions reached have to 
incorporate this uncontrollable phenomenon. 
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 To conclude this introduction, the demise of two Canadian NHL franchises has 
been discussed. The effort of a man who came within a whisker of owning a Canadian 
NHL team by using innovative financial strategies different than those of the Quebec and 
Winnipeg owners was addressed as was the importance of hockey to Canadian culture 
and pride. The chapter also explained the actions taken by governments at various levels, 
the league and individual teams to increase NHL franchise viability in Canadian cities. 
After the literature review and using the theory of deinstitutionalization, the paper will 
then explain changes and resistors to change in the league over the last 40-plus years that 
gave it the structure in place today. Finally, based on the findings, recommendations will 
be made to improve the league’s financial and competitive situation. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
An extensive amount of literature pertaining to change in sport has been 
developed using the national level as the unit of analysis. Cunningham, Slack and 
Hinings (1987) wrote about changing archetypes in national sport organizations from the 
1970s to the 1980s. The kitchen table archetype prevalent in the 1970’s (named so 
because the volunteers used to do most of the work at their kitchen tables in the evenings) 
is demonstrated by a commitment to recreational activities, a preference for volunteer 
staff, less specialization and standardization along with little commitment to science and 
technology. Conversely, the corporate professional archetype which gained momentum in 
the 1980s is indicated by values and beliefs illustrated as a commitment to an elite 
program, a preference for professional staff, greater specialization and standardization 
along with a greater commitment to the application of science and technology. Secondly, 
Hinings along with Slack (1987) wrote a paper dealing with change in the structure of 
national sport organizations as a result of the quadrennial planning program (a system 
designed to allow for the best possible performance by Canadian athletes at the 1988 
Winter Olympics.) They analyzed the organizational structure of national sport 
organizations using the elements of specialization, standardization and centralization in 
assessing if the organizations were more prone to a professional structure because of the 
implementation of the quadrennial planning program. The results indicated that only 6 
out of 36 organizations studied could be placed in the category of ideal bureaucracy.   
Publication continued surrounding change in amateur sport throughout the 1980s 
into the 1990s and beyond. Almost all of this literature dealt with Canadian sport 
organizations with a few notable exceptions including Cunningham and Rivera (2001). 
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They used data from a questionnaire to interpret different levels of specialization, 
centralization and formalization in order to identify structural arrangements within 
NCAA Division I athletic departments. Slack and Hinings (1987) continued to study 
specialization, standardization, and centralization within the context of sport 
organizations but added contextual factors to understand the impact of planning. These 
included environment, task and technology, organizational scale, resources and 
organizational age. Kikulis, Slack and Hinings (1992) identified key elements in the 
organizational values of orientation, domain, principles of organizing and criteria of 
effectiveness for the archetypes of kitchen table, boardroom and executive office. After 
identifying the key elements of specialization, standardization and centralization for the 
same archetypes, the authors compared the sector specific design archetypes to one 
another in terms of all the elements.  
Two published articles dealing with isomorphism in sports have both been set at 
the national level. Trevor Slack along with Bob Hinings (1994) used institutional 
isomorphism to explain how 36 national-level sport organizations, over time, became 
more homogenized as they were subjected to the same state mandated environmental 
pressures to adopt a more professional and bureaucratic design. Cunningham and Ashley 
(2001) investigated institutionalism along with the other two competing theories of 
isomorphism, population ecology and strategic choice, in deciding whether or not they 
were present in the perceptions of athletic directors of NCAA athletic programs 
surrounding the importance and delegation of managerial activities. Strategic choice 
turned out to be the dominant force. 
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The above literature deals mainly with the changes incurred when volunteer based 
organizations become professional based and the intention here was not to study the same 
changes in professional sports. However, the disagreements, conflict and negotiations 
that came about with the desire to maintain the traditional role of governance by a 
volunteer board instead of involving paid executives speaks to the underlying theme of 
this paper (Kikulis, 2000). The NHL needs a new economic system as the status quo is 
making it difficult for small market teams to remain financially and competitive viable. 
However, in order to adopt revenue sharing and/or cost certainty, the values and beliefs 
of the NHL Board of Governors and the NHLPA must change. This paper will identify 
why such values have not changed to this point with implications for a new viable system 
of governance and suggestions of how to implement it. 
Much research on professional sports has focused on describing the structure of 
unions in major leagues along with some of the arbitration and antitrust issues prevalent 
in the last twenty-five years (Berry, Gould & Staudohar, 1986; Roberts, 1991; Staudohar, 
1996). The impact of corporate ownership in the NHL has also been a topic of interest 
(Mills, 1991; Ross, 1991).  
With the advent of unions, corporate ownership and wealth maximizing owners, 
each and every major sports league in North America has had its share of labour unrest 
and governance conflicts. Most of the problems have focused on free agency, revenue 
sharing and salary caps. Several pieces of literature have determined that these issues 
alone or on concert, have resulted in some sort of work stoppage over the last twenty 
years in all three leagues (Berry et al., 1986; Dworkin, & Posthuma, 2002; Kovach, 
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Hamilton, & Meserole, 1997; Staudohar, 1996). These issues as they impact the NHL 
will be discussed in greater detail below.  
This paper views the unit of analysis, a major sports league, as one organization. 
A significant amount of literature has been developed arguing whether or not a 
professional sports league should be viewed as a single entity (Abbott, 2001; Goldman, 
1989; Jacobs, 1991; Roberts, 1991, Weistart, 1984). Gary Roberts (1991) provides 
evidence supporting the single entity theory in his article, Professional Sports and the 
Antitrust Laws. Roberts professes that a major sports league operates as a single entity in 
many ways.  For instance, a team cannot operate alone. Another team’s presence is 
essential in order to generate the product of a game which is what the customer purchases 
tickets for. Therefore, in order to operate a team, a minimum of at least one other 
franchise has to exist. Arguments suggest that a professional team would not hold a lot of 
value if they were forced to play outside their respective major sports league (Weistart, 
1984). Based on this fact, the teams survive together and depend on one another to 
maintain a stable existence in the market. The mere fact that each franchise breeds 
competition with every intention of winning games contradicts this notion, however, 
rivalry is simply the unusual nature of the product produced by the league – athletic 
competition. In fact each individual team’s fortunes are intrinsically affected by the 
success or failure of each and every league game (Roberts, 1991).   
However, every team is individually owned which in itself presents many 
arguments suggesting that a major sports league is just 30 odd different businesses 
competing against one another (Goldman, 1989; Jacobs, 1989). Corporate strategies 
present problems in the face of operating a league as one entity. Most notably, some 
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individual teams are part of a portfolio consisting of other business ventures not at all 
related to sport. Some are run with the intention of winning solely to maximize profits. A 
team’s success also enables some owners to fulfill personal goals and objectives. Just 
owning a team, whether it’ successful on the playing field or not, provides an owner with 
instant recognition in the community (Mills, 1991). It satisfies the ego for some and 
others have commented that they have all the money they need and are not in the business 
to make any more. Some just enjoy the company of their fellow sportsmen. Several 
owners involve themselves in the daily operations of the team while others leave these 
duties strictly in the hands of the coach and general manager (Brower, 1977). With 
differing goals and strategies such as these, it is hard to view a professional sports league 
as one single business with common objectives shared by all owners. This paper will look 
at the attitudes and motivations of different NHL owners as criterion to understand why 
revenue sharing has yet to be adopted and the barriers inherent in moving to such a 
system.   
The fact remains that professional sport leagues do act as a single entity in some 
ways but as a group of separate firms in other ways. For instance, teams operate 
independently of one another in areas such as movement of players and the hiring of 
coaches. However, the negotiation of television agreements, enforcement of management 
rights and the setting of rules for the entry draft are done through the league as a whole 
(Staudohar, 1996). Beyond these policies though, the boundary becomes somewhat 
ambiguous. Although it has been suggested that the most successful leagues are 
predominated by cooperation and common control (Weistart, 1984), even well 
established single-entity advocates and opponents in the field of law agree that sometimes 
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sports leagues should be seen as single entities while in other cases, each team in the 
league should be recognized as a separate firm (Jacobs, 1991). Except for the case of 
Fraser v. MLS, wherein the Major League Soccer Limited Liability Company, aside from 
maintaining the other so called single entity attributes of a major sports league, is also the 
employer of all the players in the league (Abbott, 2001), no court has yet to rule if a 
professional sports league is a single entity (Goldman, 1989). This paper takes the 
approach put forth by Roberts (1991) and then suggests that the traditional major sports 
leagues in North America are changing their institutional business structure and as a 
result are appearing more like a single entity focusing on financial stability and 
competitive balance. 
As all major professional sports leagues have undergone labour relations 
disruptions along with owner disagreements, articles have been written discussing the 
outcomes of collective bargaining negotiations and the impact the new agreements had or 
will have on these respective leagues (Goplerud, 1997; Hill & Groothuis, 2001; 
Zimbalist, 2000).  
One professional sports league recognized the cause and effect described in the 
previous paragraph and vowed to create a solution. Zimbalist (2000) describes how the 
NBA attempted to negotiate their most recent CBA in order to provide a more 
competitive and economically stable atmosphere throughout the league. Some teams in 
the same league represent cities with a population difference of eight fold, some teams 
enjoy the luxury of playing in a state of the art facility (a few of which are even owned by 
the team) and some owners use supplementary business interests to help fund the team 
 20 
                                                               
they own. Some of these issues and how they affect the NHL will be addressed in this 
paper. 
In his article, Zimbalist (2000) also alludes to five strategies, which could be 
employed to combat the issue of competitive balance. He suggests the employment of a 
salary cap, revenue sharing among teams, skewing the amateur draft to favour low-
revenue teams, allowing teams to be re-located more easily and the creation of rival 
league(s). This paper will look back to a previous rival league of the NHL, albeit in a 
somewhat different context. It will also focus on the concepts of revenue sharing and 
salary caps in deciding what mechanism(s) might prove most fair and effective to combat 
competitive imbalance and financially instability in the NHL. 
Some research has been done on the issues of revenue sharing and cost certainty 
as well as competitive balance measures in sports leagues. Rodney Fort and James Quirk 
(1995) conceptualized cross-subsidization in the form of salary caps and revenue sharing. 
They found that salary caps do lead to enhanced competitive balance, however, because 
most caps are inconsistent with league-wide revenue maximization, an enforcement 
problem exists. However, the authors argue that wealthy owners are not necessarily the 
main cause of the enforcement problem. The authors also analyzed revenue sharing and 
argue that competitive balance and league-wide profits will be increased in a league that 
shares gate receipts as well as local TV revenues. However, gate sharing alone will have 
no effect on competitive balance. Fort & Quirk (1995) also found advantages in the form 
of increased profits when studying the NFL’s national TV revenue sharing policy. 
On the other hand, Nicholas Jennett (1984) studied Scottish League Football in 
order to draw some conclusions as to the appropriate extent of cross-subsidization based 
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solely on revenue sharing among gate receipts. Prior to 1981-82, ticket revenue in the 
Scottish Football League was split 50-50 between the home and visiting team. 
Afterwards, new gate receipt sharing arrangements saw the home team retain 100% of the 
revenue. This change led to worse records for teams located in areas with smaller 
populations.  Most teams also saw a decline in total gate revenue with a few of the teams 
located in larger populated areas reaping the benefits. However, with the 50-50 split, 
teams in smaller markets tended to be oversubsidised preventing the larger clubs from 
improving existing facilities in order to attract a wider following. Jennett proposes that 
the optimum gate sharing line be drawn at 80-20 whereby the home team collects 80% of 
the revenue and the remaining 20% is paid into a central pool to be subsequently divided 
among the entire league. This, or a ratio near it, would still see the larger teams retain a 
large portion of revenue however the other teams would almost unanimously fare better 
compared to the 100-0 split. 
Back to the NFL, in a study focusing in part on revenue sharing, Scott Atkinson, 
Linda Stanley, and John Tschirhart (1988) concluded that revenue sharing is an effective 
incentive mechanism producing a near revenue-maximizing level of equality among 
teams. However, they also found that NFL owners as a whole did not behave as pure-
profit maximizers suggesting that some owners are also interested in the non-monetary 
benefits associated with winning. Thus, if too many owners feel that profits will be 
reduced as a result of revenue sharing, it will likely not be adopted. This paper will 
uncover the NHL’s attitude and behaviour surrounding the issue.  
Marburger (1997) concluded that along with an increase in competitive balance, 
revenue sharing decreases the average level of players’ salaries and the absence of 
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revenue sharing tends to favour teams in larger markets. In addition, quality disincentives 
exist for small-market teams when luxury taxes are included in the mix. Put simply, if 
subsidies are inversely related to team revenues, a small market team might not maximize 
their talent pool in order to generate more of a profit for the club by collecting on the 
luxury tax. This led Marburger (1997) to the final conclusion that revenue sharing 
without a luxury tax might be the most appropriate mechanism to adopt by a league 
wishing to subsidize small market teams because it will improve small market finances 
while avoiding a disincentive or enforcement problem.  
Robert Brown (1994) looked at the amount of revenue sharing among teams 
within certain conferences of American College Football. He found that conferences 
engaged in revenue sharing of higher amounts tend to be weaker than those sharing less 
as a result of a disincentive to build a stronger team realizing the rewards of team success 
diminish once the rewards are shared with conference opponents. College football is 
unique, however, in that all teams are rated on the same scale regardless of which 
conference they are in. Essentially, each conference is a separate league but the ratings 
are done nation wide. The same cannot be said for the NFL, NBA, MLB or the NHL. 
Each professional league is comprised of a group of teams whereby revenue sharing is or 
would be divided among the whole. This paper is concerned only with competitive 
balance within one league (and the financial stability thereof). 
Mason (1997) demonstrated how the NFL has maintained financial stability 
throughout the last 40 years as a result of revenue sharing. He illustrates how 
Commissioner Rozelle convinced large market owners in 1961 that a loss of TV revenue 
for their respective teams in one year would result in significant gains for each and every 
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team in future years. This was done through a negotiated TV contract with CBS whereby 
each team would receive $330,000. However, before the contract was negotiated, some 
large market clubs were receiving about $500,000 per season in TV revenue while the 
small market teams received about $150,000. Because Rozelle was able to convince 
owners that the league would be more viable as one entity in the future, the league saw 
the benefits three years later when the TV contracts increased to $1 million per team. 
However, as stated earlier, revenue sharing is not always the answer and sometimes 
modifications are necessary. For instance, the NFL also shares the revenues generated by 
merchandise sales. At one point, the Dallas Cowboys accumulated about 20% of NFL 
licensing monies off their merchandise. The Cowboys’ owner felt that he shouldn’t have 
had to split this income evenly among all the teams in the league. In addition, Mason 
(1997) also suggests that owners acting as wealth maximizers undermine revenue sharing 
by paying too much to create a winning team. In light of this, a different revenue sharing 
contract might help to control the spending habits of the wealth maximizers and help to 
stabilize the financial viability of any sports league. This paper will discuss viable 
solutions for the NHL. 
Rosenthal (1995) asks if revenue sharing can work in baseball. In suggesting 
possible solutions, he also takes a legal standpoint. Prior to mentioning any suggestions 
though, Rosenthal makes some very interesting arguments for revenue sharing such as 
the promotion of competitive balance, revenue derivation from all teams, emphasis 
placed on winning and greater fan loyalty. However, he also argues against revenue 
sharing because it may give teams a lower incentive to win along with depressed salaries, 
disparities in stadium revenue and a negative reaction by the fans as a result of perceived 
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cooperation among teams. In the end, though, Rosenthal does propose several revenue 
sharing ideas such as an equal distribution of all national and local television 
broadcasting revenues, an unequal gate receipt sharing plan and a re-purchase of every 
team by the league followed by a sale back to it’s original owner after the impact of 
revenue sharing is calculated. In this last solution, teams that owed money could re-
finance the difference through future income. MLB now shares extensively in local 
revenues. 
Free agency is another major issue within the realm of professional sports leagues 
and several studies have concluded that the free agency era has not changed competitive 
balance within baseball (Quirk, & Fort, 1992; Zimbalist, 1992). Vrooman (1996) 
suggests that those winning small market teams in baseball are dismantled then 
reassembled among various large market clubs resulting in a balance of relative team 
quality. Assuming that revenue sharing and cost certainty exist, free agency by itself, if 
anything, is a very small cause of financial and competitive instability. In light of 
previous studies done on the issue along with the fact that the current free agency rules in 
the NHL are quite stringent in relation to other pro sports leagues, few studies have been 
done on the NHL and this subject. In finding a solution to the NHL’s financial 
imbalances, some of the strict policies surrounding free agency might have to be relaxed 
in order to satisfy all parties. Literature pertaining to this is discussed below. 
Most of the articles surveyed point to revenue sharing as a viable solution to 
maintaining a financially and competitively stable league. Some of the solutions require 
cost certainty for maximum effectiveness whereas almost everyone agrees that the advent 
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of free agency has only increased competitive balance in professional major league 
sports.  
Most of the academic research completed that is directly related to the NHL is 
concerned with salary determination along with discrimination towards Francophone 
players (Lavoie, & Grenier, 1992; Lavoie, Grenier, & Coulombe, 1992; McLean, & 
Veall, 1992). An exception is Richardson (2000) who wrote a paper outlining how pay 
and performance of individual players affects competitive balance in the National 
Hockey League. He actually found that competitive balance in the NHL has steadily 
increased over time with no correlation to the creation of expansion teams, changes in the 
playing rules, revisions to the collective bargaining agreement or the introduction of Bob 
Goodenow as the leader of the players’ union. An increase in league revenues coupled 
with the escalation of players’ salaries has not caused competitive balance to decrease 
either. Richardson concluded that the reverse order entry draft enables the league to 
sustain competitive balance. Finally, he states that an argument can be made suggesting 
that teams have found ways to overcome rising players’ salaries and a stronger union, 
which, at first sight, was evident in 2002-03. For example, the Vancouver Canucks and 
the Ottawa Senators, each of which maintained one of the lowest payrolls (NHL Salaries, 
2002-2003, 2003), finished among the top six teams in the league during the 2002-03 
campaign (NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003). This observation, along with the evidence 
presented by Richardson, suggests that competitive balance is not that big of an issue in 
the NHL.  
In a related study, during a decade that saw Major League Baseball dominated by 
two teams (The New York Yankees and the Atlanta Braves), Schmidt and Berri (2001) 
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found that competitive balance as a whole was never stronger in that league than it was in 
the 1990s. This paper will add to the literature by looking at other qualitative variables 
contributing to competitive balance (evidenced in the appendices) in the NHL. 
Additionally, the paper will discuss uncover events that have led to the decline in league 
performance.    
Professional Hockey in Canada is a social icon. The country has already lost two 
small market teams to American cities in the past decade. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Jim Silver (1996) examined the situation faced by the small market 
Winnipeg Jets and although their situation might not have been any different if there was 
revenue sharing with cost certainty in the NHL, it is possible that the result could have 
been avoided. Unfortunately, out of the remaining six Canadian teams, four constitute 
small market teams (Kagan, 2001b). The problem isn’t unique to Canada. Several 
American teams are having trouble staying afloat so it is more than just a currency and 
infrastructure issue. If the past (Fischler, 1995) is any indication of what the future holds, 
the NHL is in for a long battle between players and owners and among owners 
themselves before solutions are reached.    
Various articles offer suggestions to improve the business systems of pro sports 
leagues some of which, if looked at seriously, could help to prevent conflict in the NHL 
before it begins.  Jon Greenwood (1995) took the opportunity to compare major league 
baseball to leagues outside of North America in order to find solutions to labour relation 
conflicts. In particular he looked at the Japanese Baseball League and the Football 
Association of England in describing their solutions to cost certainty issues as well as free 
agency. Greenwood suggests increasing player loyalty to teams by creating a limited free 
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agency system similar to the system in Japanese baseball. Drawing from English football, 
whereby a maximum salary provision used to exist, MLB should limit the amount each 
team can spend on free agents per year. This provides some form of cost certainty and 
does not impede a player from marketing his true ability. In addition, if a salary cap is not 
attainable, a limited revenue sharing plan should be implemented to allow small market 
clubs to compete in the free agency system.  
Vrooman (1996) also offers suggestions for a different sort of free agency system. 
He says that players should be eligible for free agency once the drafting team has 
recouped all the expenses incurred while developing him. This would mean, according to 
Vrooman, that in 1994 MLB players would have been eligible for free agency after four 
years of service at an expense rate of $2.53 million. This “free agency fix” (Vrooman, 
1996) would result in a reduction in the number of reserved players by one fourth while 
increasing competition in the free agency pool by about fifty percent thus increasing 
financial and competitive stability in the league. It is possible that some adjustments will 
have to be made to the free agency system in the NHL in order to obtain some form of 
cost certainty. The analysis of the data over the course of this paper will disclose what 
solutions will and will not work. In the end, it is possible that a combination of the above 
two examples will help to maintain franchise viability in the NHL. 
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Chapter 3 – Deinstitutionalization with an Emphasis on the NHL 
The first chapter of this paper illustrated the importance of hockey to Canada and 
Appendices C through I present the financial and competitive states of the NHL, NBA 
and NFL. MLB’s financial and competitive state has been left out because their economic 
system has just recently been significantly restructured and it is too soon to measure the 
effects. Using the theory of deinstitutionalization, this chapter will examine the 
transformation of the NHL’s business structure with comparisons to the other three major 
leagues. The final chapter will suggest some specific financial and competitive solutions 
the National Hockey League could adopt based on the evidence presented here along 
with research discussed in the literature review. 
Theory 
The theoretical framework employed is based on Christine Oliver’s (1992) The 
Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization. Institutionalized practices are seen by 
organizational participants as the obvious or natural way to conduct an activity and are 
considered very resistant to change. They are taken for granted and maintained over 
extended periods of time without the need for elaboration. Organizational behaviour is 
sustained by the influence of history and habit, which continually reinforces certain 
activities (Oliver, 1992). For example, lunchtime in North American offices is at noon.  
Therefore, if these practices are supposed to stand the test of time indefinitely, 
how is it that certain “untouchable” practices eventually disappear? Sometimes even 
activities that have been sustained for decades with no explanation as to their validity 
finally discontinue. Deinstitutionalization explains the process inherent in these changes 
as well as other long-standing customs and traditions. If these traditions are vulnerable to 
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erosion, it calls into question their stability and longevity. An examination of 
deinstitutionalizing pressures might also call on the circumstances explaining the 
conditions whereby institutional explanations might prove most powerful or appropriate 
(Oliver, 1992). 
Influencing the course of deinstitutionalization are moderating factors that impede 
or accelerate the rate at which an organization’s activities erode or discontinue. 
Organizational entropy explains natural tendencies and therefore acceleration towards the 
erosion or decay of institutional phenomena while inertia suggests that institutionalized 
activities will exhibit inevitable resistance to change. These properties moderate the rate 
of erosion over time and the pace of deinstitutionalization can be partially determined by 
their prevalence (Oliver, 1992). Figure 1 illustrates this. 
Aided by the pressures of entropy and inertia, the path to deinstitutionalization 
commences either through dissipation whereby an institutional practice gradually 
deteriorates, or through rejection, which is a direct assault on the legitimacy of a long-
standing activity or tradition (Oliver, 1992). For example, it is a North American custom 
for school children to receive holidays during the months of July and August but the fact 
that some schools have adapted year round classes because very few families require 
their children to work on the farm in the summer months anymore is an example of the 
former. Re-classifying job classifications away from the basis of stereotypical gender 
roles are an example of the latter (Oliver, 1992). 
 Perhaps the most important contribution of Oliver’s (1992) paper is the fact that it 
identifies factors that are likely to predict deinstitutionalization leading to the erosion or 
discontinuity of certain traditions. Under certain specific conditions, social agreement 
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around the value of an activity or conformity to institutional pressures will not explain 
organizational behaviour and change. Instead, the failure of organizations to accept what 
was once a shared understanding of legitimate organizational conduct or a discontinuity 
in the willingness or ability of organizations to take for granted and continually re-create 
an institutionalized organizational activity will. The factors that are hypothesized to cause 
institutionalized organizational practices to erode and act as determinants of 
deinstitutionalization fall into three categories: political, functional and social. Table 1 
summarizes the different pressures inherent in each factor, explained in more detail 
below. 
Political Pressures 
Certain activities and traditions will tend to erode when their legitimacy is 
seriously called into question. As illustrated by Table 1, the first two factors are based at 
the organizational level in that they wear down internal agreement on the value of certain 
institutional practices. The second two precipitate changes within the organization due to 
altering environmental conditions (Oliver, 1992). 
 Mounting Performance Crisis 
 Performance problems, financial or otherwise, are sometimes a breeding ground 
for internal dissent within an organization which calls into question existing practices or 
activities thereby creating a need to abandon or rectify such procedures in order to 
improve performance (Oliver, 1992). A gas station might move away from a customer 
service focus because consumers are too price sensitive and the extra cost of providing 
service cannot be recaptured in premium pricing.  
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Conflicting Internal Interests 
 This pressure arises when specific organizational stakeholders with growing 
power no longer possess any interest in sustaining an organizational practice or perceives 
the practice to conflict with their own beliefs, interests or agendas creating a disruption in 
unanimity and thus an antecedent for deinstitutionalization (Oliver, 1992). During the 
recent negotiations between Canada Post and the Postal Worker’s Union, the union 
desired a change in workload for carriers. Although it is not clear which side of the 
negotiating table the increasing use of Internet mediated communication most empowers, 
should the policy change whereby each delivery person is obligated to carry less mail, the 
procedures of the post offices that distribute the mail to the carriers might have to change 
to account for the smaller loads.  
 Increasing Innovation Pressures 
 Consensus on the merits of an institutionalized practice may decline with a rise in 
power of intra-organizational entrepreneurs who offer visionary solutions to 
organizational problems and succeed in mobilizing political support for the imposition of 
alternative organizational solutions and activities (Oliver, 1992). A computer system 
designed to track low inventory levels and reorder on demand would result in the erosion 
of power and responsibility previously maintained by a purchasing department.  
 Changing External Dependencies 
 Sometimes, the perceived value of an institutional practice begins to erode 
because its continuity has been sustained primarily by the need to conform to the 
demands or expectations of an institutional constituent and the dependency on this 
constituent has declined or disappeared (Oliver, 1992). When the survival of an industry 
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in one country depends on another nation to import a large portion of goods, the 
subsequent refusal of that nation to receive exports might result in a transformation of 
procedures directed at stimulating domestic demand in said industry.    
Functional Pressures 
 Technical or functional concerns sometimes provoke doubts about the validity or 
value of a practice perceived by organizational actors to maintain inherent worth aside 
from simple technical requirements. Therefore, these institutionalized practices are not 
necessarily immune from technical reevaluation or reconsideration and consequently 
deinstitutionalization could result from a change in the perceived utility of such practices. 
Again, as illustrated by Table 1, the first two pressures will occur on an organizational 
level while the second two emerge from environmental effects (Oliver, 1992). 
 Changing Economic Utility 
 Sometimes the economic criteria of efficiency and effectiveness begin to conflict 
with, or intrude on, institutional definitions of success and it is no longer rewarding to 
carry on under the terms of an institutionalized activity. Organizations may choose to no 
longer perpetuate institutional activities due to the fact that the benefits they were 
acquiring based on these institutional activities are no longer available (Oliver, 1992). An 
automobile finance company that has generously compensated their dealerships for 
completing precise condition reports on off-lease vehicles throughout the years could find 
the quality of the reports to deteriorate once that compensation is lowered.  
Increasing Technical Specificity 
Shifts in external constituent demands from ceremonial conformity with 
institutionally defined processes to the technical quality of an organization’s outputs, will 
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tend to erode an organization’s reliance on institutional definitions of appropriate practice 
and encourage the organization to replace these practices with more technically precise or 
efficiency-oriented performance measures (Oliver, 1992). A hotel that sets out to 
understand completely what the traveling sales rep wants in overnight accommodation, 
rather than just providing everything that most hotels do ‘just in case’, might find that 
sales reps don’t want on-site restaurants because they take clients out for dinner. Since 
running a restaurant is usually a money loser for motels, increasing technical specificity 
might see such a hotel drop the restaurants from their chain resulting in an ability to 
provide a better price to the customer.    
 Increasing Competition for Resources 
 With intensified competition for scarce resources, organizations must search for 
new methods to distinguish themselves from the competitor. Increased competition tends 
to discourage perpetuation of the status quo and motivates organizations to re-evaluate 
existing activities (Oliver, 1992). In order to attract potential students during a 
demographic decline in the university age population for example, a university might 
alter programs, change qualification criteria or improve on-campus facilities.  
 Emerging Events and Data 
 Dissonant information in an organization’s environment sometimes emerges to 
discredit or challenge the utility of the operating assumptions of organizations. These 
events may be idiosyncratic and non-repetitive but their consequences may be profound 
in terms of deinstitutionalizing existing activities (Oliver, 1992). The September 11th, 
2001 tragedy caused the FAA to question their security measures at airports across the 
US and change some of the existing procedures to decrease the chance of terrorist 
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attacks. In addition, the sudden drop in business as a result of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center saw some airlines go bankrupt and initiated others to develop new and 
improved strategies aimed at maintaining their customer base.  
Social Pressures 
 These pressures, unlike their political or functional counterparts, which cause 
organizational actors to consciously acknowledge the necessity to abandon certain 
practices, precipitate deinstitutionalization under conditions whereby organizations do 
not have a central intention of discontinuing certain activities. Table 1 indicates the unit 
of analysis dealt with in each of the four pressures (Oliver, 1992). 
 Increasing Social Fragmentation 
 Leader succession, high turnover and increases in workforce diversity will tend to 
obstruct the continued existence of organizational customs and traditions. Historical 
discontinuities are created that act to sever an organization’s links with the past and 
forestall the reproducibility of activities over time. Employees from new backgrounds 
entering an organization might bring with them different attitudes that erode the 
consensus surrounding certain activities (Oliver, 1992). The new president of a company 
might bring an attitude that grants employees more empowerment thereby phasing out 
bureaucratic policies in decision making or large numbers of female hires might yield 
more family friendly working hours and benefit structures.  
 Decreasing Historical Continuity 
Organizational mergers and vertical integration commonly introduce a new 
culture into an organization thereby disrupting the historical continuity of its value 
system, which creates social pressures on the organization to revise established 
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procedures (Oliver, 1992). A company that merges a smaller, casual branch of business 
with a larger, stricter conglomerate might have to revise its customer service policies to 
maintain efficiency while preserving morale.   
 Changing Institutional Rules and Values 
 These are akin to state or societal pressures on an organization to conform to 
public demands and expectations. They typically displace or deinstitutionalize previously 
institutionalized practices that were once considered appropriate organizational activities 
in an earlier context (Oliver, 1992). A provincial privacy act would cause many financial 
institutions to disregard old accords with fellow creditors and instead become leery when 
asked to share a customer’s personal information.  
 Increasing Structural Disaggregation 
 When the structure of an institutional field becomes more physically dispersed, 
loosely connected or locally differentiated, deinstitutionalization of collective values and 
practices are more likely to occur (Oliver, 1992). An automobile manufacturer might 
have to conform to the requests of its assembly line staff to accommodate prayer in its 
Middle Eastern operation plants.   
Methodology 
 Using a historical analysis based on the method in L.R. Gay and P.L. Diehl’s 
(1992) Research Methods for Business and Management, many data sources were 
consulted and assessed for their authenticity and accuracy. The sources looked at 
included over 200 magazine and newspaper sources made up of mostly the Edmonton 
Journal and the Globe and Mail, issues of The Hockey News, various articles and books 
written by academic scholars and economists in the area of sport, books written first hand 
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by league and union officials in professional sport, first-hand interviews of league and 
union officials in the popular press, the collective bargaining agreements of the NHL, 
NFL, NBA and MLB. In addition, Kagan World Media provided a consistent and reliable 
source to compare NHL, NFL and NBA financial figures. Finally, David Cruise and 
Alison Griffiths’ Net Worth: Exploding the Myths of Pro Hockey was used as a source for 
many of the early events in the NHL as well as a yardstick for later events. The book was 
renowned by several personalities in the area of professional hockey such as Stan 
Fischler (1995), who has been a sportswriter for over 50 years along with Globe and Mail 
sportswriters, William Houston and David Shoalts (1993), for its reliability and accuracy. 
The book itself was compiled using a cross-section of many hockey books, magazines 
and publications. The authors were also able to locate first-hand data in the Ontario 
provincial and National Archives of Canada as well as various newspapers across North 
America (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
Once the bibliographic sources of all academic data were assessed for relevancy, 
the appropriate sources were collected and also analyzed for relevant bibliographic 
sources until the academic data was near saturation and the same references began 
appearing. Then, all relevant sources were analyzed. Each piece of data was coded as it 
related to the early institutionalization of the league or one or more of the political, 
functional or social antecedents resulting in deinstitutionalization. Specific quotations 
were also recorded from several interviews of league and union officials. Once all the 
necessary information was pulled from all the relevant sources, the information was 
summarized to result in an explanation of the hypothesis (Gay & Diehl, 1992). 
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 To enhance quality and credibility, all relevant material was analyzed to consider 
data supporting or refuting the main hypothesis. The researcher does have a prior 
connection to the National Hockey League as a fan and is particularly interested in seeing 
one small market team, the Edmonton Oilers, become financially viable and more 
competitive. However, prior knowledge of the league and the game was mostly in the 
area of player personalities, skills and statistics and game strategy while business issues 
were limited to only what was in the sporting news. The researcher attempted to leave all 
personal bias out while letting the data speak to the hypothesis described in the next 
section (Patton, 1999).  
 The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. First, there is an analysis of the 
business structure of the NHL illustrating long-standing practices and activities that 
characterized the league in its earlier years. Its early institutionalization is described and 
subsequent deinstitutionalization hypothesized. The deinstitutionalization theory is then 
brought in and a process of evaluation is undertaken that parallels the Theory section. 
With each pressure, there is a speculation on how it might be present in the NHL 
followed by an analysis of evidence illustrating the effect on, or absence from, the league. 
Finally, the inertial effects are discussed suggesting specific reasons why change in the 
NHL has been held up. 
Early Institutionalization of Organizational Practices in the NHL 
The NHL, like most professional team sports leagues in their early formative 
stages, was originally a loose oligopoly comprised of individual owner interests wherein 
tacit collusion supported a social construction of taken-for-granted employment relations 
with the players. Since there was little overt cooperation, a type of invisible hand was the 
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only mechanism available to ensure the preservation of the collective structure of the 
league.   
This is not to say that there were no linkages among certain teams. In fact, James 
E. Norris essentially controlled all four American NHL teams from 1944 and for several 
years afterward1, however, he invested mainly in the Detroit Red Wings and let the other 
three languish under ineffectual management happy as long as they did not lose money. 
Conn Smythe ran the Toronto Maple Leafs as part of Maple Leaf Gardens, Ltd. (Cruise 
& Griffiths, 1991) and Jos. Cattarinich along with Leo Dandurand owned the Montreal 
Canadiens (Kagan, 2001b). As a result, the Red Wings, Maple Leafs and Canadiens 
dominated the league from 1943-44 to 1966-672 (Klein & Reif, 2001). 
 So even though the league had the appearance of a single and cooperative entity 
because one man owned or operated two-thirds of it, Norris’s personal desire to see only 
his Red Wings succeed demonstrates that individual interests came before league welfare. 
In addition, the commissioner of the league at the time, Clarence Campbell, who was 
hired in 1946, provided minimal leadership from his office of two. His mandate was to 
keep the players in line (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991) while the real business took place in 
the six individual arenas housing each team. When the owners did get together, constant 
squabbling ensued while each was careful to guard his profits (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
Some of the income jealously guarded by each owner came in the form of 
television revenue starting in 1955-56. The Canadian teams received substantially more 
than the American franchises3 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991) due to the popularity of the 
game in Canada but refused to share any of it in order to establish a stable and 
competitive league. By 1960 the popularity of the game in the US had seriously waned 
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but instead of working in cooperation with each other and the US network stations, the 
governors voted to dissolve their broadcast committee (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991) and the 
league structure continued to take the form of a loose conglomeration of franchises 
depending mostly on individual gate receipts that subsequently would not share television 
revenues as a league until 1984 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 1997).  
Even when the idea of expansion came around in the mid 1960s, several 
governors including Smythe were vehemently opposed because they did not want any 
new teams taking their players. Of course, expansion did take place in 1967 but only after 
Bill Jennings of the Rangers convinced the governors that it was necessary to thwart the 
creation of a rival league, protect themselves from anti-trust action and lure network TV 
(Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). Most of the governors only concerned themselves with their 
team and not the league’s interests. It was not until Jennings put forth some tangible 
reasons that would affect each individual owner similarly that the institutionalized 
practices of the collective unit finally began to break down.  
Strict employment relations with the players also remained institutionalized for 
many years after the initial formation of the league. Three mechanisms that kept salaries 
depressed and management in complete control included the reserve clause, the standard 
player’s contract and management’s refusal to disclose salaries (Cruise & Griffiths, 
1991). 
The reserve clause was an economic system used in the NHL for a number of 
years (Quirk & Fort, 1999 pp. 21 & 23). A player signed what was called a C-form, 
which turned his rights over to one team for life. No other team could then approach that 
player, and he could not sign with another club unless traded. Some players signed the C-
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form as early as age fifteen. Although almost certainly legally unenforceable, the C-form 
itself was never challenged (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991 p. 143). Such taken-for-granted 
acceptance of inequitable outcomes is a common hallmark of institutionalized practices 
in labour markets. 
A second document that made it nearly impossible for players to capitalize, either 
directly or indirectly, on their hockey careers was the repressive standard player’s 
contract. As the wording in the reserve clause was ambiguous, player contracts were not 
negotiated but simply decreed by management. Players were only paid during the season, 
which amounted to about six months out of the year, and had to take part in promotional 
activities put on by the club for nothing. They were also forbidden to take part in their 
own promotional activities or play another sport in the off-season unless the club granted 
permission. This rarely happened (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
 A third mechanism that kept salaries depressed was management’s refusal to 
disclose salaries. This was one of their most powerful and effective weapons. It stopped 
the players from comparing and seeking more money because of what another player was 
making4 and maintained high profits for franchises5 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
In addition, the players had no type of grievance or arbitration system to turn to 
and were completely at the mercy of the team that owned them. The League President, 
who was of course hired by the owners, settled any salary disputes (Berry et al., 1986, pp. 
209-210; Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).   
 These strict employer-employee relations combined with self-serving agendas by 
each individual owner provided the groundwork for a highly institutionalized set of 
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labour practices in the NHL. Similar situations were seen in the formative years of other 
North American professional sports leagues.  
For example, Arthur Soden, a part owner of baseball’s 1879 National League 
Boston Braves, invented the reserve clause. Its intention was to control player salaries by 
restricting competitive bidding for players by league teams. Even though it was 
challenged in court, the owners came up with two other justifications for the clause: it 
was needed to preserve the public’s faith in the integrity of the sport along with 
competitive balance within the league (Quirk & Fort, 1999 p. 55).  
Along with the NHL and MLB, the other North American professional sports 
leagues maintained some sort of mechanism similar to the reserve clause. The NBA had a 
renewal clause indicating that teams could renew a player’s contract for the same salary 
as the previous year (Miller, 1991) which eventually, through arbitration in 1969, gave 
way to an option/compensation system that still limited player movement as teams 
signing free agents had to relinquish a player (Noll, 1991). The NFL maintained a system 
similar to the option/compensation system known as the Rozelle Rule, named after the 
first commissioner of the modern day NFL (Berry, et al., 1986, p. 100). 
Perhaps the tendency for each league to maintain these restrictive systems is best 
explained by using DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) paper on institutional isomorphism. 
Resulting from standard responses to uncertainty, mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) forces one unit in a population to look like similar units that face the same 
set of environmental conditions (Hawley, 1968). Each league knew that such restrictive 
devices would keep salaries down as the supply of eligible players would be kept to a 
minimum, however, none of them really knew what would happen to competitive balance 
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and the integrity of the game if the clauses were removed. Fearing the worst, the leagues’ 
mimicked each other without any scientific validity to back up their claims and the 
practices remained imbedded for years.  
Because of these restrictive systems, the owners in each league did not necessarily 
have to cooperate with one another financially because their main expense, player 
salaries, were low enough for even the smallest of markets to handle. Baseball owners 
made continued attempts to avert free agency without ever discussing revenue sharing 
(Miller, 1991). Six of the wealthiest NBA owners would not give into local revenue 
sharing and maintained unified resistance to any modifications6 (Quirk & Fort, 1999 pp. 
64-65). Even though they were the earliest of all the leagues that agreed to put collective 
interests first, the NFL also went a number of years with minimum cooperation7 (King, 
1994, September 19).   
To conclude, every North American professional sports league maintained very 
similar institutionalized ideals promoting separate ownership interests while keeping 
player gains to an absolute minimum. The twelve separate deinstitutionalization pressures 
put forth by Oliver (1992) will now be discussed as they relate to the NHL. Over time, 
the league has changed to reveal an institution where the owners are learning to recognize 
the importance of overall interests apart from the agendas of their separate teams. The 
players have also made significant gains especially in the area of compensation. The next 
section will illustrate the process undergone by the NHL to arrive at these points. In 
addition, certain deinstitutionalized features of the other major leagues are described 
throughout to illustrate how the NHL is still void of some aspects that have the potential 
to transform it into a more financially balanced and competitive league.  
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The Deinstitutionalized Stages 
The following discussion will illustrate how the league went from an institution of 
single owner interests and player exploitation to one of league recognition with increased 
gains for players. Throughout this section, absent pressures providing examples of a lack 
of deinstitutionalization in certain areas, along with examples of inertia in the next 
section, will give some reason as to why the league is in its current state. The last chapter 
will provide recommendations that would see the NHL deinstitutionalize further in the 
direction discussed to constitute a more financially and competitively stable organization. 
Political Pressures 
Mounting Performance Crisis 
 Recall that this pressure stems from performance problems prompting an 
organization to reevaluate current procedures and practices. In the case of the NHL, 
performance problems in the form of financial instability and competitive imbalance 
particularly as manifested in small market teams continue to encourage the league to 
reevaluate its current business structure. However much change motivated by 
performance factors has already taken place. The problems described are happening in a 
league quite different to the one described in the previous section. No longer are players 
paid paltry salaries; in fact, quite the opposite is true. And no longer are owners working 
to satisfy their interests only. National television deals are now shared among all the 
teams and expansion has grown the league to five times its size in 1944. But it is also 
clear that a complex interplay of factors continues to endanger the viability of some 
teams, a realization that contributes to on-going change pressures for new labour-
management solutions at the league level. 
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Conflicting Internal Interests 
 Examples of political dissensus or conflicting interests that aim to disrupt 
unanimity and agreement among the collective unit of NHL players and owners 
surrounding aspects of the league institution will surely provide the groundwork for 
certain practices to fall. Enough dissent by players regarding their treatment by owners or 
significant conflict between owners in terms of what is right for the good of the league 
might cause highly change resistant practices to erode or disappear.  
 NHL players finally made some strides as a group and acquired limited collective 
power when the NHLPA was successfully formed in 1967. The first CBA was negotiated 
in 1975 (Appendix J) with subsequent major agreements negotiated in 1982 and 1986 
(Appendix K). Salary arbitration, discussed later, and free agency were negotiated into 
these agreements but the players’ major concessions were gains for their pension fund 
(Berry et al., 1986; Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 1997). It wasn’t until 1992, fueled by 
a collection of power and dissent resulting in a strike, that players received significant 
gains in the area of free agency along with a collective increase in revenue (Appendix L) 
(Fischler, 1995; Staudohar, 1996; Stein, 1997). However, the NHL still has the strictest 
free agency rules of the four major sports leagues in North America (Staudohar, 1996) 
illustrating that there is further room for deinstitutionalization.  
 In comparison, The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) took 
early steps to remove themselves from the exploitive hands of the owners. Salary 
arbitration was negotiated around the same time as in the NHL but due to early and 
militant revolts by the players, very liberal free agency rules were employed around the 
same time (Appendix M). The MLBPA has remained very cohesive since the adoption of 
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free agency in 1976 and their collective power (Berry et al., 1986; Miller, 1991) has 
helped to successfully institutionalize these practices.  
In terms of conflict among owners, as a result of different business philosophies 
and interests in combination with 30 competitive owners spending in pursuit of the 
Stanley Cup (Appendix N) (Fischler, 1995; Friedman, 2003, February 1; Matheson, 2003, 
February 18), salaries continue to rise in the NHL. Deinstitutionalization of the individual 
owner driven league dynamic has to occur through the inclusion of some kind of 
mechanism aimed at reducing wage expenses otherwise small market teams will become 
non-existent. The big market governors still do not agree that local revenue sharing is the 
answer and probably won’t until they find that the benefit of reduced salaries outweighs 
the cost of lower take-home and local television receipts (Quirk & Fort, 1999, p. 92). 
Therefore, a good part of the ownership group still has its own interests at heart 
(Appendix O) (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Sheehan, 1996) and even though parts of this 
institution have slowly eroded away as described later, there is still some distance to go.  
Increasing Innovation Pressures 
 This pressure speaks to innovative techniques within an organization that alter the 
balance of power between players (Oliver, 1992). In the case of the NHL or the NFL, 
NBA and MLB for that matter, the major actors that make decisions on league business 
are the Board of Governors, comprised of one representative per team. The major 
decision maker that represents the players is the union. The Board of Governors yields 
one vote per team on all issues, such as expansion, unless a team wishes to abstain. This 
has always been the case (Stein, 1997). The NHLPA has continually been set up much 
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the same way as each team elects a representative to vote on all issues (Cruise & 
Griffiths, 1991).     
 In addition, even though the athletes now receive significantly more 
compensation than they used to, there are no suggestions that the change was due to any 
sort of innovative technique or process established by the NHLPA and agreed to by the 
league. Also, the owners themselves have not increased cooperation among one another 
in similar fashion. Even if there were such cases, this pressure alludes to the power of a 
major actor in the NHL eroding away because an innovative technique is established to 
improve owner cooperation or better employee-employer relations within the 
organization. It is safe to say that the owners and players in the NHL will change over 
time, however, since their positions are the foundation of the league and essential to its 
operation, each will retain voting and structural power. 
Changing External Dependencies 
In the early years of the NHL, particularly before the first wave of expansion in 
1967, the league depended mainly on gate receipts at the team level for revenue, which 
basically served the interests of individual owners (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). With the 
advent of substantial television income, however, greater cooperation among owners was 
needed to access and maintain these revenues, which contributed to new practices and 
procedures. 
 But television-friendly changes were slow to come since the owners were 
unaccustomed to driving changes at the league level. Little was done in fact, (Berry et al, 
1986; Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Radar, 1984) (Appendix P) until Gary Bettman took over 
as commissioner in 1993. He attempted to expand the audience by making the game user-
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friendlier for the casual fan (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994, p. 77). Better camera angles were 
added making it easier to see the puck and rules were instituted to decrease fighting 
(Staudohar, 1996 pp. 138-139). The league also involved NHL players in the Olympics to 
develop worldwide recognition (Stein, 1997) and started to market the marquee players 
(Fischler, 1995, p. 55). Quicker line changes were added to speed up the game and the 
league has tried to crack down on the obtrusive and defensive play by administrating 
“obstruction” penalties (Houston, 2003, January 20), which are infractions called away 
from the puck. Appendix Q goes into more detail on these initiatives. 
 As much as the NHL has done to improve the game in order to attract a larger 
national audience and increase shared revenue, the NFL and NBA discovered this 
important external dependency much earlier and subsequently changed some of their 
practices to adapt to it. The NFL decided to increase it’s following and add to its Sunday 
afternoon lineup of games with a prime time match every Monday night beginning in 
1970. They let ABC increase production units for Monday Night Football while 
scheduling match ups between the fiercest of competitors. Certain aspects of the game 
were highlighted to increase the audience base (Chandler, 1991). Appendix R describes 
some of the details behind the NFL’s television transformation and the advent of Monday 
Night Football. The NBA has also successfully adapted its game to television and 
continues to do so by meeting with television networks on a steady basis. Years ago, the 
league added a three-point shot and sped up the game by adding a 24-second shot clock. 
The league has also been very successful in developing worldwide recognition by 
marketing itself as a brand name. They have offices all over the world and in 1997 were 
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broadcasting games in 180 countries (Rifkin, 1997). Appendix S highlights some of these 
practices.  
 The NHL has done a lot to increase adaptability to a wider audience through new 
sources thereby deinstitutionalizing somewhat the rigidity of singular owner interests. 
However, compared to the NFL and the NBA, the league has a barely penetrated the 
market. By changing even more to attract these outside sources, the NHL has the ability 
to transform into a more cooperative league.  
Functional Pressures 
Changing Economic Utility 
 It has been suggested that institutionalized rules and procedures sometimes prove 
incompatible with effective task performance and organizational efficiency. The 
institutionalized functional utility of a practice might be questioned when it begins to 
compromise efficiency (Oliver, 1992). In the case of the NHL, the process of holding 
player compensation to an absolute minimum was the previous tradition imbedded in 
league ownership aimed at generating a maximum profit. A change in such a practice 
resulting in higher profits while increasing player benefits and compensation or 
cooperation among owners suggests a transformation of institutional ideals.  
 In 1962, Chicago offered to buy superstar Frank Mahovolich from Toronto for $1 
million (Dowbiggin, 1993). Without a doubt, Chicago knew that if they had Mahovolich, 
attendance would rise to more than make up for the initial $1 million investment. 
However, this approach to recruiting players went against institutionalized practices and 
the owners strictly believed without proof that paying such an exorbitant amount for a 
player would inflate salaries significantly resulting in bankruptcy for the league. The 
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Mahovolich deal didn’t go through, but it wouldn’t be long before the changing economic 
utility of players apparent in Chicago’s thinking began to upset the status quo. 
The St. Louis Blues were a team ridiculed by the other owners for their reckless 
spending (Stein, 1997), however, they were following a new found utility and in 1991 
paid their star Brett Hull, $7.3 million over three years – up from $125,000 per year. 
They also signed free agent Scott Stevens to a deal worth $5.1 million over four years – 
up from $300,000 per year. The team then increased ticket prices and were still able to 
sell out their arena for the first time in a decade. Spending an additional $2.25 million per 
year in salary on two good players yielded an additional $6 million in 1990-91 (Cruise & 
Griffiths, 1991). Appendix T outlines the economic theory suggesting why professional 
team sport athletes earn the salaries they do (Quirk & Fort, 1999) with examples of 
spending habits from competitive owners (Kagan, 2001b). It also argues that most 
professional team owners, no matter how competitive they are, still want to earn a profit 
from their team (Quirk & Fort, 1999). New payment philosophies have enabled owners to 
run a somewhat more efficient league with an increased ability for them to sign players 
they feel will raise fan support and ultimately profits for the team. This has resulted in 
significant gains for the players.  
Increasing Technical Specificity 
 Institutionalization breeds under conditions of goal ambiguity and technical 
uncertainty. Greater clarity in the causal processes by which organizational goals are 
achieved will tend to deinstitutionalize prevailing superstitions or beliefs about the 
appropriate or legitimate means of obtaining organizational ends (Oliver, 1992). With the 
incredible surge in player salaries over the last two decades, professional sports leagues 
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have been searching for ways to control spending among owners and maintain a 
competitive league. Without the ability to control salaries through restricted movement 
mechanisms, most major leagues have had to learn to understand the process that causes 
salaries to escalate and create technically precise solutions that both the owners and 
players can agree on.    
 Pete Rozelle and the NFL managed to create a revenue sharing solution to combat 
this problem even before salaries began to escalate by understanding that the 
consequence of large market teams competing against small market teams would result in 
a competitive imbalance (Harris, 1986). Even when salaries were low, large market 
owners still had more money to play with and could outbid inferior owners for players on 
the selling or trading block. As the NFL’s success with television revenue grew and its 
60-40-gate receipt scheme (whereby 60% of the ticket revenue generated from each game 
is distributed to the home team and 40% to the visiting team after 15% is deducted from 
the total for home field administration expenses) continued, the wealth of the league 
maintained its fairly even distribution (Staudohar, 1996; Zimbalist, 2000) resulting in a 
competitive balance evidenced by Table 2. Relative to these high revenues, salaries 
remained low because player movement was still restricted (Staudohar, 1996). These 
restrictions led to a player uprising resulting in two strikes (Appendix U) (Ahlburg & 
Dworkin, 1991) but when the dust settled, the players essentially traded freedom of 
movement for a salary cap (Appendix V) which rises with league revenues (Dworkin & 
Posthuma, 2002). Table 3 indicates an even higher increase in competitive balance. The 
financial success of the league and increase in player salaries is outlined in Appendix I 
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and illustrated by team in Tables 4 and 5. Table 6 shows how popular the game is with 
attendance based on percent of capacity at many venues in the high 90s.  
 With the free agency concessions received by players after the NBA’s merger 
with the American Basketball Association (ABA) and the subsequent rise in salaries, the 
NBA was able to convince the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) to allow 
the institution of a salary cap in 1983. This was the first such evidence of cost certainty in 
North American major league sports since the advent of free agency. The NBA 
understood the direction they were headed in if they did not do something to curb salaries 
and since the large market owners made a pact to not share in local revenue6, the league 
designed a system that would force teams to adhere to a spending limit. The cap has been 
modified several times and the last CBA agreed to in 1999 actually placed restrictions on 
individual salaries resulting in a transfer of monies from the superstars to the balance of 
the league (Appendix W) (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002; Gorman & Calhoun, 1994; Noll, 
1991; Zimbalist, 2000). However, comparing Table 2 to Table 3, the latest agreement has 
not resulted in an increase in competitive balance. Appendix H and Tables 7 and 8 
indicate the league is still not financially stable and salaries are the highest of the four 
major leagues. Attendance figures in Table 9 show that venues are generally not as full in 
relation to the NFL based on percent of capacity.  
 The MLBPA remained strong and unified for years refusing to give up their hard 
fought free agency concessions (Appendix M) (Berry et al., 1986; Miller, 1991) while 
placing the onus on the owners to learn how to cooperate. Finally, in 1995, both the 
players and the league agreed on a luxury tax system that would transfer monies from the 
wealthy teams to the lesser however the exchange was minimal. In the last agreement, the 
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owners finally agreed to share substantially more in local revenue and league-wide 
sharing has increased from 20% to 34% (Appendix X) (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002; 
Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement, n.d.; Miller, 1991; Naylor, 
2003, January 21; Sheehan, 1996). 2002-03 is the first year that the new deal is 
operational and therefore its success is hard to measure at this time. 
 Pressures in the NHL to integrate this improved understanding of the technical 
specificity of cost and revenue solutions still exist but it remains the only league without 
any type of cost restraining mechanism. The owners want cost certainty and the players 
want the owners to adopt revenue sharing or cooperate more (Friedman, 2003, February 
1; Sullivan, 2003, March 31). The last section of this chapter will outline the inertial 
forces keeping the NHL from adopting these solutions and the last chapter will discuss 
ways to alleviate those forces.  
Increasing Competition for Resources 
 The NHL is currently the superior hockey league in North America, if not the 
world. The league as a whole has little competition for its main resource, elite hockey 
players. The formation of a new league with similar appeal might cause the NHL to 
change some of its current practices and procedures in order to keep attracting its main 
resource. As a result of this change, should the league take the appearance of one with 
more cooperation or increased control and compensation for players, the causes for such 
deinstitutionalization might be considered an antecedent consistent with the theme 
throughout this paper.  
 In 1972, The World Hockey Association (WHA) became direct competition with 
the NHL for professional hockey players and began plucking players from NHL teams in 
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their reserve years. The NHL argued that its reserve clause, which essentially tied a 
player to his team for life by adding on an extra year at the end of a contract, barred 
players from competing on other professional franchises, however, this clause was in 
direct violation of the Sherman Ant-Trust Act by restricting players from negotiating with 
or shifting teams or leagues (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). As a result, the NHL was forced 
to remove the reserve clause and they replaced it with a free agency in exchange for 
compensation plan (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Houston & Shoalts, 1993, p. 126).   
This was still quite a restrictive mechanism, however, because of the competition 
between leagues for resources, player salaries rose from an average of $28,500 in 1972 to 
$96,000 in 1977 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). The NHL finally decided it had to merge 
with the WHA in order to curb salaries. It took three years of negotiations between 
owners on both sides and in 1979 a deal was struck (Stein, 1997). But, had the players 
from both leagues used this competition to their advantage, deinstitutionalization would 
have been quite evident resulting in a system whereby their compensation might have 
increased dramatically possibly forcing owners to cooperate more themselves.  
Under antitrust laws, the NHLPA had to approve the merger, which put them in 
an excellent bargaining position to have the free agency rules further revamped. 
However, unlike the NBPA, who was in a similar position, they did not use the 
opportunity to its full advantage and approved the merger for as little as $200,000 a year 
in annual benefits (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
 The NBPA on the other hand, by way of an antitrust suit, refused to let the NBA 
merge with the ABA from 1970-1975. It was not until a new CBA was negotiated in 
1976 abolishing compensation payments for free agents and replacing it with a right of 
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first refusal clause that the NBPA agreed to the merger (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Noll, 
1991).   
The reluctance of the NHLPA to use a competing league as leverage to negotiate 
a better CBA no doubt played a role in the players’ relatively low average salaries 
throughout the 1980s while the NBPA’s new CBA as a result of competition with the 
ABA, helped to increase salaries substantially. In 1988, the average NHL salary was 
$179,000 compared to $500,000 in the NBA (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
Emerging Events and Data 
 Irrefutable or unexpected events in the NHL organization that result in increased 
gains for the players or increased cooperation among the owners would provide evidence 
to support this antecedent. For many years, as previously mentioned, owners felt it was 
necessary to keep player salaries suppressed in order to maximize profits. A one-time 
event due to one owner’s change in philosophy might provide fertile ground for the 
whole system to change.   
 Bruce McNall, who owned the Los Angeles Kings in 1988, had to do something 
to increase fan attendance, which was sitting at about 10,000 per game so he bought 
Wayne Gretzky from the Edmonton Oilers for $18 million and then paid him an 
unprecedented $20 million over eight years as salary. During Gretzky’s second season as 
an LA King, gate receipts more than tripled. McNall had increased his own revenue by 
bringing possibly the best hockey player in history to his city. He basically spent money 
to make money (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
 This contract was the first publicly disclosed deal and shortly after full disclosure 
was given to all NHL players who finally had a guide to use in deciding what they 
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thought a fair income was and salaries skyrocketed8 (Dowbiggin, 1993, p. 13). This event 
in itself deinstitutionalized one of the major mechanisms used by NHL owners to keep 
salaries depressed. No longer were salaries kept a secret.  
 Uncontrollable issues that affect the financial stability of one or more of the 
league’s franchises might prompt the owners to come up with a collective solution. In the 
case of the NHL, a significant number of teams are Canadian. Since Canadian teams 
collect revenue in Canadian dollars but now pay their players in American currency, 
irrefutable evidence exists illustrating they are at a disadvantage no matter how well they 
market their team because over time the Canadian dollar has lost a lot of ground on the 
American dollar. That being the case, NHL owners came up with the Group II 
Equalization Plan and the Supplemental Currency Assistance Plan discussed in the first 
chapter which, through contributions by each team, are designed to help small market 
Canadian franchises combat their weak dollar (Public Policy Forum, 1999). It takes 
absolute irrefutable evidence but the owners are able to cooperate somewhat on a local 
level. 
Social Pressures 
Increasing Social Fragmentation 
 Within an organization, new members might bring with them fresh backgrounds 
or experiences differing significantly from the prevailing culture. The advent of these 
new attitudes might lead to major changes causing previously institutionalized traditions 
and practices to erode. Three ways in which new attitudes might enter the culture of an 
organization are through high turnover, leader succession or an increase in employee 
diversity. Any of these situations present in the NHL that leads to more cooperation 
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within the league or increased gains for players could be considered an antecedent for 
deinstitutionalization in that direction.  
 Turnover in any professional sports league is very high, however, different from 
traditional industry in that almost every player does not want to leave the organization 
until age or injury forces them to retire. Competing for jobs is the norm and the players 
generally come in with the same attitude, to do what it physically takes to keep a job in 
the league. Although involved as union reps, the business structure of the league almost 
always plays second fiddle to the game itself and next to no deinstitutionalization has 
occurred based on turnover. The same can be said for the increase in workforce diversity 
that came with the influx of Europeans now playing in the NHL. They came to North 
America to play with the best players in the world and seldom concern themselves with 
the business of the league. The players leave their personal business up to sports agents to 
negotiate individual salaries. In terms of league business, they put their faith in the 
appointed union leader.   
 This disconnect between the game and the business means that leadership change 
is far more important as a factor in the NHL’s transformation than any type of steady 
erosion of practices due to the changing expectations of players. Bob Goodenow is the 
current Executive Director of the NHLPA, a post he has held since 1990. His strong 
communication skills (Stein, 1997) were illustrated in his ability to educate the players in 
seminars about perceived inequities in the NHL CBA and the need for change 
(Staudohar, 1996, p. 149). He turned once mild-mannered unionists into a militant power 
(Fischler, 1995, p. 113) and sought to rectify years of one-sided concessions and blatant 
inequities that previous bargaining had built into their relationship with the owners 
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(Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  Appendix L outlines the gains he made for players after he 
led them out on their first ever strike in 1992. 
 It seems as though Bob Goodenow has taken a page from Marvin Miller’s 
leadership style.  The former negotiator with the Steel Workers’ union used his leadership 
and communication skills to create a solid and committed MLBPA thereby changing the 
social behaviour of the players as a collective unit from one that adhered to the owners’ 
demands and exploitive actions to one that fought for and achieved increased benefits, 
compensation and freedom. He transformed the administrative and business structure of 
baseball right before the league’s eyes not by trying to turn the players into millionaires 
but by fighting for what he thought were fair concessions (Korr, 1991; Miller, 1991). 
  The current leader of the NHL, Gary Bettman, has influenced the league into 
engaging more of a cooperative structure. He has worked to form and maintain a stable 
league office while using an international focus to help obtain good television and 
marketing deals9 (Fischler, 1995; Kagan, 2001b; Naylor, 2003, January 21; Staudohar, 
1996) (Appendix Q). This focus on league business drives up shared revenue causing the 
league to appear as more of a cooperative entity (Fischler, 1995). He also emanates a 
cooperative attitude with the Board of Governors by insisting on broad involvement in 
decision making and refusing to allow rule by governance committee (Fischler, 1995, p. 
181). Bettman’s cooperative attitude extends to the bargaining table, which is evident in 
his requests to Goodenow to commence negotiations for the next CBA (Brender, 2003, 
January 3).  
As a previous leader in the NBA, Bettman learned a thing or two about leadership 
from David Stern, who is the current commissioner of the National Basketball 
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Association (Fischler, 1995). Stern also maintains a cooperative attitude pulling the 
league’s franchises together into a single entity that operates as one well-oiled machine 
with a worldwide symbol (Appendix S) (Rifkin, 1997).   
As an example of how important leadership is to a sports league, Pete Rozelle was 
arguably a pioneer in developing cooperation among owners of a professional sports 
league. He helped to transform the NFL into a single entity by convincing large market 
owners in the early 1960s that it would be beneficial to share in ticket sales and 
broadcasting because since big markets could not buy up all the talent, it would create 
more of a competitive atmosphere resulting in higher fan interest and ultimately increased 
league revenues to be split among all the teams10. His social behaviour and keen business 
sense were enough to change a consensus of singular owner interests into one of 
cooperation for the good of the league (Harris, 1986). 
Decreasing Historical Continuity 
 A merger with another league that introduced a more collaborative culture into the 
NHL might act to erode the historical suspicions of individual owners and promote 
cooperation. Similarly, different labour practices in the merger partner might signal a 
need to reexamine existing approaches.  
 As mentioned earlier, the WHA merged with the NHL in 1979. The competing 
league did maintain one major social characteristic opposite to that institutionalized in the 
NHL. The new league didn’t operate with a reserve clause allowing players much more 
freedom in their movement around the league and resulting in higher salaries (Hunter & 
Weber, 2000; Kagan, 2001b). With the competition for players, this was one major 
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reason why the NHL had to revise their business structure and eliminate the clause 
(Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
 The WHA also realized that television was an important external dependency and 
placed teams in highly populated media oriented locations such as Houston, Phoenix, San 
Diego and Cleveland. The more media-savvy WHA also caused its pucks to be painted 
red and blue to address the concerns of viewers who complained that they could not 
follow them (Kagan, 2001b). Ultimately the idea was to develop a national following and 
reap the shared benefits of a big network television contract, but traditional hockey 
followers did not like the red and blue pucks (Kagan, 2001b). The WHA also sold the 
name of their championship trophy to Avco, a household finance company, and invested 
the proceeds into shared revenue for the league (Hunter & Weber, 2000) but that is 
basically where the cooperation ended.  
 When the WHA finally merged with the NHL in 1979, only six teams remained 
and only four, the Edmonton Oilers, Winnipeg Jets, Quebec Nordiques and Hartford 
Whalers, actually joined the National Hockey League (Kagan, 2001b). The WHA did 
help to deinstitutionalize the NHL, albeit very little. Although it had more to do with the 
competition and legal battle for players, the NHL dropped the use of their reserve clause. 
However the WHA had become poorly managed and was desperate to join the big league 
(Hunter & Weber, 2000; Kagan, 2001b). The NHL used this situation along with their 
authoritative power over the players to limit the changes they had to make to their 
business structure. And although it had more to do with the work of one new owner from 
the old WHA, Marcel Aubut of the Quebec Nordiques, as a result of his desire to sell his 
team’s television rights non-exclusively to Carling O’Keefe rather than the traditional 
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Molson who the Canadian teams had been working with for years, the NHL finally began 
to share national television rights equally across the league11 (Stein, 1997).  
Changing Institutional Rules and Values 
 Pressures by a relevant governing body that caused the NHL to conform to certain 
standards would be good examples of deinstitutionalization if they either eroded 
exploitive player reforms or promoted cooperation as a result of the dissipation of self-
serving interests by owners.  
 There are incidents in the National Hockey League whereby the courts have made 
decisions and recommendations that led to the abolishment of suppressive labour 
practices previously maintained by the league, however, little evidence suggests that 
outside governing bodies ever directly impacted the institution of self-serving owner 
interests. 
 In 1969, a Task Force on Sports in Canada did not like the aspect of the reserve 
clause that indicated a club could request that a player enter into a contract for the playing 
season under the same terms and conditions of the previous season’s contract with only 
salary being open to mutual agreement (Dworkin, 1981, p. 264). Since the player had 
nowhere to go if he did not agree to the owner’s salary recommendation, there was little 
room for negotiation. That was until 1969, when, as a result of the Task Force’s 
recommendation to change this clause to give the players more leeway in the negotiation 
of salary, the NHLPA convinced the league to agree to salary arbitration whereby an 
impartial arbitrator would settle salary disputes brought forth by players in certain 
instances. While it has been modified several times, this practice has been in effect ever 
since 1969 and allows the arbitrator to use impartiality in settling on a fair salary figure 
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lying somewhere in between the owner’s and player’s request (Berry et al., 1986, p. 209-
210). Since arbitrators can use other salaries for comparison, this practice has 
significantly inflated players’ income.  
In addition, mostly because of legal battles with the WHA, the courts sanctioned 
the NHL’s limited free agency practices in 1973 and, as a result, the reserve clause was 
subsequently dropped by the league and replaced with an option clause (Appendix Y) 
(Berry et al., 1986; Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). Similar erosions were also taking place in 
other leagues. Fueled by the leadership qualities of Marvin Miller, free agency in Major 
League Baseball was also adopted based on a groundbreaking court decision that found 
the wording in the reserve clause required a player to remain on his team for only one 
extra year after his contract expired (Appendix M) (Berry et al., 1986; Miller, 1991). 
Finally, NFL players obtained liberalized free agency through the influence of a National 
Football League Players Association (NFLPA) antitrust suit court decision that stated the 
NFL’s free agency system was in violation of the antitrust laws. In this case, the hard 
salary cap was also negotiated based on this decision (Appendix V) (Dworkin & 
Posthuma, 2002).  
Increasing Structural Disaggregation 
 An organization that develops a physically dispersed and locally differentiated 
structure sometimes sees traditional practices erode away in order to accommodate its 
new formation (Oliver, 1992). The best application of this concept to the institution of the 
NHL would be an argument that, as a result of expansion, the ability of the original 
owners to collude has been steadily eroded dissipating restrictive practices and creating a 
better livelihood for players and resulting in a more cooperative environment.  
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 The NHL has undergone several waves of expansion thereby creating more jobs 
for professional hockey players but no evidence really exists to suggest that expansion 
resulted in a collectively better livelihood for the mass, just more professional hockey 
careers in an elite league.  
 In terms of a cooperative environment, expansion has always been a concept that 
the majority of the Board of Governors has agreed upon at any given time because of the 
incredible source of one-time revenue it creates for the whole league. In addition, putting 
hockey teams in television friendly cities creates an opportunity for increased interest in 
the game thereby generating a chance for a big national television contract that the whole 
league can share in (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 1997).  
 This was the case in the first wave of expansion during 1967 whereby $2 million 
was the entrance fee and television friendly cities such as LA and Philadelphia were 
selected. And in the 1990s, the price had increased to between $50 and $80 million 
dollars. A total of nine teams were inducted from good television markets such as 
Atlanta, Florida and Anaheim (Shoalts, 2003, January 22; Stein, 1997). Appendix Q 
describes some of the television deals struck in the midst of the 1990s expansion wave. 
 In addition, the NHL ownership group has grown to represent thirty teams 
compared to six in the pre-expansion days. Individual interests have been diluted severely 
as an owner’s vote holds one-sixth the value it used to. Cooperation becomes an 
automatic necessity and increased deinstitutionalization in that direction is necessary to 
support teams in non-traditional hockey cities like Nashville and Tampa Bay.  
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Inertial Effects 
 The NHL has taken many steps toward deinstitutionalizing into a cooperative 
entity and there is no question that player compensation has increased dramatically to 
become fairly even with other big-league salaries. This section will explain why the NHL 
has not deinstitutionalized further to become an organization similar to the other North 
American big leagues with their very liberal free agency rules and additional cooperation 
between owners. 
 To recap, inertia suggests that institutionalized activities will exhibit inevitable 
resistance to change (Oliver, 1992). Organizational individuals might possess preferences 
for consistency in their actions over time and perceive that continuous commitment to the 
same activities will reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Staw, 1981).  
 NHL players made their first attempt to form a union in 1957 but failed. The 
owners did everything in their power to prevent the formation of the new association and, 
in exchange for very few concessions, the players finally buckled under the owners’ 
pressure (Appendix Z) (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). The league thought that if a union was 
formed, salaries would skyrocket and teams would go bankrupt. By adhering to the status 
quo and continuing to exploit players, the owners felt safe that uncertainty would remain 
at a minimum and the league would stay profitable.  
 Ten years later, the players were successful in forming a union and they appointed 
a man by the name of Alan Eagleson as their Executive Director. However, Eagleson 
only worked in a part-time capacity and did not maintain the leadership qualities of a 
Marvin Miller or Bob Goodenow. He talked down to the players in a mixed form of 
legalese and insults and did not empower them to become united and fight for their rights 
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(Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). Eagleson preferred to please the owners rather than his own 
constituents (Appendix AA) while negotiations remained quite placid (Appendix AB) 
(Berry et. al, 1986; Stein, 1997). He never questioned owners’ claims that the league was 
in trouble and did little to advance the players in the area of free agency. Instead, he 
would negotiate increases in the pension fund along with privileges to play international 
hockey (from which he himself profited significantly) (Appendix K) (Berry et al., 1986; 
Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Houston & Shoalts, 1993; Staudohar, 1996). Eagleson’s 
leadership was very inertial because he would always convince the players that the 
owners were in dire straits and for the good of the game, the players should not push for 
free agency otherwise team finances might begin to dry up (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). He 
too seemed uncertain of what change would bring to the financial stability of the league 
and his powerful leadership prevented the players from standing up for their rights.  
Clarence Campbell was the president of the NHL for over 30 years and his job 
was to do little more than to keep the players in line. He did not lead the owners into the 
new generation of professional sports or develop a cooperative attitude. From his two-
person office, Campbell did not attempt to adapt the game of hockey to television nor did 
he promote expansion. Campbell would mostly insist that expansion or adaptability to 
television’s schedules would cause too many travel problems even though things were 
working fine in other leagues. Expansion finally took place but it was mostly due to the 
threat of a rival league (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). Campbell was more of a reactionary 
and rarely behaved proactively. He respected the status quo and did as little as possible to 
change things thereby reducing uncertainty for the league.  
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 Other than developing a professional office by hiring several vice-presidents, 
John Ziegler Jr. did little more than Campbell to create a “good for the league” attitude 
among owners. He also did little to advance the league in the area of marketing and 
television therefore very little cooperative revenue was generated under his regime 
(Appendix AC) (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Fischler, 1995; Staudohar, 1996; Stein, 1997). 
Ziegler thought small and honestly thought it was better to promote NHL hockey in local 
television markets (Appendix P) (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994; Houston, 2003, January 20; 
Staudohar, 1996) while every other league was looking nationally.  
 Sometimes, the need to deinstitutionalize is recognized but immobilized by the 
perception that it will be costly or by a lack of expertise or understanding of how to 
achieve it (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).  
 By 1994, the average salary in the NHL was $560,000 per year (Kagan, 2001b) 
and the owners felt it was time to artificially restrain escalating salaries (Fischler, 1995; 
Staudohar, 1996). This created a huge barrier in the union’s attempt to negotiate anything 
in the area of increased free agency privileges. In fact, the owners delayed 
deinstitutionalization by recommending a luxury tax on top of limited free agency 
(Staudohar, 1996). 
 The large market owners have always felt that sharing their local revenue among 
the rest of the league is a costly solution (Shoalts, 2003, January 18). They also feel it is a 
complicated system and are uncertain as to what the results will bring (MacDonald, 2003, 
January 27). Instead, they look to the players for a solution that will curb their own 
spending. The union did not waiver in its refusal to accept the league’s proposed luxury 
tax, however, after a four-month lockout, they did take a few steps back in the area of 
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free agency and other previous concessions (Appendix AD) (Fischler, 1995; Friedman, 
2003, February 1; Staudohar, 1996).  
 In his article, The Impact of Corporate Ownership on Labor-Management 
Relations in Hockey, Rob Beamish (1991) suggests that owners in professional sports 
have the capital, resources and ability to withstand a strike or lockout longer than the 
players mostly due to the fact that they have other business interests to fall back on. The 
players, however, as well paid as they are, cannot afford to stay out of work for too long, 
as careers are short and lost earnings pile up fast. This more than likely had an effect on 
their ability to negotiate more concessions and ultimately control in 1995. 
With the current CBA set to expire in September of 2004, the owners are again 
pushing for a cost certainty solution whereby the players would agree to a mechanism to 
control salaries. Gary Bettman and the majority of Governors feel this is a legitimate and 
necessary answer to restricting the habits of 30 competitive owners all spending in 
pursuit of the Stanley Cup. For years, the league attempted to reduce uncertainty by 
adhering to the status quo and refusing serious gains for free agency. However, salaries 
still went up and now the owners are looking to the players to stray away from the status 
quo and adopt another form of cost restraint besides limited free agency (Appendix AE) 
(Friedman, 2003, February 1; Shoalts, 2003, January 18).  
The union argues that the owners control all the revenue that comes into the 
league along with the expenses that go out. They simply want the league to reevaluate the 
distribution method of their revenues and agree to some sort of sharing scheme but the 
large market owners refuse claiming it will cost too much, reduce the value of their 
teams, possibly allow too many free riders and the results it will bring remain uncertain 
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(Appendix AE) (Brender, 2003, January 3; Friedman, 2003, February 1; MacDonald, 
2003, January 27 Shoalts, 2003, January 18; Talalay & Russo, 2003, February 3).  
 The next chapter will provide recommendations to the union and league that 
would bring about financial and competitive stability. The deinstitutionalization pressures 
described throughout this chapter that were absent or insufficiently strong are reevaluated 
and suggestions for the implementation of practices to bring about the necessary change 
resulting in further control for players and additional cooperation between owners will be 
discussed. 
 68 
                                                               
Chapter 4 – Discussion and Recommendations 
The first chapter of this paper discussed why it is important for the NHL to 
improve its business structure from a Canadian perspective. That was followed by a 
review of the literature. The third chapter analyzed how the NHL’s current business 
structure and performance problems evolved using the concept of deinstitutionalization 
including some specific events and leaders over time that enabled the other three major 
leagues to deinstitutionalize into cooperative entities with increased gains for the players. 
In order to curb the financial disparities and competitive differences in the NHL, this last 
chapter will consider selected antecedents either insufficient or absent with respect to 
deinstitutionalization in addition to inertial forces discussed in chapter three. It will then 
make recommendations for the NHL based on these findings, past studies outlined in the 
literature review, the history of the NHL’s economic system and mechanisms employed 
by the other North American major sports leagues. Where feasible, insights into possible 
implementation will be provided based on the deinstitutionalization thrust of this inquiry. 
Selected Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization 
Conflicting Internal Interests 
 Examples in chapter three surrounding this antecedent illustrated that NHL 
players have expressed dissent over the years in terms of the restrictive practices 
employed by the league and have used collective bargaining as a medium to divest 
themselves of these mechanisms. However, in almost every set of collective bargaining 
negotiations since 1975, the players have been limited to minor gains, especially in the 
area of free agency (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Staudohar, 1996). Even though the 
NHLPA enjoys other mechanisms in the CBA used to increase salaries (National Hockey 
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League Collective Bargaining Agreement, n.d.), no other league has managed to keep 
free agency as restrictive as the NHL. Further, the main reason salary arbitration was 
instituted can be attributed to the 1969 Task Force on Sports in Canada that was critical 
of the reserve clause in the NHL’s standard players’ contract (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
Even so, during the last set of negotiations, the owners were successful in limiting both 
these mechanisms somewhat (Staudohar, 1996). 
 The literature review stated that the dawn of free agency in professional sports 
leagues has not really impacted competitive balance in a negative way, and most studies 
along with general observations indicate it has actually increased competitiveness 
(Miller, 1991; Quirk, & Fort, 1992; Zimbalist, 1992). Marvin Miller, the initial leader of 
the MLBPA, was the first Executive Director of a North American major sports league to 
negotiate free agency. He realized that total free agency would result in an influx of 
available players thereby negating the objective of raising player salaries. Luckily, the 
majority of owners never picked up on this basic supply and demand theory and Miller 
used his gut feeling to negotiate a six-year tenure for players before they could become 
unrestricted free agents (Miller, 1991). Twenty years later, John Vrooman (1996) did a 
scientific study and found that, in 1994, four years was the optimal tenure for a player to 
remain tied to a team before becoming a free agent. This amount of time, combined with 
the elimination of salary arbitration in years four, five and six of a player’s career, would 
allow the team to recoup training and conditioning expenses from the player while 
maintaining an optimal competitive and financial balance throughout MLB.  
 With continuing salary inflation over the last nine years, Vrooman’s same study 
might elicit different results, but, in accordance with the evidence, one way for the NHL 
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to improve financial and competitive imbalance while deinstitutionalizing further to 
reveal a league with more freedom and control for its players would be to drastically 
reduce salary arbitration and restrictions for free agency. Salary arbitration is an 
inflationary process as it elevates salaries to correspond to the highest incomes earned by 
star players. Eliminating or severely containing it while decreasing free agency 
restrictions would increase the supply of available players thereby reducing salaries 
because teams would have more players to bid for. This would reveal the truer market 
value of a player with the increased ability for small market teams to maintain or 
purchase talent.  
As evidenced in the last chapter, even though conflict exists over the issue of 
sharing local revenue, the small market owners have yet to develop enough power or 
visibility to convince the large market owners that the idea will result in a stronger 
league. Most large market owners cannot see the financial and competitive results this 
mechanism would bring and maintain the institutionalized belief that giving up a part of 
local revenue will negatively affect their bottom line equal to the portion they have to 
share. It is imperative for the small markets to rise up and illustrate to the large markets 
that the league itself is only as strong as the small market franchises (Naylor, 2003, 
January 21).  
Revenue sharing must be seen as an investment in the viability of the whole, not 
as a handout to poor performers. An easy parallel here is the Canadian system of 
provincial transfer payments wherein monies flow from provinces with large budgetary 
surpluses like Alberta to poorer provinces like Newfoundland in the interests of 
maintaining a stronger Canada. However, the often vocal categorizations of the ‘have-
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nots’ as free riders by the ‘haves’ and the absence of a similar state to state transfer 
mechanism in the US point to fundamental barriers surrounding such ‘socialist’ ideals. 
This is evident in comments iterated by general managers such as Boston’s Harry Sinden 
who referred to the sharing of local revenues by saying, ‘“I thought communism died. 
You won’t see it revived in the NHL.”’ (Fischler, 1995, p. 167) Or that of former New 
Jersey Devils majority owner John McMullen who alluded to Edmonton, Quebec, 
Hartford and Winnipeg and said, ‘“To hell with the small markets.”’ (Fischler, 1995, p. 
182) Evidently, with the exception of Edmonton, those cities now find themselves 
without NHL hockey. 
Pete Rozelle probably had less data than is currently available to professional 
sport team owners and yet he convinced the NFL that “League Think” would maintain 
competitive balance and make the game more attractive to its dependencies, which in 
turn, would add value to the league and increase revenues among all the teams (Harris, 
1986). In addition, almost all the academics (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Jennett, 1984; 
Marburger, 1997; Mason, 1997) discussed in chapter two agreed that revenue sharing 
would lead to increases in competitive balance and/or financial stability. The mechanics 
to implement a new system that might lead to a financially stable and competitive league 
by deinstitutionalizing the owners into a more cooperative conglomerate are discussed in 
the section on Increasing Technical Specificity.  
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Changing External Dependencies 
Gary Bettman has done an excellent job in his cooperative negotiations with 
television networks and, as a result, the amount of money each team receives from 
national broadcasts has increased dramatically. However, the NHL still derives the 
majority of its revenue from ticket sales and other local sources and the financial 
disparities between large and small markets continue to grow. In order to further 
deinstitutionalize into a cooperative entity, the NHL needs to generate an even larger 
source of revenue from national television and marketing. They might do this by 
marketing hockey for the great game that it is while tweaking some aspects to make it 
even more appealing to the casual viewer.  
The National Hockey League is one of the most important institutions to 
Canadians, however, ranks a distant fourth in the US among North American major 
league sports (Houston, 2003, January 20). With a population ten times that of Canada, 
the US is where a lot of the external television market lies. Over the years, the media has 
consistently maintained that one major reason for American non-interest in the game is 
the fact that hockey is the only sport where players do not get ejected for fighting (Klein 
& Reif, 1998). If the league really wants to attract the American casual viewer, it has to 
consider abolishing this institutionalized and traditional practice. Most Canadians and 
almost all of the players would disagree, however, Americans have continually told the 
media that fighting is one major reason why they will not watch hockey. In terms of 
national television revenue, football is currently number one in the US (Houston, 2003, 
January 20) and with a guaranteed tackle almost every play, it seems as though 
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Americans are not against the rough stuff. Therefore, body checking without the fisticuffs 
in hockey might very well attract the casual American viewer (Klein & Reif, 1998). 
For years now the NHL has been trying to crack down on the hooking and 
holding taking place in the neutral zone during hockey games (Klein & Reif, 1998). This 
tactic is arguably reserved for the less competent and, in many instances, lower payroll 
teams, in an attempt to slow down highly skilled and offensive players giving themselves 
a chance to win. To combat this problem, the NHL has started calling “obstruction 
penalties” which are holding, tripping or interference infractions that happen away from 
the puck and mostly in the neutral zone. However, many players tend to go down quite 
easily when they feel a stick against their body. As a result, referees are also allowed to 
use their discretion to either negate the penalty or call a diving infraction. However, some 
players fall quite convincingly making it difficult for an official to tell the difference 
between a legitimate hook and a dive. So where is the happy medium? How does the 
league strike a balance between knowing when to call legitimate penalties, when to call 
diving or when to let it go?  
This is an issue that many stakeholders in the NHL have wrestled with for years. 
A simple answer dates back to the 1950s and 1960s when skilled players seemed to skate 
around inferior opponents with the greatest of ease because they would not get hooked 
down or slashed across the legs (Klein & Reif, 1998). If the defensive player did not take 
the offensive skater with his body, and was beaten, he still might be able to do something 
like turn around, chase the man down and dive beside him while swiping at the puck with 
his stick. If he was unsuccessful, the offensive player generally had a chance to score or 
make a good pass. Now, stick-work on the body has come to be known as good defense, 
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however, is still against the rules (Klein & Reif, 1998). In order to allow every skater the 
opportunity to play on a level playing field without the necessity for the referees to crawl 
inside their heads and decide if they fell on purpose or were forced down, every time a 
player touches an opposing player with his stick thereby impeding movement in any way, 
he should be penalized. Eventually the players would know that all stick-work is 
considered a penalty, resulting in its drastic reduction. This would speed up the game 
through the neutral zone allowing more appealing plays at breakneck speeds. The game 
would become more attractive to casual viewers thereby increasing its value to television 
advertisers. As a result, national broadcast revenue and shared income would rise.  
With all the franchises in the league now, many teams only play each other once 
per year. This does little to generate fierce rivalries and fan interest. The NHL might 
consider separating the Eastern and Western Conferences into two leagues, which would 
result in more games between the same teams whereby a friendly hatred would emerge 
more frequently among clubs making for really exciting and passionate hockey. Inter-
league games, much like what MLB has adopted, could make up for the loss of certain 
cross conference matches previously enjoyed by fans and teams alike. For example, 
Montreal and Toronto, being in the east, could still play teams like Edmonton and 
Calgary in the west by way of inter-league games and the fan and player interest 
generated by these games would remain.  
The NHL is the only major sports league in North America in which the regular 
season games have a possibility of ending in a tie. This also does little to generate the 
casual fan’s interest. The NHL has attempted to combat this issue by reducing the amount 
of skaters to four during a five-minute overtime period. This creates more room on the ice 
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to skate and the idea is to generate more scoring chances. Teams are also awarded one 
point in the standings after a regulation tie. The basis for this idea was to give teams the 
motivation to go for the win knowing they already have a guaranteed point. However, 
even with this alteration, the proportion of games ending in a tie has not changed 
dramatically. The number remains at about 12% (Klein & Reif, 2000), however, from 
personal observation, chances have increased noticeably. The NHL might consider 
keeping the existing rules although increasing the overtime session to ten minutes or 
perhaps a full extra period. Some hockey people have suggested shootouts after five 
minutes of overtime (Houston, 2003, January 20). This would really excite fans as a 
winner is guaranteed but many traditionalists are not yet sold on the idea.  
Many other ideas have been tossed around suggesting ways to improve the game 
such as decreasing the size of goalie equipment, widening the nets or decreasing the size 
of the posts to enhance scoring. With the exception of maybe decreasing the size of 
goalie equipment to the point that the netminder is fully protected without actually using 
his extra equipment as an advantage, most of these ideas begin to take away from the 
roots of the game and are probably not necessary. The most important thing to do is bring 
out the speed and the skills in the elite hockey players. Out of the four major North 
American sports, hockey is by far the fastest and the NHL has to find a way to expose 
this trait once again. Then they have to advertise this asset to the world and use their 
European connection in terms of players as an advantage over the NFL, NBA and MLB. 
Even if the league does not ban fighting, they still have to market the game and the 
marquee players extensively and show the US and the rest of the world how fast and 
exciting this game really is. Only then will attraction to the game increase enough to 
 76 
                                                               
possibly generate national television contracts in the same vicinity enjoyed by MLB or 
the NBA. This would result in much more cooperation at the league level as each team 
would depend more on this league generated revenue.  
Increasing Technical Specificity 
 Given the very clear point presented in the paper up to here illustrating that the 
other major sports leagues in North America have found and agreed to processes that 
attempt to achieve the organizational goals of competitive balance and financial stability, 
there seems to be little reason the NHL cannot use some of these specific practices. In 
fact, the failure of the NHL to do so suggests that implementation issues should figure 
prominently in any discussion of how the situation might improve. As it was noted above 
that the NHL could learn much from how other leagues have addressed similar problems, 
the specific mechanisms are described in more detail below with a focus on their 
compatibility with the NHL. Following this discussion of the content of proposed 
changes and a review of the remaining forces, a process for their implementation by the 
league is considered as a mandate for Gary Bettman. 
In terms of models for possible change, the NHL might want to pay particular 
attention to the structures and systems in place in the NFL and MLB, which include 
considerably more local revenue sharing than the NBA. MLB’s new system has not been 
in place long enough so the results cannot yet be measured, however, the NFL has been 
using the same revenue sharing system for over 40 years now and the liberalized free 
agency in exchange for salary cap rules were added 10 years ago (Dworkin & Posthuma, 
2002). The results illustrate that the NFL is the most financially and competitively 
balanced league.  
 77 
                                                               
In following the hypothesis of this paper and comparing the NHL to the three 
other major leagues, NHL owners have to increase their cooperation substantially more 
than they have in previous years before they should expect the players to agree to any 
more cost restraints. Sports economist Andrew Zimbalist agrees and notes the league 
currently shares less than 10% compared to 63% in the NFL, 35% in the NBA and now 
34% in MLB (Waldie, 2003, January 22). But even though the NFL and NBA share 
significantly more revenue, two of the major sources they draw from, national television 
broadcasts and league marketing, are the same sources the NHL shares. The difference is 
that the NFL and NBA enjoy significantly more income from these sources (Kagan, 
2001a; Kagan, 2002; Kagan, 2001b). In saying this though, the NFL still shares in local 
ticket revenue along with all television broadcasts and MLB has recently adopted a local 
revenue sharing plan (Kagan, 2002; Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, n.d.), hereinafter known as “(MLB CBA, n.d.)”. It is well within the 
boundaries of the NHL to do the same.  
This section will first analyze a more technically specific league using only the 
owners’ suggested solution of cost certainty. Three slightly different approaches to this 
concept have been taken in the NBA, NFL and MLB.  
 First, the NBA employs what is called a soft salary cap. This basically means that 
the maximum a team can set their payroll at amounts to a designated percentage of league 
gross revenues. The calculation of revenues involves a complicated set of calculations 
beyond the scope of this paper, however, when all is said and done, each team is 
supposed to adhere to the calculated cap (NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, n.d.), 
hereinafter known as “(NBA CBA, n.d.)”. With this soft system comes a plethora of 
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loopholes such as allowing any player to join the payroll at the minimum salary and the 
ability for teams to keep certain players even though their salaries will exceed the cap 
(Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002, NBA CBA, n.d.). As a result, payrolls are still widely 
diverse as illustrated in Table 8. During the 2000-01 season, the lowest payroll was $25.2 
million and the highest was $87.2 million. Obviously, quite a disparity still exists, 
however, most of the payrolls were in the $40 and $50 million range. In addition, starting 
in 2001-02, teams exceeding the cap after accounting for the loopholes have had to pay a 
luxury tax to the NBA which is usually used to help out the less fortunate teams (NBA 
CBA, n.d.).  
Should the NHL adopt a system similar to this without revenue sharing, it is quite 
possible that the larger market teams would use the loopholes to their advantage resulting 
in a continued competitive imbalance and financial disparity (Fort & Quirk, 1995). 
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that competitive balance in the NBA has not improved since the 
adoption of the pay scales in 1998-99. Financial balance was still unstable across the 
league in 2000-01 as evidenced in Appendix H and even though there was a fair amount 
of shared revenue, it was consistent across the league and the loopholes in the salary cap 
provided the large market teams with an added advantage in acquiring talent. There is no 
telling how the luxury tax will affect things but it did not lower salaries after its first year 
of employment. If the league deinstitutionalized into a more cooperate conglomerate and 
local revenue sharing was adopted, league-wide performance would probably increase 
significantly.  
Second, the NFL employs a hard salary cap, which basically means there are 
fewer loopholes and stricter rules surrounding each team’s adherence to it (NFL 
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Collective Bargaining Agreement, n.d.), hereinafter known as “(NFL CBA, n.d.)”. The 
disparity between the lowest payroll of $55.3 million and the highest payroll of $92.4 
million in 2000-01 as evidenced in Table 5 illustrates slightly less of a difference than 
that of the NBA and most of the payrolls were in the $60 to $70 million range. The large 
amount of shared revenue allows the NFL to institute a hard cap while remaining fair to 
the players and most of the teams resulting in a financial and competitive balance. 
With the tendency for payrolls in both the NBA and NFL to concentrate in one 
area with only a few obvious outliers, it is apparent that even with the loopholes these are 
effective methods to control salaries. With no salary cap, payrolls in the NHL were 
grouped throughout the $20, $30, $40 and $50 million dollar range in 2000-01. 
Therefore, the NHL could very well limit the spending habits of some teams by 
employing this mechanism but without revenue sharing the cap would have to be set at a 
number low enough so that the smallest market could afford to ice a competitive team 
while remaining financially viable. According to Tables 10, 11 and 12, in 2000-01, 
Calgary and Buffalo still lost money with payrolls of $30.2 and $39.6 million 
respectively even though attendance was in the high 90s in terms of percent of capacity. 
It appears they did their best to maximize revenue but still fell short. Therefore, any type 
of cap would have had to been set as low as $30 million for these two teams, among 
others, to have had a fair chance of competing for the same type of players the large 
markets were able to attract. However, two problems arise with a system like this when it 
does not include revenue sharing. 
First, as mentioned earlier, the loopholes are more advantageous to the large 
market clubs and second; it transfers even more revenue into the pockets of the big 
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markets. Since ticket sales among other revenue sources are based on market demand and 
not player salaries (Quirk & Fort, 1999), the large market clubs will continue to enjoy the 
same revenues, however, the reduction in expenses results in higher profits. Because the 
salary cap really has not resulted in a drop in player expenses for the small market clubs, 
they will continue to lose money or make very little. This mechanism by itself really isn’t 
fair to the players or the small markets since the large markets would not enjoy the 
revenues they do without the existence of these two parties.  
Finally, baseball adopted a luxury tax in 1995 that levies higher payroll teams to 
subsidize lower payroll teams. This mechanism was new to North American major league 
sports and did not seem to work too well by itself (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002), so 
baseball decided to include a local revenue sharing plan in the following collective 
bargaining agreement to go along with the tax (MLB CBA, n.d.). The luxury tax also has 
the tendency to suppress salaries as all teams want to keep their payroll low in order to 
avoid paying the tax (Sheehan, 1996) and, again, really is not fair to the players, however, 
it does potentially help out small markets more than the other two mechanisms in that 
they actually receive additional revenue thereby increasing their ability to compete for 
talented and experienced players. This mechanism is a possibility for the NHL, however, 
as with baseball, a revenue sharing scheme must accompany it. 
In light of this information, in order to achieve financial and competitive balance, 
the NHL has to deinstitutionalize further to reveal more cooperation among owners. 
Local revenue sharing has to be adopted. First, the evidence presented throughout this 
paper has pointed to the fact that the players have received very little of their increased 
gains through collective bargaining and therefore the owners must first devise a system 
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on their own to combat the financial and competitive balance problem in the NHL before 
looking to the players for more solutions. Second, revenue sharing can control 
competitive balance and financial stability without a cost restraint (Marburger, 1997) but 
for reasons stated above, the opposite is not true. As evidenced by Appendix T, owners 
will generally strive to make a profit (Quirk & Fort, 1999). Therefore, if each owner has 
less to spend, he will probably reduce his payroll. Also, not considering enforcement 
issues, if a smaller market owner has more to spend, he will increase his payroll to add 
more talent and improve the team. Therefore, if it was a perfect world and a league 
shared all revenues, based on the theory of MRP (marginal revenue product) and 
professional team sports (Quirk & Fort, 1999) and not taking into account the differences 
in other team expenses, each franchise would have about the same chance to compete for 
the same players negating any kind of correlation between team salaries and win/loss 
percentage. Add in Vrooman’s (1996) findings on free agency and a league would be 
financially and competitively stable with total revenue sharing and very liberal free 
agency. Finally, since the product produced by a sports league is athletic competition and 
necessitates two teams competing against each other (Roberts, 1991), each team should 
theoretically receive at least the direct revenue derived from each match. 
This paper proposes several revenue sharing solutions and the results are outlined 
in Table 13 using the NHL’s 2000-01 financial figures. All are within the capacity of the 
NHL to achieve. The first solution is based on the gate-sharing scheme used in the NFL 
as well as the findings of Fort and Quirk (1995). The authors suggest that gate-sharing 
alone will not achieve competitive balance nor will it enhance league-wide profits and, in 
fact, local television revenue sharing is also necessary. The evidence presented in this 
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paper on the NFL corroborates this. Since each person watching each game is enjoying 
the athletic competition derived from the product, the direct revenues created should go 
to each team. Table 13 outlines the NHL’s results using a 60-40 gate (after 15% is 
deducted from home gate receipts for administration purposes) along with 50% local 
television sharing scheme. Toronto is the biggest subsidizer as their revenues drop $11.6 
million, however, with the exception of a few franchises, most would share very little and 
two-thirds of the league actually receive money including Bill Wirtz of Chicago, one of 
the biggest critics of revenue sharing (Stein, 1997).  
The next two solutions are adapted from baseball’s latest CBA whereby 34% of 
local revenue is contributed to a central fund and the results show that slightly more is 
shared than in the first solution. Erring on the side of caution, the examples presented in 
Table 13 were calculated by reducing the entire revenue figure for each NHL team by 
34%, adding the results together then dividing the pool equally among all the teams. The 
small market franchises usually end up with a net gain in revenue and the large market 
teams a net loss. The results favour small market teams additionally when that number is 
increased to 40%.  
Finally, considering the union did propose an amendment to the owners’ original 
proposal of a luxury tax during the lockout of 1994-95, the above three mechanisms were 
re-evaluated with the addition of the union’s luxury tax scheme. The union proposed that 
the top four spending teams pay a tax of 7%, the next four pay 5%, the next four pay 3% 
and the next four pay 1% on their total payrolls with the balance of this money going to 
help small market teams (Staudohar, 1996). Since one proposal in this paper is to relax 
the free agency rules drastically, it is probably safe to assume that even with a revenue 
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scheme by the owners that will depress salaries somewhat, the union would still agree to 
this very conservative luxury tax proposal. It is a form of cost certainty that seems to 
work best with the NHL’s situation and most of the owners should also agree to it. The 
examples including the luxury tax proposal presented in Table 13 were derived by taking 
the top 16 payrolls from Table 11, reducing each team’s corresponding shared revenue 
figure by the proper percentage and adding the results together. The income was then 
distributed evenly among the fourteen teams with the lowest payrolls.    
The final proposal in Table 13, which includes a 40% revenue sharing plan in 
combination with a luxury tax, is similar to Major League Baseball’s (MLB CBA, n.d.) 
and redistributes the most income from larger to smaller markets thereby leveling out the 
playing field and reducing disparities substantially. Only eleven teams would have 
actually shared their revenue in 2000-01, with eight of those franchises sharing well in 
excess of $2 million. These eight teams losing so much money is about the biggest reason 
why local revenue sharing is hard to adopt. In addition, this last example would have 
actually seen five out of the eleven sharing teams come away with a negative cash flow in 
2000-01. This really isn’t fair to the large market owners. However, with this system in 
place, salaries would surely subside (Quirk & Fort, 1999) to reflect an average more in 
line with total league revenue and based on the economic theory of professional team 
sport salaries (Quirk & Fort, 1999) save for the luxury tax, the players would receive 
their fair share, even more so if free agency was liberalized substantially. Instead of the 
New York Rangers spending $60 million on salaries in 2000-01, some of that money 
would have been transferred to the smaller markets (Naylor, 2003, January 21) and their 
profit margin would have remained on the positive side and probably close to $3.5 
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million. This leaves two other major problems inherent in revenue sharing, free riders and 
reduction in team values. 
With revenue sharing, each team’s financial success is dependant on the success 
of each and every other team within the league. The more income large markets can 
produce increases the amount received by a small market and the more revenue generated 
by a small market reduces the amount a large market has to share. In terms of each 
revenue sharing scheme discussed, many teams receive a substantial increase in revenue 
even though their own market is lagging.  
Using attendance, which is generated by ticket sales, the NHL’s number one 
source of revenue, and comparing Table 12 to Table 13, it is apparent that many teams 
with low attendance receive nice bonuses when revenue sharing is involved. For 
example, Carolina, with an average attendance of only 71.3% of capacity, would have 
received between $4.7 and $9.7 million extra with revenue sharing in 2000-01. In 
addition, large market teams might find it beneficial to not maximize revenues in order to 
also share income. Large market Chicago, with an average attendance of 73.2% of 
capacity in 2000-01 would have actually increased their revenue through the 60-40 ticket 
and 50% local television shared scheme by $2.9 million. Table 14 uses revenue figures 
from 1999-00 and illustrates this scenario best. The table is divided into revenue per team 
for 1999-00, revenue per team using the ticket/local television scheme and revenue per 
team using the same scheme assuming 100% attendance across the league. The bottom 13 
teams in the table illustrate that as revenue is shared, their own income is increased and 
as the league strives for 100% attendance or a maximization of revenues, their share rises 
even more. It is assumed these teams will strive to maximize the revenue in their own 
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market in order to reap the benefits of revenue sharing. The top five teams in the table 
slowly lose money as they have to share their income and even more so as the league 
strives for 100% attendance. It is assumed they will not strive as hard to maximize 
revenues because their benefit decreases as a result. These issues cause an enforcement 
problem. 
Simply enough, each team, be it in a wealthier or inferior market, has to 
understand the success of the league depends on their cooperation. A franchise that has 
the ability to generate millions of dollars more in luxury suite and ticket revenue has to 
continue to strive to achieve it for the good of the whole. The league itself might consider 
employing somebody with every team to ensure that each market is being utilized to its 
full potential while developing marketing ideas specific to each area. At first, some 
markets will not be as strong as others such as the case right now. However, if each team 
is given more of an equal chance to acquire similar players aided by a reduction in free 
agency restrictions, the league should become more competitive as long as the small 
market teams use the extra money to develop their team and not simply to improve 
profits (if they don’t, minimum payrolls might have to be instituted). For instance, the 
low payroll teams that are forced to depend on a defensive style of play to impede 
talented and offensively skilled players thereby giving themselves a chance to win might 
start to play more of a free-wheeling game because the teams have been evened out. 
Combine this with the suggestions proposed in the last section designed to improve the 
game itself and more fans will start to believe their team always has a legitimate shot to 
win an entertaining game.  
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As more fans in all areas start to enjoy the game of hockey, as exemplified by the 
NFL’s competitive balance and high attendance ratings, demand and revenues will 
increase giving more markets the ability to support themselves and the larger markets 
will have to share less and less. Some markets might never warm up to the game of 
hockey and their teams may have to move but with vigorous revenue sharing comes an 
improvement in competitive balance, which leads to a larger following, ultimately 
leading to an increase in television and marketing revenues. This would inflate the value 
of every team in the league.  
In the end, by deinstitutionalizing further to become more cooperative, the NHL 
will improve its competitive and therefore financial balance league wide and in the long 
run, the system is fair to everyone.  
Emerging Events and Data 
 Recall that one uncontrollable phenomenon evident in the NHL is the difference 
in value between the Canadian and American dollar. The NHL has attempted to combat 
this problem through a cooperative revenue sharing mechanism however the solution 
barely makes up for the impact felt by Canadian teams. A new league wide revenue 
sharing scheme would probably reduce the acceptance of the Group II Equalization and 
Supplemental Currency Assistance Plans thereby reducing the new revenue figures 
calculated in Table 13 for small market Canadian teams by $2 or $3 million so, perhaps, 
there is an additional solution that lies outside the boundaries of the NHL. 
The government of Canada has said that until the NHL comes up with a viable 
solution to help keep Canadian small market teams financially stable, they will not invest 
another penny of taxpayer money into the league (MacDonald, 2003, January 27; Public 
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Policy Forum, 1999). The evidence presented in this paper illustrates that even with 
various solutions adopted by the league, small market Canadian teams will still have a 
problem remaining viable due to the currency difference.  One solution proposed by 
Brian Burke, the general manager of the Vancouver Canucks, is to use Canadian lottery 
money generated from NHL games to assist Canadian franchises. Since the money is 
produced using NHL schedules and results, it is essentially derived from the pockets of 
NHL fans and directing it towards helping Canadian NHL teams combat the currency 
problem is not synonymous with taking funds that would otherwise be used for 
healthcare and other social programs (MacDonald, 2003, January 27).  
Part of the $300 million generated each year (MacDonald, 2003, January 27) 
could be used strictly to pay the currency difference on player salaries. This number 
amounted to $125 million in 2001-02 for all six Canadian teams. In order to qualify for 
this scheme, teams might have to reach a reasonable season ticket target and maintain 
revenues below the league average similar to the qualifying procedure in the NHL’s 
current program (Public Policy Forum, 1999). Since betting on NHL games is somehow 
related to fan interest, a reduction in Canadian teams would surely reduce the amount of 
total revenue from such lotteries. With the aforementioned plan, the government would 
still receive excess money to invest in social programs while helping to keep the lottery 
revenue generating teams viable.   
Increasing Structural Disaggregation 
 The league has expanded into markets that are new to hockey and has to develop 
a cooperative plan by involving the solutions mentioned in this chapter in order to grow 
the game in new areas. Once the fans see that their city has a competitive team, attraction 
 88 
                                                               
to the game will increase (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994) and so will the strength of the 
market resulting in a growth in league revenues. Appendix AF makes a strong argument 
for this case by comparing different cultures that were new to professional hockey in the 
early 1990s.  
The Other Pressures 
Obviously, the solutions mentioned throughout this chapter that aim to create a 
financially and competitively balanced league through increased concessions for the 
players and cooperative mechanisms among the owners are based on the mounting 
performance problems evident in the NHL. Some pressures, though, have either exercised 
their full effect already, no longer exist, or are not relevant to the NHL’s situation.   
First, there is really no cooperative innovation or innovative concession that will 
create a competitively and financially balanced league because the two main parties, 
owners and players, will always exist, each with relative power.  
As for changing economic utility, based on the theory of MRP and a professional 
athlete’s salary, most owners will now continue to pay their players based on the revenue 
derived by them while maintaining some profit (Quirk & Fort, 1999) regardless of the 
cooperative mechanisms employed.  
Third, in order to combat any pressures created by competition for resources, 
another professional league with the stature of the NHL would have to exist to compete 
for players. While this is not the case right now, a new WHA is set to begin play in 2004 
(Karl, 2003, May 2). Should the league become as prominent as it did in the 1970s, the 
NHL might be forced to maintain their stature through cooperative mechanisms and 
concessions for the players, however, it does not seem as though that will be necessary. 
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The new WHA will employ a $10 million salary cap thus reducing competition for 
players (Karl, 2003, May 2). A subsequent merger by the two leagues might result in 
similar changes and thus a decrease in historical continuity, however, based on the former 
evidence, a merger is not likely.  
Finally, should a strike or lockout ensue with one party claiming that the other 
refuses to bargain in good faith such was the case in MLB (Miller, 1991) or if the players 
bring forward an antitrust lawsuit similar to some of the cases in the NBA or NFL 
(Staudohar, 1996), a new precedent might force the owners to agree on a cooperative 
system with some form of cost certainty while allowing the players increased liberality in 
terms of free agency. 
Implementation: The Kotter Model 
 Gary Bettman’s positive attitude has provided the league with excellent leadership 
over the last ten years resulting in additional shared revenue in the form of expansion 
income along with significantly more revenue derived from national television. However, 
there are no signs that the NHL will be expanding any more in the near future nor should 
they. And if television ratings continue to decline, the national broadcast deals will 
become smaller and smaller (Houston, 2003, January 20). It is time for Bettman to lead 
the owners into a cooperative revenue sharing system similar to one of the solutions 
described above in order to combat some of the financial disparities among franchises 
and create a more competitively balanced league.  
 John Kotter (1996) developed an eight-stage process most organizations should 
follow when embarking on change of massive proportions. With the expiry of the current 
CBA only a year away, Bettman does not have adequate time to convince 30 owners that 
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the long standing practice of not sharing local revenue needs to be changed, however, 
using Kotter’s (1996) advice, he can initiate the momentum.  
 Of course, initiating change in a professional sports league in today’s age usually 
requires collective bargaining on the part of the owners and players, however, the 
Executive Director of the NHLPA, Bob Goodenow, has given the league the green light 
to develop their own revenue sharing plan (Sullivan, 2003, March 31). In response to this, 
Gary Bettman is only interested in cost certainty at this time and instead wants to meet 
with the union as soon as possible (Friedman, 2003, February 1) to commence 
negotiations on that issue. As illustrated previously, in order to fully deinstitutionalize, 
local revenue sharing is a must for the NHL. Bettman should initiate it immediately.  
Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
This is the first step in Kotter’s (1996) change process. Essentially, it is important 
for managers to present a crisis or a set of opportunities to the senior staff in order to 
convince the organization that change is required. Concrete data and hard facts are 
necessary to negate any refutation of the evidence.  
NHL owners are aware that a problem exists and Appendices C through G of this 
paper illustrate the financial stability and competitive balance problems apparent in the 
league. The problem is the owners are almost unanimous on the solution, which amounts 
to a form of cost certainty (Friedman, 2003, February 1; MacDonald, 2003, January 27).  
Creating the Guiding Coalition 
 It is essential for the managers leading change to develop a partnership with 
several experts in the organization who maintain leadership and management skills. 
 91 
                                                               
Within this group, it is important to establish trust in combination with a common goal 
that is both sensible and appealing (Kotter, 1996).  
Gary Bettman would not have a problem selling the idea of local revenue sharing 
to the twenty plus owners who will benefit immediately from the solution. However, it is 
the five, six or seven large market owners who refuse to give up a portion of their profits 
that makes the plan hard to adopt. Bettman has to find two or three smart and prudent 
large market owners who have the league’s interests at heart and understand that this idea 
will benefit everyone and increase the value of all NHL teams in the long run. It has been 
suggested that Ed Snider, governor for the Philadelphia Flyers, would perhaps buy into a 
local revenue sharing system that works for the league while reducing costs for his own 
club (MacDonald, 2003, January 27). Large market owners with this type of vision are 
who Bettman needs to coalesce with in order to adopt the idea. 
Developing a Vision and Strategy 
 According to Kotter (1996), an effective vision has to convey a picture of what 
the future will look like and be appealing to stakeholders. It also has to remain focused 
yet flexible in order to adapt to any changing conditions. Finally, it is essential to create a 
realistic and attainable vision that is easy to communicate and understand.  
 Here is an example of a vision the NHL would want to achieve, “The NHL will 
strive to be the most exciting hockey league in the world by showcasing the talents and 
speed of the best players worldwide. Through local revenue sharing it will become 
financially and competitively balanced to the point that each team and its fans will truly 
believe they have an equal shot at building a Stanley Cup contending franchise while 
remaining profitable. As a result, within five years, league wide revenues will have risen 
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by 200%.” This paper surely projects the same type of vision that Gary Bettman would 
employ in the NHL, however, the ideas and arguments proposed here call for local 
revenue sharing and not cost certainty to attain that vision.  
Communicating the Change Vision 
 It is essential for change leaders to constantly communicate the vision. Using 
every possible medium, the coalition has to repeat the vision along with the change 
strategies while modeling such behaviour themselves (Kotter, 1996). 
 NHL large and small markets alike wishing to adopt local revenue sharing have to 
show the disbelievers that they will build their own market to its highest potential. In 
addition, during any contact with team owners, it is important for the coalition to produce 
evidence suggesting that local revenue sharing is an effective way to fix league 
performance. They can do this through the scientific literature pointing to revenue 
sharing and not cost certainty as a viable solution and by using other leagues such as the 
NFL as examples illustrating the success of the mechanism.  
Empowering Broad-Based Action 
 It is important for an organization to garner the support of all its employees when 
embarking on a change initiative. Communication is essential to create a shared sense of 
purpose and all systems and structures must be aligned with the vision. The change 
leaders should encourage risk-taking and non-traditional ideas, activities and actions from 
its employees (Kotter, 1996). 
 The NHL’s employees are also its Board of Governors. The change coalition has 
to convince them that the risk inherent in giving up some of their local revenue will pay 
off a few years down the road. The league also has to align its 30 franchises in a way that 
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will produce the highest results in each market while removing obstacles blocking that 
route. Employing someone in each city to study the intricacies of each individual area 
and then reporting back to the league could possibly do this. 
Generating Short Term Wins 
Change in any organization is a long process and it might take years to fully 
achieve the vision. It is necessary to keep everyone on the change path and creating short-
term gains does this. It is also necessary to visibly recognize and reward those who made 
the wins possible (Kotter, 1996).  
 Improved attendance figures, more proportioned player salaries, increased profits 
among small market teams along with similar profit margins for large market teams 
and/or larger television deals, as slight as the gains may be, would show everyone that 
local revenue sharing is worth it. New audience demographics and/or increases in 
television ratings would also keep the momentum up. Much of the credit would have to 
go to the large market owners, especially in the first few years of the new system, as their 
sacrifices would have made the wins possible. However, small market teams must also 
demonstrate that they are not incompetent free riders through open information sharing 
and aggressive local marketing.  
Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change 
The increased credibility accumulated from short-term wins is used to change 
systems and policies that do not correspond with the transformation vision. It is also 
important to develop people who have the ability to implement the change (Kotter, 1996).  
 Local revenue sharing in the NHL would have to start slow, perhaps using the 
first solution mentioned in the previous section. However, once the short-term gains were 
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realized, the amount shared would also increase. The ideas proposed in this paper might 
not fit perfectly with the NHL’s vision, therefore, a committee of owners who are 100% 
behind the idea of transformation could work to develop ideal solutions. In addition, the 
NHL is not a traditional organization as each governor is essentially a free market owner, 
therefore, the league could not just hand any dissenters a retirement package. However, 
they could ask any owner who does not have the league interests at heart to sell his or her 
stake in the NHL.  
Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture 
An organization must articulate to its mangers and staff the connections between 
organizational success and the change that brought it there. Documentation is essential to 
ensure leadership development and succession. If there is no evidence illustrating new 
policies and procedures, a change in leadership might result in a reversion back to old 
traditions and practices (Kotter, 1996).  
 In the NHL’s case, it is important to engrain the new revenue sharing and 
marketing practices into the culture of the ownership group. In addition, incoming owners 
would have to be educated on the financial and competitive successes inherent in the new 
system. Documentation in the league’s CBA and bylaw manual would provide future 
leaders with the necessary information to continue running a stable league just as it has in 
the NFL for over 40 years now. 
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
 Using the theory of deinstitutionalization developed by Christine Oliver (1992), 
this paper hypothesized that the NHL has slowly moved from an organization comprised 
of individual owner interests who supported taken-for-granted employment relations with 
the players, to one characterized by cooperation among owners mirroring more of a 
single entity whereby the players have enjoyed increased compensation and freedom of 
employment.  
 However, many events and leaders along the way have impeded this 
transformation leaving the NHL years behind the other major North American sports 
leagues. The NHL still has the strictest free agency regulations and they share the least 
amount of revenue. Should they continue deinstitutionalizing in a cooperative direction 
instead of forcing additional concessions onto the players, the author predicts the league 
will become financially and competitively balanced.  
 This prediction is also based on several studies done on revenue sharing and cost 
certainty, which were outlined in the literature review along with an analysis of 
technically specific solutions implemented in other leagues. While MLB finally came to a 
solution in 2002 that includes additional local revenue sharing and appears to give small 
market teams a fighting chance to stay competitive and profitable, only the NFL and 
NBA’s solutions have actually produced results. The NFL’s vigorous revenue sharing 
provided years of stability until about the late 1980s when labour strife impeded the 
momentum of the league (Staudohar, 1996). However, combining liberal free agency and 
a form of cost certainty, the league has become consistently competitively balanced and 
financial stability and popularity remain strong. The NBA on the other hand has used 
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only cost certainty to attempt to combat their financial and competitive problems while 
trying to grow the league as a single entity but without sharing in local revenue. The 
results in this paper illustrate that some financial problems still exist, popularity is waning 
and consistent competitive balance has yet to be achieved. The luxury tax only took 
effect in 2001-02 and actually transfers money to small market teams. The future remains 
somewhat uncertain, however, without local revenue sharing, the luxury tax did little to 
combat performance problems in MLB (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002). Future researchers 
might consider studying the impact of the tax a few years down the road so long as it is 
negotiated into the NBA’s next CBA. In addition, future research should aim to uncover 
the impact MLB’s new system will have on its financial and competitive stability.  
 The evidence in this paper suggests that revenue sharing will increase the NHL’s 
performance both financially and competitively and it is apparent that the league’s course 
to full deinstitutionalization requires significantly more cooperation among the owners 
and less pressure on the players to conform to demands for cost certainty. However, the 
conflict between players and owners continues. Large market teams refuse to give up a 
portion of their local revenue and still do not see the benefit that increased revenue 
sharing will bring in the long run. They do not see that it will improve league 
performance and also provide every team with financial stability. The league would be 
cooperating on a much higher level, however, individual teams would maintain separate 
ownership but on more of an even keel in terms of revenue with the ability to acquire 
equal amounts of talent thereby strengthening the fan’s perception of competition.  
 Enforcement problems are inherent in any revenue sharing scheme, however, 
through negotiations and careful planning there are several ways, some of which were 
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suggested in this paper, to combat the major issues. The biggest impediment to local 
revenue sharing right now lies in the Commissioner’s refusal to initiate an acceptable 
plan of action immediately. It is not a change that will happen overnight. The 
Commissioner has to instill the idea in the ownership group methodically and 
consistently with the firm belief that it is the best solution to improve league 
performance.  
 The league also has to work on adapting the game to a wider external audience by 
first, changing certain rules to enhance the excitement level and then, by marketing the 
speed and talent extensively. This would create a larger national revenue base and 
increase the shared proportion thereby leveling out league equality further. 
 In addition, with significant expansion over the last 12 years, the NHL has 
structurally disaggregated to find itself in areas unfamiliar with the game of hockey. In 
order to create a market in these new areas, the league has to modify its existing practices 
and cooperate financially in order to give the new teams some ability to acquire the 
necessary resources to attract a dedicated following of hockey fans.   
 Finally, deinstitutionalization in the said direction will of course and perhaps most 
importantly, give small market teams, especially those in Canada, a chance to compete 
year in and year out while maintaining financial viability. Since Canadian teams will still 
be at a disadvantage to American teams even with the implementations of the proposals 
contained herein because of the weak Canadian dollar, there are solutions to combat the 
currency issue further, however, their employment rests solely on the willingness of the 
players and owners to cooperate. The owners must first cooperate among themselves and 
then look to the players for some extra help afterwards. 
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Two small market teams left Canada in the 1990s and now play in American 
centers. Their relocations were based on similar circumstances. The NHL wanted each 
team to build a new venue. Neither Winnipeg nor Quebec City could afford to do so 
without government funding. The owners at the time were not exorbitantly wealthy and 
desired some sort of system in the NHL to allow their team an equal shot at maintaining 
profitability. Within the confines of such a system, perhaps each owner could have raised 
the capital to build a new venue or looked to the government for funding based on 
conditions that would guarantee the existence of the hockey team for an extended period 
of time. Speculation aside, what is known is that several Canadian teams face the same 
set of circumstances now. Even though these teams play in well-equipped venues, the 
market just does not exist to demand high ticket, luxury suite and advertising prices. 
However, the interest is strong, the games are exciting, the franchises are well managed 
and creatively marketed and the proposed solutions resulting in a full 
deinstitutionalization of the league would keep these teams viable while improving the 
financial and competitive picture for the whole league.  
  The current CBA expires in 2004, however, the owners can fix league 
performance immediately by cooperating further on a financial level. They can then look 
to the players to agree to cost certainty in the form of a luxury tax but only after relaxing 
some of the free agency restrictions. Whatever the outcome, future researchers will want 
to measure the impact of the new system because in the end, the most important factor is 
a well-balanced and competitive league that will provide North America with an 
unmatched form of entertainment. 
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Endnotes 
 
 1 After he bought the Chicago Blackhawks in 1944, James E. Norris owned three 
out of six NHL teams including the Detroit Red Wings. His interest in Madison Square 
Gardens made him a majority owner of the New York Rangers and he also had control 
over the Boston Bruins for some time (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
 2 One of these teams finished first overall from 1943-44 until 1966-67. During 
that time, only Chicago finished atop the league once. And while Chicago won one 
Stanley Cup during the same time, Montreal, Detroit or Toronto was the champion every 
other year (Klein & Reif, 2001). 
 3 In 1955-56, each American team received a portion of $100,000 in return for a 
10 game series on CBS. That number jumped to $210,000 for the 1956-57 season and 21 
games. The Maple Leafs and Canadiens each received $331,000 for television and radio 
rights in 1956-57 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
 4 All these mechanisms turned players into virtual servants averaging a salary of 
$8000 in 1957 with some players making as little as $3500. At that time the average 
sportswriter received $4800 and the average teacher about $5500. However, players were 
also required to pay most of their own expenses. Some had to pay for two residences if 
they were traded in mid-season. If they wanted their wives to attend training camps, they 
had to foot the bill for accommodations and transportation and $900 came off the top of a 
player’s annual salary for the pension fund. Some also carried additional insurance for 
fear of a career ending injury and rarely received compensation from their team if they 
were hurt towards the end of the season and prevented from earning off-season income. 
Once all these bits and pieces were subtracted from their gross salary, it was reduced by 
about 25% (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
5 Maple Leaf Gardens, owned by Conn Smythe and his partners, had an interest in 
the Maple Leafs and between 1932 and 1957, earned a profit of $3.4 million (Cruise & 
Griffiths, 1991). MSG declared a profit of $0.5 million in 1955 but the actual number was 
much higher because a portion of the dividends were siphoned to Jimmy Norris, Arthur 
Wirtz and other shareholders in 1954, 1955 and 1956. In addition, franchises use to 
under-report attendance figures or bring in more fans per game than the arena was rated 
for and pocket the extra money (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Dowbiggin, 1993, p. 161). 
Increased ticket revenue combined with the television deals mentioned earlier made NHL 
owners very rich. In fact, the period of 1955 to 1965 was a very profitable time for the 
owners but the players’ share of the revenue actually declined while their pensions 
remained stagnant (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
6 On December 7, 1979, six strong drawing NBA franchises met at the 21 Club in 
New York City. In attendance were the New York Knicks, New Jersey Nets, Philadelphia 
76ers, Boston Celtics, LA Lakers and Chicago Bulls. The meeting was held to develop 
unified resistance to any changes in the gate or local TV revenue-sharing rules of the 
NBA. The “unholy six”, a name dubbed by some of the frustrated small-city owners, 
formed a coalition to block such a change. As a result, revenue sharing rules among 
teams have remained unchanged in the NBA up to the present day  (Quirk & Fort, 1999 
pp. 64-65).   
 7 Before Pete Rozelle convinced the larger market teams that revenue sharing 
would create a stronger league, each team was making its own television deals. Cleveland 
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had a syndication deal with a private network and NBC was buying the rights to 
Pittsburgh and Baltimore games. Most of the other teams fended for themselves on CBS. 
In 1961, most of the small market teams received about $150,000 from television and the 
larger markets received about $500,000 (King, 1994, September 19).    
 8 In the 16 months after Gretzky signed with the Kings, 11 high-profile players 
renegotiated contracts for huge increases including Mario Lemieux who obtained a new 
$2 million per year deal (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). Others included Mark Messier, Eric 
Lindros and Pavel Bure (Staudohar, 1996, p. 139). Bob Goodenow suggested that 
Gretzky’s signing unlocked the ability for owners to pay their players large salaries. 
Combined with salary disclosure and arbitration, even lesser players have thrived. 
Income was pushed up 200 to 300% within two years and even rookies went from 
making an average of $105,000 per year to about $135,000 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; 
Dowbiggin, 1993, p. 13, Shoalts, 2003, January 18). Of course salaries have risen every 
year since. 
 9 Since setting his original mandate, corporate sponsorship at the league level has 
grown from $25 million in 1993 to $400 million in 2002-03. Corporate sponsors continue 
to rise along with merchandising sales, broadcasting revenues and licensing. These 
incredible increases stem from the fact that the league has begun to market itself 
substantially worldwide aided by the large base of players who come from outside North 
America (Fischler, 1995, p. 55; Naylor, 2003, January 21). Ed Horn, the newest president 
of NHL Enterprises Inc. said, “I think it’s a combination of things, but it also has been the 
commissioner taking a sport that was operational and turning it into a marketing 
organization.” (Naylor, 2003, January 21) 
 10 The first NFL league-wide television contract negotiated was with CBS Sports 
for 1962 and 1963 and paid the league $4.65 million per year amounting to about 
$330,000 per franchise. In 1964, all three major networks wanted the rights to televise 
NFL football and a secret bidding process took place. NBC offered $10.75 million per 
year, ABC offered $13.2 million and the high bid was CBS who offered $14.1 million per 
year for the right to televise NFL football. This would give each team approximately $1 
million per season (Harris, 1986). 
11 In 1984, U.S. teams received $750,000 instead of just over $150,000. That 
number continued to rise year after year and was a start to help out the small market 
teams (Stein, 1997). Evidently CTV was not very profitable in the original deal and 
Molson eventually bought out Carling O’Keefe in 1989 (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
Today the NHL still shares all national broadcast revenue and in 2002-03 earned $120 
million with American stations and $100 million in Canada (Houston, 2003, January 20). 
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Appendix A 
The Demise of the Winnipeg Jets 
 
 The Winnipeg Jets entered the NHL in 1979 along with the Hartford Whalers, 
Edmonton Oilers and ironically, the Quebec Nordiques. Until their move to Phoenix in 
1996, the Jets, for the most part, were financially unviable (Silver, 1996). Player salaries 
were not a big issue in the early 1980s, as payrolls remained relatively low. For instance, 
the small market Edmonton Oilers put together a dynasty that saw them win five Stanley 
Cups in seven years with a payroll under $4 million annually (Silver, 1996).  
 Most of the Jets money woes were founded in their rental agreement with 
Winnipeg Enterprises; the owner of the Winnipeg Arena that housed many elite hockey 
teams represented by the City of Winnipeg throughout the latter half of the 20th Century. 
Dating back to 1956-57, the Winnipeg Warriors paid Enterprises 20% of gross ticket 
sales while Enterprises also took all the money for parking and concessions. Until their 
departure in 1996, the Winnipeg Jets faced the same problems. While many teams collect 
at least some revenue from the operations of their building, the Jets were never able to do 
the same (Silver, 1996). 
 In order to combat these issues, the owners of the Winnipeg Jets attempted, on 
several occasions, to construct an arena that would enable them to collect the needed 
revenue from concessions and parking. However the government was constantly looked 
upon to aid in the funding of a new arena just as they had been when they footed the $3.5 
million price tag in order to expand the existing Winnipeg Arena from 10,000 to 15,000 
seats. This was a stipulation before the NHL would allow the Winnipeg Jets into the 
league (Silver, 1996).  
 The Jet’s owner’s aspirations to again enlist the aid of government aroused 
concerns from many Manitoba taxpayers, politicians and interest groups. Note that the 
government was already supporting the losses created by the expense of running a 
National Hockey League team in the 1990s. In 1991, an Interim Operating Agreement 
was introduced (IOA) while alternative arena sites were investigated. Simply put, the 
IOA saw the Manitoba provincial and the Winnipeg municipal governments share the 
burden of the Jets’ losses from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1997 (Silver, 1996).  
  And while the government was footing the bill for all these losses, the corporate 
sector was investing little of their own money to support the team. Many different 
corporate groups contributed time and energy to help keep the team financially afloat but 
invested very little of their own cash. It was suggested that they felt the investment would 
be too risky (Silver, 1996).  
 The NHL was also putting the heat on the owners to build a new arena. 
Specifically, the new commissioner of the NHL, Gary Bettman, had specifications that he 
wanted every NHL arena to meet. Some cities required minor renovations while other’s 
needed to have new buildings. Winnipeg was one of these cities (Silver, 1996). 
 With all the Jets’ woes, it is not certain that even a CBA with revenue sharing and 
a salary cap would have saved the team. However, there were several cost benefit 
analyses done that measured the economic impact of a professional hockey team in 
Winnipeg. Most of these studies were said to underestimate the future cost of player 
salaries (Silver, 1996). Had some form of cost certainty or revenue sharing been in place, 
perhaps these reports could have generated more concrete numbers that would have 
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provided solid ground to base decisions on. Unfortunately for Winnipeg hockey fans, no 
such cost certainty was imminent. 
 In fact, the NHL lockout of 1994-95 ended with no meaningful salary cap or 
revenue sharing schemes. Three specific consulting reports indicated that without a salary 
cap and revenue sharing or at least one such mechanism in place, there was no way that 
an arena deal would work (Silver, 1996). And without a new arena, the NHL would not 
allow the Jets to stay in Winnipeg nor could they afford to. 
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Appendix B 
The Demise of the Quebec Nordiques 
 
 The Quebec Nordiques endured a fate similar to that of Winnipeg. As with the 
Jets, they were also on the wrong end of an economic disparity that saw so many teams 
playing in new, expensive buildings lined with luxury boxes that brought in significantly 
more revenue than ticket sales alone. In order to compete in the modern day NHL, 
Marcel Aubut and his fellow owners required an arena that also gave them control over 
the concessions and parking (Diamond, 2000). Aubut and his five limited partners, like 
the owners of the Jets, looked for government help. However, the premier of Quebec, 
Jacques Parizeau, refused to use taxpayer money to finance a new 19,000 seat arena 
(Duhatschek, 2000) without the assurance of getting the cash back if the team was sold in 
the future. The government also offered to buy $17 million in Nordique shares while 
absorbing $14 million of the team’s debt over the following two seasons (Talks extended 
on Nords Future, 1995) but conveyed that unless the NHL franchise guaranteed a 
reduction in spending and sold about 100 luxury boxes, it would not consider the 
construction of a new arena with taxpayer money (Nordiques deny government made bid 
to acquire part of franchise, 1995). For Aubut though, it would not be enough just to help 
keep the team afloat. He needed an immediate commitment to build a new arena with a 
promise to cover operating losses as well (Double overtime: hockey fans in Winnipeg 
and Quebec City fight to save their teams, 1995). 
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Appendix C 
Salaries and Revenue Disparities in the NHL 
 
 There is no question that salaries in the NHL have been rising steadily over the 
last 14 seasons. In 1989-90 the average NHL salary was $232,000 USD (Kagan, 2001b). 
Four years later it had more than doubled to $560,000 USD (Kagan, 2001b). The season 
after the shortened 1994-95 campaign saw the average NHL player making $892,000 
USD (Kagan, 2001b). At the turn of the century, the average had jumped to $1.3 million 
USD (Kagan, 2001b). And during the 2002-03 NHL season, the average player made 
$1.7 million USD (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003). Table 11 outlines team salaries from 
2000-01 to 2002-03.  
 Revenues generated by each NHL team differ greatly (playoff income is not 
included in any revenue figures unless specifically referred to). In 2000-01 the Toronto 
Maple Leafs brought in the most money at $107 million. The Phoenix Coyotes brought in 
less than half that at $53 million. And yet the Coyotes only spent $1 million less on 
expenses (Kagan, 2001b). These two examples represent the extreme highs and lows with 
respect to revenue and all the teams together averaged $68 million in revenue and $61.2 
in expenses (Kagan, 2001b). See Table 10 for all team revenues in 2000-01.    
 Within these averages, however, lie many disparities. Over the course of three 
seasons from 1998-99 to 2000-01, 11 teams, including Toronto, the New York Rangers, 
Detroit, Montreal, Colorado and San Jose, consistently drew revenues large enough to put 
them in the top 15. During the same period, 11 teams including, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, 
Carolina, Ottawa, Edmonton and Calgary, constantly remained in the bottom 15. In 2000-
01, the top eight teams in terms of revenue generated an average cash flow of $21.9 
million while the bottom eight lost an average of $5.4 million. Although three of these 
teams are Canadian (Edmonton, Vancouver and Calgary), the bottom five are American 
(New Jersey, Anaheim, Buffalo, Washington and Phoenix) (Kagan, 2001b). 
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Appendix D 
American Franchise Viability 
 
It has been suggested that franchise viability problems exist only within Canada 
simply because expenses are paid in American currency while revenue is collected in 
Canadian dollars (MacDonald, 2003). However, the currency difference is not the only 
problem (playoff income is not included in any revenue figures unless specifically 
referred to).  
The first point addressed is attendance. Since ticket sales are the number one 
source of revenue in the NHL (Kagan, 2001b), it is important for the market, especially 
small markets, to support the team. Not taking into account possible management 
problems, especially due to the fact that they had losing records, two franchises from 
American markets relocated during the 1990s. On average, fans prefer to watch teams 
with winning records. Rising salaries and low revenue resulting in the inability to ice a 
competitive team might have been an excuse for the poor performance of these small 
market teams in the 1990s, however, it does not quite explain why the management had 
so much trouble building winning teams for a sustained period of time prior to that. 
The Minnesota North Stars, with an average attendance over 26 years of 83% 
capacity and a win/loss record of 0.439, left for Dallas in 1993 and the Hartford Whalers 
left for Carolina in 1997 after averaging 78% of capacity over 16 years with a win/loss 
record of 0.430. During many years, crowds filled less than 70% of each building 
(Attendance Figures, 2002; Klein & Reif, 2001). Table 12 outlines attendance for each 
team in the NHL from 2000-01 to 2002-03. 
 The attendance problems in Minnesota were unusual considering the hockey 
hotbed it is (LaBlanc, 1994) which is probably why the region has recently been awarded 
another NHL franchise. However, the Minnesota Wild, who play out of St. Paul instead 
of Minneapolis, played in front of crowds averaging 100% of capacity (Kagan, 2001b; 
NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) during their first three years of existence. This is quite a 
jump but not a huge surprise considering that Minnesota boasts some of the best college 
hockey in the US. However, with erratic attendance being far too common combined 
with low local TV revenues and escalating player costs (Stein, 1997), Norm Green 
decided to move the franchise that he bought from George and Gordon Gund in 1990 for 
$38 million, to Dallas (LaBlanc, 1994), where attendance has been quite steady 
(Attendance Figures, 2002). Both the new Minnesota and the old Minnesota did fine 
financially during the 2000-01 season. The Dallas Stars, now owned by Thomas Hicks 
(Kagan, 2001b) had a cash flow of $10.6 million. The Wild were behind only Toronto 
earning $26.7 million (Kagan, 2001b). Average attendance reached 100% for each team 
during the 2001-02 and 2002-03 campaigns (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the owner of the Hartford Whalers did not fair as well. With 
attendance continuing to be a problem, the Whalers were the subject of relocation 
rumours during the 1992-93 season. However, while the owner at the time, Richard 
Gordon, was negotiating a new lease on the Hartford Civic Centre, the Governor of 
Connecticut, Lowell Wecker, insisted that he would not let the Whalers leave town. 
Unfortunately, attendance sustained low levels and even the luxurious Civic Centre 
skyboxes, a huge source of revenue for any team, began to vacate (LaBlanc, 1994). In 
1994, Gordon sold the Whalers to Peter Karmanos, Thomas Thewes and Jim Rutherford 
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for $47.5 million. Amidst the usual protests and even a “Save the Whale” campaign, 
Karmanos confirmed that the team would play elsewhere in 1997 (Diamond, 2000). 
Elsewhere turned out to be North Carolina, a hotbed for NASCAR racing and 
college basketball. Attendance did not increase as Karmanos had hoped, however, once 
the team moved to Raleigh from Greensboro, average attendance went up 4,000 per game 
(Diamond, 2000). But in 1999-00 that still made Carolina the second lowest city in terms 
of attendance attracting just enough fans to fill 65.3% of their venue (Kagan, 2001b).  
Attendance did increase one year later to 71.3% of capacity and in 2001-02, Hurricane 
fans filled 82.8% of the Raleigh Entertainment and Sports Arena (NHL Attendance 
Leaders, 2003).  
So the Carolina Hurricanes are attracting almost as many fans on average as the 
Hartford Whalers did. Their low attendance certainly isn’t helping them financially, 
however. In 2000-01 they were in the black by $0.9 million (Kagan, 2001b) and average 
attendance rose the following season and again in 2002-03 to 83.7% of capacity (NHL 
Attendance Leaders, 2003). It appears that Carolina is slowly adopting professional 
hockey as a form of entertainment and their run to the Stanley Cup finals in 2002 likely 
encouraged this. The true test will come in 2003-04. Will the fans return after a last place 
finish in 2003 (NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003)? 
Other American NHL cities are struggling to attract fans as well (Attendance 
Figures, 2003).  While the average attendance during 2002-03 was 88.6% of capacity in 
US cities, it was 97.6% in Canadian cities (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) and all six 
Canadian cities were in the top half of the league. Granted, most of the expansion in the 
NHL took place in sunny American cities not accustomed to the sport of hockey, 
however, cities like Chicago and Boston, which were original six franchises, along with 
New Jersey, which has won two Stanley Cups in the last eight years, are not filling their 
buildings (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003). 
Attendance is a problem. However, it is not the only problem plaguing the 
finances of many NHL teams. Chicago averaged 73.2% (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) 
of capacity in 2000-01 and still retained a positive cash flow of $10 million (Kagan, 
2001b). Boston, while only filling 87.9% (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) of their 
building, also made a profit, albeit a small one, of $1.3 million (Kagan, 2001b). Even the 
relatively new Tampa Bay Lightning, which averaged 14,906 fans at 75.4% capacity 
(NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003), managed a profit of $18 million (Kagan, 2001b). And 
finally, the New York Islanders, with a dismal 68% average capacity (NHL Attendance 
Leaders, 2003), saw a positive cash flow of $7.9 million (Kagan, 2001b). 
Conversely, American teams with low attendance are also losing money. As 
mentioned earlier, the two-time Stanley Cup Champion New Jersey Devils are having 
difficulty filling their building. In 2000-01, the team averaged 15,642 fans for a capacity 
of 82.2% (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) and lost $1.4 million (Kagan, 2001b). 
Attendance seems to be decreasing as well because during 2002-03, the building was 
only filled to 78% of capacity. The Anaheim Mighty Ducks lost $6.3 million in 2000-01 
(Kagan, 2001b) with an average capacity crowd of 78.6% (NHL Attendance Leaders, 
2003) and Washington attracted only 15,534 fans per game that amounted to 83.2% of 
capacity (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) and a loss of $9.6 million (Kagan, 2001b). 
Finally, Phoenix, who filled their building to roughly the same capacity as Boston at 
87.7% (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003) lost $15.3 million in 2000-01 (Kagan, 2001b). 
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Interestingly, teams that don’t fill their buildings either lose money or make 
money. What variables account for the disparity? As mentioned earlier, the Boston 
Bruins attracted, on average, 15,432 fans per game for a mean capacity of 87.9% and a 
total attendance for the year of 632,746 (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003). The 
Washington Capitals attracted slightly more fans that year for a total of 636,914 at an 
average capacity of 83.2% (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003). Boston actually 
accumulated $4.5 million more in expenses and yet Washington lost $9.6 million 
compared to Boston’s gain of $1.3 million (Kagan, 2001b).  
The difference, of course, is revenue. Boston’s was $73.8 million and Washington 
collected only $58.4 million (Kagan, 2001b). Table D1 illustrates that a ticket to a Boston 
Bruins’ game was significantly higher in 2000-01 compared to Washington and the 
organization collected gate revenue of $30.1 million compared to Washington’s gate 
revenue of $23.2 million (Kagan, 2001b). Tables D2 and 10 respectively illustrate that 
Boston collected almost twice as much as Washington in luxury suite revenue and 
another $3 million over Washington in local media rights (Kagan, 2001b). Both arenas 
were constructed in the mid 1990s, have about the same number of luxury suites and, in 
fact, Washington’s arena seats more people (Kagan, 2001b).  
Another American NHL team that has difficulty competing with the larger market 
franchises is the Buffalo Sabres. They did run into ownership trouble in 2002 after the 
financial downfall of the owner, John Rigas and his Adelphia Communications 
Corporation. The league took over the franchise for most of 2002-03 (Associated Press, 
2003, January 13) when attendance was only at 73.5% of capacity (only 70% during the 
first 25 games) (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003), however, there is now a new owner in 
place named Tom Golisano (Gleason, 2003, March 21). It is anticipated that attendance 
will continue to increase into next year after an all around unstable 2002-03. Even before 
the team fell on hard times though, in 2000-01 when the average attendance was 17,839 
at 95.5% of capacity (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003), the team still lost $8.2 million 
(Kagan, 2001b). Their expenses were comparable to those of Boston but being in a small 
market, the Sabres were unable to generate the local TV rights that Boston did. As shown 
by Table D2, they were also unable to sell their luxury suites at the same prices, only 
$55,000 to $100,000 compared to Boston’s asking prices of $181,000 to $280,000 
(Kagan, 2001b).  
This is where the franchise viability problems within the NHL become most 
apparent – differences in revenue. Some teams could continue to sell out their brand new 
state of the art buildings and not make as much money as another team that only sells out 
80% of their brand new state of the art building. Tables 10, D1 and D2 illustrate that 
some teams are able to sell tickets and luxury suites at higher prices and demand more 
revenue from local TV rights. The above examples show that the problem is apparent in 
the US and not just a cause of the difference between US and Canadian currency.   
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Appendix E 
Canadian Franchise Viability 
 
From 1998 to 2000, the Edmonton Oilers made a profit of $3.2 million while the 
Vancouver Canucks lost $24.0 million. Calgary was also in the red with a loss of $6.8 
million. In 2000-01, the Edmonton Oilers, Vancouver Canucks and Calgary Flames lost 
$700,000, $800,000, and $1.0 million respectively (Kagan, 2001b). (All figures for 
Canadian teams are quoted in American dollars unless otherwise specified and do not 
include playoff revenue.) Similarly, each team maintained attendance over 90% of 
capacity with Edmonton averaging 92.7%, Calgary 96.9% and Vancouver 92.4% (NHL 
Attendance Leaders, 2003). Ottawa lost $2.7 million in 1998-99 and the following year 
made $1.4 million. They also managed a small profit of $1.2 million in 2000-01 (Kagan, 
2001) while maintaining attendance at 96.2% of capacity (NHL Attendance Leaders, 
2003). In addition, documents, which were prepared by lawyers and auditors and 
subsequently obtained by the Globe and Mail in January 2003, indicate that the majority 
of Canadian franchises lost money in 1996-97 and 1997-98. Including playoff revenue 
when appropriate, the Edmonton Oilers lost $5.7 and $4.2 million respectively while 
Vancouver lost $19.7 and $32.0 million. Calgary lost $3.0 million but managed a small 
profit the next year of $700,000. Contradicting Kagan’s (2001b) figures, Ottawa has 
shown consistent losses of $16.5, $22.8, $12.0, $8.9, $8.0 and $15 million from 1996-97 
to 2001-02 for a total of $83.2 million over six years (Waldie, 2003, January 22), 
however, it is unclear whether these numbers include debt repayments to the owner of the 
Corel Centre, Ottawa’s venue.  
Though faced with substantial losses, it is clear that small market Canadian fans 
are attending the games. In fact, average attendance has risen over the last two seasons in 
the four smallest markets from 94.4% in 2001-02 to 96.6% in 2002-03. Including the 
hockey hotbeds of Montreal and Toronto, the average attendance for 2002-03 increases to 
97.6%. Using Table 12, the average Canadian attendance over the last three seasons 
reveals a number of 96.4%.  The argument here is that NHL hockey in Canada attracts 
fans and the teams could not be moved solely for a lack of interest. 
So what is causing this so called crisis in Canada that causes the small market 
Canadian teams to consistently lose money or barely break even? It is a combination of 
factors including escalating players’ salaries, which were discussed in Appendix C, the 
devalued Canadian dollar compared to the US currency used by the NHL and the alleged 
lack of government support (Morrison & Burnside, 2003).  
Beginning with the last point first, the first chapter outlined the limited steps taken 
by Canadian governments to save two NHL franchises and it is probably not in the 
government’s best interest to funnel taxpayers’ money directly into the hands of NHL 
teams. However, even though Canadian NHL teams are in the entertainment business, 
they are required to pay extra taxes that other entertainers, such as Canadian bands and 
singers, are not. The federal government, for the most part, does not hand out the same 
tax breaks and associated perks to NHL hockey teams as they do to movie companies 
(Morrison & Burnside, 2003). 
In addition, Canadian NHL teams are required to pay a significantly higher 
amount of municipal and provincial property and capital tax compared to that of their 
American counterparts. In fact, in 1997, all 21 American teams combined paid only one-
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quarter of the tax levied by the six Canadian teams (Public Policy Forum, 1999), 
however, as was outlined in the first chapter, various governments have taken some steps 
to curb these expenses. 
It is also common for American arenas to be subsidized heavily by public funds 
however most Canadian teams do not enjoy that advantage (Public Policy Forum, 1999). 
Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, which built new venues in the last ten years, used no 
public money to finance construction. Ottawa’s Corel Centre was 21% publicly financed 
and Calgary and Edmonton, which opened their arenas in 1983 and 1974 respectively, 
did use public funds to finance construction and some of the renovations were also done 
using public money. Conversely, one-third of American arenas were 100% publicly 
financed while four used public funds for at least 80% of the construction. Out of the 
other 12 teams, only Columbus and Boston did not use at least some public money to 
finance the construction of their venues.  Of course, a new arena means more seats, more 
luxury suites and, as illustrated by Table 10, some teams either own the arena or have a 
favourable deal with the lessor for luxury suite, concession and parking rights thereby 
generating more revenue (Kagan, 2001b). It is much easier for the team to succeed 
financially in a new, state of the art building if the original bill is already paid or 
generously financed. 
Arguably the biggest obstacle Canadian NHL teams face is the weakness of the 
Canadian dollar compared to the US dollar. While Canadian teams collect almost all their 
revenue in Canadian currency, they have to pay most of their expenses, most significantly 
players’ salaries, in US dollars. On average, Canadian teams lose about 35% just 
exchanging their revenue into American currency (Public Policy Forum, 1999). To put 
this into perspective, had the Canadian dollar been on par with the American dollar, in 
2001-02, the Edmonton Oilers would have made a profit of about $15 million. Instead 
they lost $2.2 million. In fact, the Canadian teams combined paid out $230 million in 
payrolls alone during 2001-02. Out of this, $125 million was the difference between 
Canadian and American currency (MacDonald, 2003). 
As mentioned earlier, the average attendance for Canadian NHL teams is in the 
high 90 percent of capacity. Even with this enviable attendance, the revenue generated, 
once converted into American funds, is meager when compared to that of US teams. For 
example, Edmonton and Calgary, during the 2000-01 season, generated gate revenue in 
the area of $22 million while Ottawa and Vancouver took in about $30 million (Kagan, 
2001b). Compare this with New Jersey and Atlanta, who only filled up around 82% of 
their venues but still brought in over $30 million in gate revenue each. In addition, the 
average ticket price for an Edmonton game in 1999-00 was $33.63 which, when 
converted back into Canadian dollars, is more than the average ticket price of $46.50 to 
attend a New Jersey game during the same year (Kagan, 2001b). Examining this even 
further reveals that a team like Detroit, who fills up their venue to 99% of capacity on 
average, generated a gate revenue of $41.2 million in 1999-00 charging an average price 
of $50.23 per ticket. Using $0.65 as an average exchange rate for 1999-00, Edmonton’s 
average ticket price works out to $51.74 CAD which is still more than Detroit’s, 
however, because of the currency difference, Edmonton collected only almost half of 
what Detroit did in gate revenue (Kagan, 2001b). 
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Appendix F 
Competitive Balance 
 
There is no question that fans prefer to watch winning teams. In 2002-03, the 
average attendance for teams with winning records was 93.6% of capacity and out of the 
15 attendance leaders, 10 had winning records whereas the average attendance for losing 
teams was 86.7% of capacity and nine out of the bottom 15 teams in terms of attendance 
had losing records (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003; NHL Standings 2002-2003, 2003). 
Therefore, it is necessary for general managers to ice the best group of players they can 
and provide an opportunity for the fans to watch a winning team. Of course, within 
professional sports there is always a reasonable amount of doubt as to who will win the 
game or at least there should be (MacDonald, 2003).  
The problem many general managers face is balancing a financially stable team 
with a competitive team. Notwithstanding growth, salaries have increased at an even 
faster rate so there is now a disparity between revenue and expenses along with 
disparities among what teams are allowed to spend. This makes it difficult for teams to 
retain talent (Morrison & Burnside, 2003, February). The reason Edmonton would have 
made close to $15 million after accounting for the currency issue in 2001-02 is because 
their payroll was among the lowest in the league at $25.9 million. Calgary, Ottawa and 
Vancouver were also among the bottom 10 in terms of payroll (2001-02 Team Payrolls, 
2001). Statistically, teams cannot continue to build winning teams with payrolls 
significantly lower than those of their competitors and less wins generally equals less 
fans, which equals less revenue. 
A Spearman Rho Correlation was done using SPSS in deriving the figures for 
Table 3. Basically, the sample size used was around 30 depending on the year measured, 
which includes all the teams ranked from 1 to 30 in terms of payroll and then 1 to 30 with 
regard to winning percentage. The test itself will reveal a correlation between negative 
one and one. Negative one means that each number is oppositely correlated to the 
contrasting figure. So if the highest payroll team had the lowest point total and so on and 
so forth, the correlation would have come out to negative one. Conversely, if the highest 
payroll team had the highest point total and so on and so forth all the way to the bottom 
of the list where the lowest payroll team had the lowest point total, the correlation would 
equal one. If there is no correlation whatsoever, the calculation should end up in the area 
of zero. A random draw of 30 numbers was done chronologically to illustrate this point 
and revealed an insignificant correlation of 0.08. The significance level is the amount of 
error possible in the answer so if it is significant at 0.05, there is a five percent chance of 
error. Comparing the above numbers to the random draw correlation, it is apparent that 
there is still some relationship between an NHL team’s winning percentage and their 
payroll. 
A simple correlation comparing points earned in a single regular season to a 
team’s payroll reveals 0.45 significant at the 0.05 level during the 2000-01 season. That 
number jumps to 0.64 significant at the 0.01 level during 2001-02 and then drops to 0.42 
significant at the 0.05 level during the 2002-03 campaign of which seven of the top ten 
teams in terms of payroll finished in the top ten in the standings (NHL Salaries, 2002-
2003, 2003; NHL Standings, 2003-2003, 2003). Tables 2 and 3 outline rank correlations 
comparing payrolls to winning percentages for the NHL, NBA and NFL from 1990 to 
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2003. The average between the tables indicates that correlation in the NHL has increased 
significantly over the last seven years.     
There are exceptions to this and payroll in no way is the only indicator of a 
winning team. If the New York Rangers, Ottawa Senators, San Jose Sharks and 
Minnesota Wild are dropped from the 30-team sample during 2002-03, the correlation 
jumps from 0.42 to 0.69 and if the former two along with Florida are dropped from the 
sample during 2000-01, the correlation goes from 0.45 to 0.73, both significant at the 
0.01 level leaving a one percent chance for error. This is because Minnesota and Ottawa 
did quite will with a small payroll and San Jose along with New York and Florida 
finished poorly with a large payroll. Some of the reasons for these differences follow. 
San Jose, 11th in the league with a $48 million payroll (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 
2003) finished out of the 2002-03 playoffs with 73 points including only 28 wins 
combined with 37 losses (NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003). At the beginning of the 
season, some hockey analysts chose the San Jose Sharks to win the Stanley Cup. 
However, the Sharks started the season without their number one goalie, Evgeni 
Nabokov, who did not re-sign with the team until late October. Key defenseman, Brad 
Stuart, missed the first 16 games also due to contract problems combined with an injury. 
Scott Thornton had shoulder surgery and missed the first 14 games and finally the whole 
coaching staff was fired on December 1, 2002, barely two months into the season 
(McKeon, 2003, April 4). By December 20, 2002 after 32 games played, San Jose was 
sitting in 11th spot out of 15 in the Western Conference (Mackie, 2003, January 3). By the 
time February rolled around, the Sharks were still in 11th spot and only managed one win 
on their seven game road trip (McKeon, 2003, April 4). Finally, March saw the Sharks 
trade away three of their seven most expensive contracts (McKeon, 2003, April 4; NHL 
Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003) and the general manager, Dean Lombardi who orchestrated 
the trades, was fired one week after the trade deadline on March 19th. Lombardi was 
criticized for not signing Nabokov and Stuart earlier as well as his firing of coach Darryl 
Sutter and assistants so early in the season. Team president Greg Jamison is confident the 
Sharks will make the playoffs next year and just needed a fresh start (McKeon, 2003, 
April 4). 
Unlike the Sharks who consistently improved over the course of six years before 
the 2002-03 campaign (McKeon, 2003, April 4), the New York Rangers have struggled 
consistently over the last number of seasons. Their $69 million payroll, highest in the 
NHL (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003), earned only 78 points in 2002-03 including 32 
wins and 36 losses (NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003), which was not enough and they 
missed the post-season for the sixth straight year (Kay & Brender, 2003, February 28). 
Since 1999-00, the Rangers have had the highest payroll and a number of star players on 
their roster such as Pavel Bure, Eric Lindros and Alexei Kovalev.  
So why is this team having such a hard time just making it to the playoffs? Instead 
of slowly building a winning team with the ability to maintain high priced talent, the 
Rangers are simply purchasing the experienced players from other teams. Glen Sather, 
who built a five-time Stanley Cup champion team in Edmonton, was hired as general 
manager for the New York Rangers in 2000. Five Stanley Cups for any general manager 
is obviously an impressive feat, however, Sather’s ability to draft future NHL stars 
eluded him shortly after and his Edmonton Oilers missed the playoffs four straight years 
in the 1990s. The Rangers hired Sather in 2000 hoping he would turn a team that had 
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missed the playoffs for three straight seasons, around. The new GM brought in several 
stars immediately but mixed them with players of limited ability and was unable to create 
any type of chemistry. He has also hired two unproven head coaches during his rein as 
GM. Ron Low brought his losing record over from Edmonton and Bryan Trottier had no 
NHL coaching experience (Kay & Brender, 2003, February 28).  
The Rangers mentality seems to follow that of a win now philosophy and they are 
unwilling to maintain the necessary patience it takes to build a winning team. Sather 
purchases players that have proven themselves on other teams but has not taken the time 
to develop players who can learn to play with one another in synch and create that 
chemistry that enables high payroll teams to win (Kay & Brender, 2003, February 28). 
Florida struggled in 2000-01 with a payroll that ranked eighth in the NHL. The 
bulk of that went to one player, Pavel Bure, who was the fourth highest paid player at the 
time (Kagan, 2001b). Although the “Russian Rocket” managed to amass a league high, 
59 goals (NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003), his team only managed to win 22 games 
while losing 38. This was tied for the fourth worst record in the league (NHL 2000-2001 
Standings, 2001). In fact, Bure himself scored almost 30% of the team’s goals that year 
(NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003; NHL 2000-2001 Standings, 2001) while taking only 
21% of the payroll (Kagan, 2001b). Some would say Florida got what they paid for. 
Unfortunately most would say it takes more to win than one superstar who can put the 
puck in the net. It appears that Florida has learned their lesson though. In 2002, 
ironically, they traded Bure to the Rangers (NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003) who, as 
illustrated above, have not learned their lesson. Florida’s payroll dropped significantly in 
2002 to $31 million, which was 22nd in the league (2001-02 Team Payrolls, 2001). They 
finished with only 60 points that year (NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002), however, Bure 
played 56 out of a possible 82 games with Florida before being traded (NHLPA.com 
Player Search, 2003). In the first full season without Bure, the Panthers’ payroll was $33 
million, tied for 19th with Calgary and Vancouver (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003). The 
2002-03 season saw Florida improve slightly to 70 points (NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 
2003). Under the direction of a new head coach Florida is a young team with several 
developing stars.    
On the other hand, the Ottawa Senators, with a payroll of a few million dollars 
less than that of Florida at only $30 million (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003), managed 
to capture first place overall in 2002-03 with 52 wins and 21 losses (NHL Standings, 
2002-2003, 2003). An expansion team in 1992-93, Ottawa finished poorly in the 
standings for many years enabling them to acquire high draft picks (MacDonald, 2003, 
January 17). But it has been the management of the Ottawa franchise that has hung onto 
these draft picks that has caused the team to improve so much. 13 of the players currently 
playing for the Senators were drafted by the team and have been developed year after 
year while gaining experience and maturation (Burnside, 2003, January 17).  
The coach is also growing with the team. Jacques Martin has remained a fixture 
with the Senators even though his team had been bounced three straight years by Toronto 
from the playoffs. Martin realizes that the organization has developed talent but 
maintains that hard work and a team approach remain the cornerstones of success. His 
team believes in his abilities and the systems he has preached. He has gained their trust 
and respect due in large part to the fact that he has remained at his post for so long 
(Burnside, 2003, January 17). 
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So unlike the Rangers, Ottawa has thrived on their draft picks while maintaining 
patience and it looks like Florida is heading in that direction. Ottawa has stuck with their 
coach through the bad times and as a result finished first overall in 2002-03. But will this 
trend continue if nothing is done about the current revenue and expense disparities in the 
league? Will players, such as Alfredsson, Bonk and Redden, who have developed into 
young stars, demand higher salaries once the opportunity arises (MacDonald, 2003, 
January 17)?   
Finally, the Minnesota Wild, a team made up of so-called has-been players with 
the exception of a few young talents, surprised a lot of people in 2002-03 (Kay, 2003, 
April 11). With a payroll of only $21 million (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003), the Wild 
amassed an impressive 93 points by winning 41 games and losing only 29 (NHL 
Standings, 2002-2003, 2003). Similar to Ottawa, coach Jacques Lemaire preaches a team 
concept with a concentration on defense. Even with a rising young star by the name of 
Marion Gaborik, the Minnesota management promotes team unity. They truly believe 
that the job of their fourth line winger, Matt Johnson, is equally as important to the 
success of the team as Gaborik’s offensive skills (Brophy, 2003, February 7).   
In addition, Jacques Lemaire is a proven coach. He won the Stanley Cup in 1995 
as the coach of the New Jersey Devils (Brophy, 2003, February 7) and the systems and 
strategies he has sold his team on have enabled the new franchise to compete with the 
talent-laden powerhouses of the National Hockey League (Kay & Brender, 2003, April 
11). Lemaire is a highly respected individual that demands hard work from his players 
and in return rolls all four lines consistently (Kay, 2003, April 11). He keeps the dressing 
room loose and relaxed and truly believes in his team (Darling, 2003, May 8).  
The team Lemaire truly believes in is one that is made up of players who have 
seen adversary throughout their entire professional hockey careers (Darling, 2003, May 
8). Dwayne Roloson, the goaltender, has been with three different NHL organizations. 
Wes Walz came to Minnesota from Lugano of the Swiss League and Filip Kuba never 
even played a game with his previous team, the Calgary Flames, before being selected by 
the Wild in the expansion draft. Sergei Zholtok and Cliff Ronning were acquired in 
exchange for late draft picks. The list goes on (Kay, 2003, April 11). No matter how the 
team came together, they believe in themselves, each other and never said die throughout 
the 2002-03 season (Darling, 2003, May 8).       
In the end, good coaching, strong management and the will to believe can only 
take a team so far (MacDonald, 2003) and yes, once a team gets into the playoffs, 
anything can happen such as an anomaly of upsets. It is still a game full of professional 
athletes and every team wants to win. It has been said that on any given night, most teams 
in the NHL can beat any other team in the NHL (Kay & Brender, 2003, April 11). And 
teams like Ottawa and Minnesota build young talent and enforce defensive systems to 
gain an edge but it is the teams that have the ability to hang onto talent while tweaking 
their lineups that have the most success. 
 Colorado has amassed a record of 181 wins, 96 losses, 42 ties and 14 overtime 
losses in regular season play while winning one Stanley Cup in the last four years (Klein 
& Reif, 2001; NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003). 
They also maintained key players during that same time, namely Peter Forsberg, Joe 
Sakic and goaltender Patrick Roy, whose combined salaries have risen from $18.5 
million in 1999-00 (Kagan, 2001b) to $27.9 million in 2002-03 (NHL Salaries, 2002-
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2003, 2003). In addition, they were able to bring in a key defenseman in 2000. Ray 
Bourque’s salary was an additional $5.5 million (Kagan, 2001b). Bourque has since 
retired, however Rob Blake, an acquisition in 2001, received $9.3 million in 
compensation in 2002-03 bringing the total for Colorado’s top four salaries to $37.2 
million for 2002-03 (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003) compared to $23.6 million for their 
top four salaries in 1999-00 (Kagan, 2001b).  
Detroit’s regular season record over the last four years is 196-85-39-14 and they 
have also won a Stanley Cup in that time (Klein & Reif, 2001; NHL 2001-2002 
Standings, 2002; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003). Three key players that have 
remained with the team over that time are Steve Yzerman, Nicklas Lidstrom and Brendan 
Shanahan who had a combined salary of $16.0 million in 1999-00 (Kagan, 2001b). In 
2002-03 that combined salary rose to $26.0 million (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003). 
Detroit was also able to secure arguably the best goaltender in the game at the time, 
Dominek Hasek. He helped Detroit to win the Stanley Cup in 2002 while earning $8.0 
million (ESPN.com news services, 2001, August 23). Hasek then retired but returned to 
Detroit for the 2003-04 campaign however before the start of the 2002-03 season, Detroit 
signed another reputable goaltender, Curtis Joseph, also for $8.0 million per season. The 
2002-03 campaign saw Detroit’s top four salaries at a combined $34.0 million (NHL 
Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003) compared to $20.1 million in 1999-00 (Kagan, 2001b).   
Conversely, Edmonton, who has put together a decent record of 145-119-51-24 
without winning a playoff series in the last four years (Klein & Reif, 2001; NHL 2001-
2002 Standings, 2002; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003), has had to continually trade 
away key players in an attempt to keep their payroll at an affordable level. In 1999-00, 
Edmonton’s top three salaries equaled $9.2 million (Kagan, 2001b). In 2002-03, that 
number only rose to $9.4 million, however, the salaries belonged to three different 
players. The former combination belonged to Doug Weight, Bill Guerin and Roman 
Hamrlik, who made a total of $20.7 million in 2002-03 each playing for a different team. 
Ryan Smyth, Janne Niinimaa and goaltender Tommy Salo made up the $9.4 million for 
the Oilers in 2002-03. Add in Anson Carter at $2.4 million and the total for Edmonton’s 
top four salaries last season equaled $11.8 million (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003). 
However, at the trade deadline of 2002-03, general manager Kevin Lowe traded Anson 
Carter and Janne Niinimaa along with minor leaguer Ales Pisa and a second round draft 
pick away to the New York Islanders and New York Rangers in exchange for Brad 
Isbister, Radek Dvorak, Cory Cross and minor leaguer, Raffi Torres (NHL Trade 
Deadline 2003, 2003). Cross, Dvorak and Isbister earned a total salary of $4.1 million 
compared to Niinimaa and Carter’s combined salary of $5.3 million in 2002-03. This 
means that Edmonton’s top four salaries in 2002-03 now equaled $10.6 million including 
Salo, Smyth, defenseman Jason Smith and newly acquired left-winger Brad Isbister 
(NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003). This is even less than the top four salaries combined of 
$10.9 million in 1999-00, which belonged to Weight, Guerin, Hamrlik and right-winger 
Alexander Selivanov (Kagan, 2001b).  
Colorado and Detroit’s top four salaries combined of  $37.2 and $34.0 million 
respectively were more than Edmonton’s whole payroll of $31.0 million in 2002-03 
(NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003). Edmonton was a team heading for the playoffs in 
2002-03 and they traded away their top scorer in Anson Carter and top defenseman in 
Janne Niinimaa. It is hard to suggest they made the trades purely to improve their team. 
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Kevin Lowe is trying to keep his team young and cheap in order to stay financially viable 
(Kay & Brender, 2003, March 28).  
 A team like Ottawa would probably stay quite competitive if they could hang 
onto most of their key players but a few examples illustrate that compared to players of 
the same stature in the league, players like Marian Hossa, Daniel Alfredsson, Radek 
Bonk and Wade Redden who together made up the four highest salaries on Ottawa in 
2002-03 combined equaling $12.8 million (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003), could very 
well look for a substantial pay raise when they become free agents. Ottawa’s record over 
the last four seasons is 180-103-37-14 including the best record in the league this past 
season  (Klein & Reif, 2001; NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002; NHL Standings, 2002-
2003, 2003). During the 1999-00 season, Ottawa’s top four salaries combined equaled 
$10.8 million (Kagan, 2001b) but only one belonged to the list that occupied the four 
highest salaries on the team in 2002-03 and that was Alfredsson (NHL Salaries 2002-
2003, 2003). The combined salaries of Alfredsson, Bonk, Redden and Hossa in 1999-00, 
was a mere $5.7 million (Kagan, 2001b). Obviously this total has increased substantially 
over the last four years to $12.8 million (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003) and judging by 
their play on the ice, these guys could be in line for big pay raises once the opportunity 
arises.  
Clearly there is more that goes into negotiating a player’s contract than simple 
statistics however total points and plus-minus rating (minus one if a player is on the ice 
when a goal is scored against his team and plus one if he is on the ice when his team 
scores a goal) are two big factors. Over the last three seasons and 224 games, right-
winger Daniel Alfredsson amassed a total of 219 points with a plus-minus rating of 29. 
He made $4.4 million in 2002-03. On the other hand, Bill Guerin, who now plays for the 
Dallas Stars, combined 201 points with a plus-minus rating of 11 in 227 games over three 
years and made $8.7 million in 2002-03. In the same time, over 233 games, defenseman 
Wade Redden scored 126 points with a very respectable plus-minus rating of 67. He 
earned $3.0 million in 2002-03. Conversely, Colorado defensemen Rob Blake, during 
239 games, combined 111 points with a plus-minus rating of 47 and in 2002-03 he earned 
$9.3 million. One last comparison looks at Ottawa’s centreman Radek Bonk who, over 
the course of three years and 226 games, collected 183 points and a plus-minus rating of 
36 while earning $3.2 million in 2002-03. Finally, centreman Bobby Holik, who now 
plays for the New York Rangers after many years with the New Jersey Devils, totaled 
139 points with a plus-minus rating of 25 over 225 games. In 2002-03 he earned $9.6 
million (NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003).  
So, with very similar statistics over a three-year period, for all intents and 
purposes, and not taking into consideration player loyalty to their team or other intangible 
assets, it is apparent that Ottawa’s combined top three salaries could possibly go from 
$10.6 to $27.6 million. Although the Senators did sign Wade Redden in the summer of 
2003, Daniel Alfredsson will be an unrestricted free agent in July of 2004 (Garrioch, 
2003 March 14). Looking at the revenue numbers in Table 10 and taking into account 
other expenses, aside from player salaries of $24.1 million, it is obvious that Ottawa 
could not support three players at $27.6 million per season. That is almost the total of 
their whole payroll in 2002-03 (NHL Salaries 2002-2003, 2003).  
There is no guarantee the players for Ottawa will receive offers in line with the 
examples chosen, however, it is almost certain they could increase their current income. 
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The team does sit at a slight advantage now as they play in a new arena that generates 
about $6 to $10 million more in luxury suite revenue than that of Edmonton or Calgary 
(Kagan, 2001b). The new owner of the franchise, Eugene Melnyk, also owns the arena 
therefore additional luxury suite, concession and parking funds is extra revenue that can 
be put back into the franchise. However, with the current economic system the NHL 
operates under, and with the still low amount of revenue Ottawa generates compared to 
large market teams (Kagan, 2001b), there is a slim chance Ottawa could keep all three of 
their top salaries together while maintaining a financially viable team. 
Another team that was competitive from 1999-00 to 2000-01, amassing a record 
of 79-68-17-9, was the Pittsburgh Penguins (Klein & Reif, 2001; NHL 2001-2002 
Standings, 2002; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003). Mario Lemieux, drafted by the 
Penguins first overall in the 1984 entry draft (NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003), bought 
the troubled team, who had filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in October of 1998. The 
owners at the time, Howard Baldwin and Roger Marino, owed 200 creditors 
approximately $120 million. They also paid $6 million per year, more than any other 
team in the league, to lease out their playing venue from SMG. Lemieux Development 
paid an estimated $95 million for the team. Lemieux himself fronted $25 million for a 
majority ownership stake in the team while forgiving $7.5 million in back salary and the 
other $70 million came from his investor group. The new lease agreement is also in line 
with other ones around the league. The Penguins pay $1 million per season while the 
lesser, SMG, agreed to invest $5 million in Lemieux’s plan for a stake in ownership plus 
voting rights on the board (Kagan, 2001b).  
As competitive as the team was for two more seasons after Lemieux Development 
bought the franchise, the 1998-99 operating losses of $13 million plus combined debt 
equaling $38 million in 1999-00 (Kagan, 2001b), caused the Penguins, in part, to trade 
away their highest salaries, which meant key players. In July of 2001, Pittsburgh traded 
away, arguably their best player at the time and perhaps the best in the league, Jaromir 
Jagr, along with Frantisek Kucera, to the Washington Capitals in exchange for Kris 
Beech, Michal Sivek, Russ Lupaschuk and future considerations (NHLPA.com Player 
Search, 2003). The only player on any NHL payroll at the beginning of the 2002-03 
season was Jaromir Jagr (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003) and the other four players 
were not even found in the NHLPA database (NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003). Two 
years later, from February 9th to March 11th of 2003, Pittsburgh traded away 10 players 
on their payroll along with two others within the organization and a conditional draft pick 
(NHL Trade Deadline 2003, 2003) amounting to a total salary of $11.9 million per year 
(NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003) in exchange for 12 new players, three draft picks, $4 
million in much needed cash (NHL Trade Deadline 2003, 2003) and a total salary of $5.8 
million per year. Included in the players Pittsburgh traded away were Alexei Kovalev and 
Janne Laukkanen, who took up two of Pittsburgh’s top four salaries. Out of the two 
salaries at the top of the Penguins’ payroll at the end of 2002-03, one belonged to the 
owner, Lemieux, at $5.3 million, who, of course, forgave back salary once already. The 
other, at $4.0 million, belonged to Martin Straka. Four other players sat at just over $1.0 
million and the total payroll was down to $25.0 million from $31.0 million at the 
beginning of the season (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003; NHL Trade Deadline 2003, 
2003). 
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Of course, in all its dealings, Pittsburgh received more players in return at cheaper 
salaries (NHL Salaries, 2002-2003, 2003; NHL Trade Deadline 2003, 2003) however, 
along with two key players in Jan Hrdina and Alexei Kovalev who accounted for just 
over 20% of Pittsburgh’s goals all year, they gave up a lot of experience; 4,716 man-
games in exchange for 1,497 man-games to be exact (NHL Trade Deadline 2003, 2003; 
NHLPA.com Player Search, 2003). During the midst of all the trades, on February 19th, 
2003, Pittsburgh sat tied for 10th spot among 15 teams in their conference (Mackie, 2003, 
March 7). At the end of the year, after all the transactions, Pittsburgh finished in 14th 
spot, four points out of last overall, and only managed another four wins in 24 games 
(NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003).      
With this tremendous drop in the standings, it is probably no coincidence that 
Pittsburgh’s attendance went from 21st overall on February 1st, 2003 (Matheson, 2003, 
February 1) to 25th overall by the end of the season (NHL Attendance Leaders, 2003). As 
was illustrated earlier, fans prefer to watch winning teams, or at least a team they think 
will have a chance of winning. Mario Lemieux, the owner, has said that his team cannot 
compete with the current economic system in the NHL (Sullivan, 2003, February 12). 
And to their credit, general manager Craig Patrick has said the club is in the process of 
rebuilding with an eye towards the new collective bargaining agreement in 2004. By 
keeping his payroll young and inexpensive right now, he hopes to be in a better position 
to compete if and when a new system is in place (Pens rebuilding, Patrick says, 2003, 
March 13). In saying this, as with other teams described earlier, the economic system did 
not cause the Penguins to go bankrupt but it makes it hard for them to generate any kind 
of profit, while staying competitive, in order to pay down their debt.  
Over the course of an 82 regular game season, the league shows a significant 
winning percentage/payroll correlation most years and if the current system is not 
changed, this phenomenon could worsen leaving Canadian and American small market 
teams battling for the basement (Sullivan, 2003, April 14) and thus fan support. 
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Appendix G 
NHL Large Market versus Small Market  
 
The small markets that most of the Canadian teams play in make it difficult to 
compete with the rising revenues throughout the league. Edmonton and Calgary play in 
two of the oldest buildings with few luxury boxes. Skyreach Centre has been renovated 
twice in the last 10 years and now has 50 luxury suites and 16 skyboxes (Kagan, 2001b), 
however, the seating capacity has dropped to 16,839 from 17,100. The Pengrowth 
Saddledome has 72 luxury suites (Kagan, 2001b) with a seating capacity of 17,409. The 
Flames made $1.6 million a year from 1998-99 to 2000-01 on their luxury suite sales 
while the Saddledome kept $2.4 million each year and the Oilers received $1 million per 
year during the same period with Skyreach Centre keeping $1 million per year. Ottawa’s 
luxury suite revenue has been increasing steadily over the years from $600,000 in 1998-
99 to $900,000 in 2000-01 (Kagan, 2001b), however, now that Eugene Melnyk owns the 
arena that number could increase to $9 million or higher (Kagan, 2001b). The Corel 
Centre was built in 1996 and Ottawa only sold 75% of the suites in 2000-01 while 
advertising out of a market slightly larger than that of Edmonton or Calgary. In addition, 
Pittsburgh only generated $2.2 million in luxury suite revenue (Kagan, 2001b). The point 
here is that if Edmonton, Calgary and Pittsburgh were to build huge arenas with over one 
hundred luxury suites like many of the new arenas across Canada and the US (Kagan, 
2001b), the market would probably not supply tenants to fill all the boxes at the same 
prices. Most of the large markets including New York and Detroit along with Montreal 
and Toronto receive $9 to $12 million in luxury suite revenue and are also able to sell the 
boxes for two to three times what Edmonton, Calgary, Pittsburgh and Ottawa can (Kagan, 
2001b). See Table D2 for a list of all the teams’ luxury suite numbers, prices and 2001 
revenue. 
Local television deals vary across the league depending on what the market 
allows for with small market teams at the bottom of that list. Toronto and Montreal had 
healthy local and cable television deals in 2000-01 at $18.5 million and $10.5 million 
respectively. Edmonton and Vancouver were around the league average of $6.9 million at 
$6.5 million and $6.2 million while Ottawa and Calgary were at the bottom of the list at 
$1.5 and $2 million, however, Calgary had 13 games on local stations with undisclosed 
revenue and Ottawa six. Buffalo only generated $3.5 million in cable television deals 
(Kagan, 2001b). Even sponsorship and signage provided significantly more revenue in 
2000-01 for some teams like Dallas, New York and Detroit who received $12, $9.4 and 
$8.5 million respectively while Pittsburgh, Ottawa, Edmonton and Calgary each received 
between $2.5 and $4 million. Table 10 shows each team’s local revenue in 2000-01.  
So what should be done to stabilize team finances across the NHL? Should the market 
dictate where these teams will play? If Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Buffalo, Washington 
and Pittsburgh cannot generate the same revenue as Toronto, New York, Detroit, 
Colorado, Philadelphia and Dallas, should they be moved to a city that can, even though 
the fan support is evident (Buffalo and Pittsburgh historically have had good fan support 
except for this past season; 91% and 94% average capacity respectively over the 14 years 
previous to 2002-03 (Attendance Figures, 2002))? The answer is no and the 
recommendations for a stronger league are based on the findings in chapter three as well 
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on the evidence presented in Appendices H and I concerning the financial and 
competitive states of the NBA and NFL.   
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Appendix H 
Competitive and Financial Issues in the NBA 
 
The average salary in the NBA has steadily risen from $2.2 million, one year 
before the lockout in 1997-98 to $2.9 million in 1999-00, one year after the lockout 
(Kagan, 2001b) and in 2002-03 it sat at $4.1 million (Salary Cap for 2003-04 Season Set 
at $43.84 Million, 2003). Table 8 outlines team salaries for the NBA over the last three 
seasons. Even with the large amount of shared revenue combined with an artificial 
restraint on salaries, the league has not appeared to maintain financial stability or 
competitive balance. The NBA does not share in local revenues and many disparities 
between teams continue to exist (playoff income is not included in any revenue figures 
unless specifically referred to).  
 In 2000-01, the New York Knicks generated $159.5 million in revenue and the 
Vancouver Grizzlies and Charlotte Hornets only brought in $52.5 and $57.4 million 
respectively. While the Grizzlies are now in Memphis and the Hornets in New Orleans, 
five other teams brought in $70 million or less and a total of seven teams generated over 
$90 million. As outlined in Table 7, 16 teams had a positive cash flow in 2000-01 but 13 
teams lost money. The top eight averaged a cash flow of $23.7 million while the bottom 
eight lost an average of $10.3 million. The average between revenues and expenses for 
the whole league in 2000-01 was $4.5 million, which is even worse than the NHL’s 
average of $7 million (Kagan, 2001a, 2001b).  
 Many of the money losing NBA teams with low revenues outlined in Table 7 
maintained attendance above the league average of 86.1% of capacity in 2000-01 and 
expenses below or close to the league average of $78.9 million. Included in this list and 
verified by Tables 7 and 9 are Minnesota, Milwaukee, Dallas, Seattle and San Antonio 
(Kagan, 2001a). As with most professional sports leagues, the NBA is also performance 
driven. In 2002-03, the 17 teams with winning records brought in an average attendance 
of 89.8% of capacity while the 12 teams with losing records generated an attendance of 
83.8% of capacity (NBA Attendance, 2003; NBA Standings, 2003). Attendance in the 
NBA continues to rise but was still lower than the NFL and NHL in 2002-03 (Tables 6, 9 
and 12).  
 Lower overall attendance might very well have to do with the fact that the NBA is 
still competitively unbalanced. Table 2 illustrates that even with a soft salary cap, through 
1990-1996, it was not as balanced as the NFL, which shares vigorously in local revenue. 
Even after the adjustments to the salary cap in 1999, Table 3 illustrates only one year of 
competitive balance. Perhaps with the addition of the payroll tax in 2002 (NBA CBA, 
n.d.), those numbers will eventually improve.  
 The payroll tax after the 2002-03 season amounted to $151.2 million (NBA Team 
Salaries, 2002-03, 2003; Salary Cap for 2003-04 Season Set at $43.84 Million, 2003), 
which will be distributed to certain NBA teams based on the discretion of the league. The 
tax did not seem to increase salaries too much the year after it was instituted as illustrated 
by Table. Table 3 illustrates that teams with higher payrolls win more often, providing a 
big incentive for at least some teams to lure in bigger stars. It is hard to measure the 
effects of the tax right now but if the loopholes were ignored and $151.2 million was 
spread evenly over the bottom half of the league in terms of revenue for 2000-01, each 
team would have received an average of $10.1 million and three of those teams would 
 129 
                                                               
have still lost money. Milwaukee would have been in the black by about $1 million 
(Kagan, 2001a).  
 Several teams in the NBA generate much more in local revenue than others and 
Table 7 illustrates this. The LA Clippers had a profit of $11.3 million in 2000-01 but their 
payroll was only $25.2 million. That was $24.0 million below the average. Although they 
only generated an average attendance of 73.1% of capacity, if ticket revenue was 
increased another 27% to reflect 100% of capacity, it would equal $33.7 million bringing 
the profit up to $20.4 million. Had they tried to build a team with an average payroll, it 
would have resulted in a $4 million loss. Another good example is Minnesota, especially 
since they had good attendance in 2000-01 with average expenses but still lost $3.8 
million even though they were below the average payroll (Kagan, 2001a).  
 Again, it is hard to judge what kind of effect the latest CBA will have on 
competitive and financial stability especially since it has only been in place for four years 
with the luxury tax only in its second year of enforcement. The current results illustrate a 
league still divided by large and small markets resulting in volatility and so far the 
payroll tax has not compelled too many teams to change their spending habits. 
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Appendix I 
Competitive and Financial Issues in the NFL 
 
 The average salary in 1996-97 was $791,000. It then dropped to $725,000 in 
1997-98 but increased to just under $1.14 million in 1998-99. In 2002-03 the average 
salary was up to slightly over $1.5 million (Kagan, 2002). Table 5 outlines team salaries 
from 2000 to 2002.     
 The NFL is a financially stable league (playoff income is not included in any 
revenue figures unless specifically referred to). In 2000-01, the Arizona Cardinals 
brought in the least amount of revenue at $98.6 million while the Washington Redskins 
collected $158.9 million, however, those represent the two extremes. In 2002-03, the 
figures jumped to $111.8 million and $167.4 million respectively. As outlined in Table 4, 
revenues in the NFL are generally higher than expenses and the average between the two 
for the whole league in 2000-01 was almost $20 million. This is significantly higher than 
the NHL’s difference outlined in Table 10, which is only $6.8 million. In fact, only the 
Seattle Seahawks have lost money in more than one fiscal year since 1998 and judging by 
Tables 4 and 6, that was probably due to excessively high expenses and lower than 
average attendance. From 1999-00 to 2001-02, they lost a total of $17.4 million, 
however, their cash flow was $8.1 million in 2002-03. In addition, only Green Bay, 
Indianapolis, New Orleans, Oakland and Philadelphia also lost money in the same time, 
however, only during one fiscal year each for an accumulated total of $10.3 million. The 
rest of the league has remained in the black (Kagan, 2002).  
 The financial disparities between NFL teams are fewer and less in magnitude than 
those in the NHL. Only 7 teams maintained a spot in the top 15 places in terms of 
revenue generation five years straight from 1998-99 to 2002-03 while 9 maintained a 
position in the bottom 16. The NHL saw 11 teams in each of those positions from 1998-
99 to 2000-01. Average cash flow for the top eight teams in 2000-01 was $31.1 million 
and $7.1 million for the bottom eight (Kagan, 2002). During the same year, the NHL saw 
the bottom eight teams lose $5.4 million on average while the top eight cleared $21.9 
million (Kagan, 2001b). 
 As with the NHL and the NBA, fans prefer to watch a winning, or, at least, 
competitive team. Out of the 19 teams in the NFL that had at least a .500 record in 2002, 
the average attendance was 97.8% whereas the thirteen teams that had losing records only 
saw, on average, 89.8% of their venues filled (NFL Attendance, 2003; NFL Standings, 
1997-2002, 2003). However, even a 90% capacity rating is respectable when compared to 
sports venues around North America. As indicated in Table 6, attendance in the NFL is 
steadily on the rise. In fact, in each of the last three years, only seven teams or less have 
not filled their stadium to 90% of capacity. Arizona seems to consistently draw small 
crowds, which is a good reason why they have the lowest revenue intake. The rest of the 
team’s attendance varies usually depending on how well they are doing however the 
league is very competitively balanced and no team really sees a lag in attendance for a 
sustained period of time.  
 Because the NFL has such a huge equally distributed television contract and a 60-
40-gate receipt split (after 15% is deducted from home gate receipts for administration 
purposes) both combined with a hard salary cap, no team really has an opportunity to 
stock their team with expensive talent. Table 5 indicates that the average salary in 2000-
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01 was $68.1 million while Table 4 shows that each team was guaranteed $74.5 million 
in shared merchandising, expansion and media revenues. In 2002-03, those numbers 
respectively jumped to $86.8 million and $87.7 million. Most teams in the NFL can stock 
their rosters without even selling a ticket (Kagan, 2002)! 
 Tables 2 and 3 illustrate there is little correlation between winning percentage and 
payroll like there is in the NHL or the NBA. There is a hard salary cap in the NFL, 
however, some teams do not reach the cap and certain loopholes allow some to exceed it 
creating a fluctuation in payrolls. It is interesting to note that in three of the four years 
before the salary cap was instituted and the free agency rules relaxed (Table 2) (1990-
1993), the NFL showed a significant correlation between payroll and winning percentage. 
However, since the amendments, and in eight out of nine years (Tables 2 and 3), there 
has been no significant correlation between payroll and winning percentage.  
 Because of all the shared revenue the NFL enjoys, there are very few problems in 
the area of franchise viability. Table 4 outlines NFL gate revenue by team. In 2000-01, 
with the exception of a few teams at the top and bottom, most of the combined revenues 
fluctuated around $20 to $25 million. Even luxury suite revenue did not show a 
significantly uneven distribution between small and large market teams. Small markets 
like Baltimore, Buffalo, Kansas City, Green Bay and Indianapolis had luxury suite 
revenue in the top half of the league in 2000-01 while places like New York, Philadelphia 
and Chicago were in the bottom half. Building agreements and ownership arrangements 
dictate some of the revenue. However, where some teams lose out in places like luxury 
suite revenue, they make up for in advertising or local media and the figures in Table 4 
indicate that as a whole the small markets are alive and well (Kagan, 2002) based mostly 
on the windfall of the healthy revenue sharing arrangement.   
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Appendix J 
1967 Concessions and 1975 CBA 
 
 The NHLPA was recognized in June of 1967. The first set of concessions gained 
by the union did not amount to much. Minimum wage was boosted to $10,000 however 
only one player at the time was actually making less than $10,000 and the season went 
from 70 to 74 games with another playoff round and no remuneration for the players. 
Meal allowances went up $5 a day and the players got paid for some exhibition games. 
But while the new NBC television contract and increased attendance revenue went from 
$892,000 to $2.2 million, the players’ share of league wide revenue fell 1.4% and shortly 
after expansion, from 1969 to 1971, the league’s revenue increased 15.6% but the 
players’ salaries and benefits only went up 9%. Further agreements were reached through 
collective bargaining on other issues and the first written CBA was published in 1975 
however the owners, as usual, complained about their financial troubles and the majority 
of the new agreement was just a rubber-stamping of the decisions handed down by the 
US Department of Justice along with the concessions forced upon the NHL by the rival 
WHA (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 1997). 
 133 
                                                               
Appendix K 
The 1982 and 1986 CBAs 
 
In 1981, the owners were against total free agency because they wanted to protect 
their substantial player development investment and predicted that total free agency 
would spark salary increases that would aggravate the owners’ financial plight. Many of 
them argued that they were losing money. The players on the other hand, argued that the 
old system of equalization whereby the acquiring team had to give up a player on their 
roster discouraged free agency and kept salaries depressed. The draft age had been 
reduced to 18 resulting in an influx of players thereby reducing the average length of an 
NHL career by three or four years. The players thought if free agency were liberalized it 
would offset this trend by increasing salaries during time spent in the league (Berry et al., 
1986, p. 224-226). 
In the end though, the players took the owners’ words that teams were losing 
money and for fear of bankrupting any of them agreed to keep the free agency rules 
restrictive otherwise the supply of players might rise which would really depress salaries. 
The final agreement reached on August 17, 1982 was for five years. Players could 
become unrestricted free agents at age 33 otherwise compensation was required. The old 
system of equalization remained in effect for players under the age of 24 or with less than 
five years of pro experience. All other free agents were compensated for in the form of 
draft picks on a sliding salary scale. With free agents making less than $85,000 or inside 
the boundaries of the old system of equalization, a right of first refusal existed whereby 
the previous club could retain the free agent by matching the offer of the new team (Berry 
et al., 1986, p. 226-227). 
With this new system, player movement was still quite restrictive and during the 
life of the 1982 agreement, no free agents changed clubs in situations in which they were 
subject to significant compensation from the signing club, which made it a leading topic 
of the players’ union during talks about a new CBA in 1986. The sliding salary scale was 
adjusted slightly but really only reflected the rising pay levels. Now, if a player made 
under $110,000, no compensation was required. If a team lacked a qualified draft pick as 
compensation, a cash penalty was required and the age for unrestricted free agency went 
from 33 to 31 (Staudohar, 1996, pp. 156-157). 
The fact that the players received relatively little freedom in their unrestricted 
movement among other concessions had a lot to do with their negotiating strategy in the 
early years of the union and it cost them dearly. Essentially, they elected to trade freedom 
of movement, equitable grievance procedures, arbitration reform, a cut of broadcast 
revenue and an improvement in the playoff split, which were all advances made by 
players associations in other major league sports, for meagre improvements in the 
pension plan and medical benefits (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
The strategy was flawed, for one, because the players did not control or have any 
input into the pension fund and the owners did not disclose any more information than 
they had to which amounted to a yearly audit and proper contributions. Up until 1986, the 
NHLPA gave up the chance for free movement of players in exchange for enhancements 
to pension benefits however the benefits came from the surplus in the fund, which was 
not from the owners, but from the players’ own deposits in the 50s and 60s. Even in 1986 
when Eagleson negotiated a $250,000 retirement bonus to be paid at age 55 to players 
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with 400 or more games to their credit, the owners simply allocated a percentage of the 
surplus already in the fund to pay for it (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991 p. 266-267). 
Secondly, the NHLPA never took into consideration the future value of an $8 
million and $12 million pension increase in 1979 and 1986 respectively. 30 years down 
the road, they would be worth rather less than their face value. In addition, in order to pay 
for the $250,000 retirement bonus, only $16,871 had to be set-aside in 1986. If 20% of 
the players then in the NHL were to make the magic 400-game mark, the league would 
have had to set aside only $1.36 million to cover the commitment when the first players 
claimed their bonus in approximately 30 years time (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). The 
problem was that most players figured they would play 400 games and be eligible for that 
$250,000 at age 55 so they weren’t overly concerned about present income. They did not 
realize they could have made even more than that with the advent of unrestricted free 
agency (Houston & Shoalts, 1993, pp. 161-162). 
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Appendix L 
The 1992 CBA 
 
With the collective bargaining agreement set to expire in 1991, the union had a 
new leader in Bob Goodenow. His demands were lengthy and specific. Included were the 
use of an independent arbitrator to interpret the league’s constitution and bylaws instead 
of the president, all amendments be negotiated with the NHLPA, payment to the players 
of 60% of the revenues from the first four playoff games of each series, increased 
insurance and pension benefits (Stein, 1997) including a pro-rated amount out of the 
lump sum of $250,000 for players that did not reach the 400-game mark, a reduction in 
the entry draft system by six rounds and a restructuring of the free agency bylaws to 
reduce equalization by compensation (Staudohar, 1996, pp. 150-151).  
Ziegler countered with three controversial offers. As a disincentive to a strike and 
to reduce the demand for additional playoff revenue, he suggested that instead of the 
players being paid all of their annual salary before the playoffs commenced, on 
agreement with the club, he wanted players paid twice a month throughout the calendar 
year. Second, as trading card revenues were sure to increase from a meagre $100,000 per 
year, the league requested that the players sell their photographs to trading card 
companies during 1991-92. The standard players contract said that clubs had exclusive 
rights to player photographs but with the limited revenue it was generating, the club had 
overlooked the fact that Eagleson had sold the rights to various companies. After 1991-
92, the league was going to want some of the anticipated multi-million dollar revenue. 
The owners also wanted each team to reduce their roster by one skater thereby 
eliminating a salary (Stein, 1997).  
 Goodenow would not give in to any of Ziegler’s requests, which pleased the 
players. He did not listen to Ziegler and did not agree that collective bargaining required 
a give and take on both sides. Goodenow only wanted what he thought were overdue 
gains for the players. He would not listen to the owners’ alleged financial predicaments, 
the meetings went nowhere and for the first time, the NHL’s CBA expired without a new 
one in place (Stein, 1997).  
 During 1991-92, both sides agreed to continue under the rules of the old CBA 
without a work stoppage however on April 1, 1992, the players went on strike. Most of 
the amendments had been worked out except for the issues of an independent arbitrator 
along with the trading card fiasco. Goodenow did not want to give up this primary source 
of revenue for the NHLPA (Stein, 1997).  
 By this point, NHL player salaries had risen substantially, which is why it was 
difficult for most to understand why the NHL players would want to strike. Ray Ferraro, 
a player at the time, brought things into perspective by suggesting that its previous leader 
misrepresented the union so maybe a strike was necessary (Fischler, 1995, p. 30).  
Of course the owners were not used to this backlash from the players and some of 
the old-line conservative like Chicago owner, Bill Wirtz, Boston owner, Jeremy Jacobs, 
and New Jersey owner, John McMullen, were willing to go head to head with Goodenow 
and sacrifice the season however others wanted to salvage the playoffs (Fischler, 1995, 
pp. 35-36). 
Finally, Ziegler made a statement to the players and it was clear the majority of 
the owners wanted the playoffs to commence, “if it will make the players happy, if it will 
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be the thing that gets them back to what they do best, playing the game, I will call it a 
surrender. I will call it an unconditional surrender. All they have to do is go back and 
play hockey.” (Fischler, 1995 p. 34) 
Negotiations had stalled for six days and following his statement, Ziegler sent a 
proposal to Goodenow agreeing to give up the owners’ stance on trading cards. The 
union had to accept the offer within 48 hours or the season would end. Goodenow agreed 
to the offer but requested some other amendments (Stein, 1997). In the end the owners 
received four extra games however the players received the revenue from two of them. 
The contract would expire in two years and the draft was reduced by one round. The 
players’ share of trading card revenue remained at 68% and the union was allowed input 
into choice of arbitrators. Eligibility for unrestricted free agency went from 31 to 30 and 
other compensation rules were adjusted slightly in the players’ favour however the 
relatively generous compensation to teams that lost free agents aged 25-29 continued to 
impede player movement. In addition, their playoff pool was increased by about 100% 
over two years (Staudohar, 1996, pp. 151, 157).   
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Appendix M 
Salary Arbitration and Free Agency in MLB 
 
 With Marvin Miller at the helm, the players were able to retain solidarity which 
perpetuated their growing power thereby giving them the ability to challenge the existing 
practices of the owners they felt conflicted with their own interests. Two of these 
practices included misrepresentation in salary disputes and the continuation of the reserve 
clause.  
 Miller negotiated salary arbitration in 1973, which stipulated that if a player had a 
salary dispute with his club, an impartial arbitrator would decide a binding figure. It 
prevented the suppression of salaries as well as a bias commissioner, who was working 
for the owners, from deciding what a player should make (Berry et al., 1986, p. 58; 
Miller, 1991). The method, which continues to be used, limits the arbitrator to choose 
only one salary or the other and he or she is not permitted to exercise any middle ground 
(Berry et al., 1986, p. 58). Players who have accumulated three or more years of service 
are eligible for salary arbitration (MLB CBA, n.d.). This practice, along with the advent 
of free agency, has allowed players to make significant gains in terms of compensation.  
 Arguably, Miller’s greatest feat was his role in the abolishment of the reserve 
clause, which led to unrestricted free agency. Miller knew that the owners themselves 
were not all that confident in the reserve clause. Evidently, they had a binding right to re-
sign a player without his signature but even so it wasn’t until 1972 that a player actually 
played in a regular season game without signing a contract. That was Ted Simmons. It 
seemed as though the owners were unsure of what would happen should they actually use 
the reserve clause regularly and figured that unsigned contracts could not be renewed 
more than once. Before long a player, in his own best interest, could complete a season 
under a renewed contract and then, since he did not have a contractual connection to any 
club, declare free agency (Miller, 1991). 
 The real test came when two pitchers, Andy Messermith of the Dodgers and Dave 
McNally of the Expos, refused to sign contracts for the 1975 season. Messermith wanted 
a no-trade provision or at least the right to approve a trade and McNally was about to 
retire but even so was still the property of Montreal for life as that was the case under the 
reserve clause. Their clubs renewed their 1974 contracts themselves. They had the right 
to do so under the renewal clause, which stated that a player’s contract, could be renewed 
for one additional year (Berry et al., 1986, p. 56; Miller, 1991). 
 However, at the end of the 1975 season, the commissioner declined free agency 
status to Messermith, who the union used as their test case. The two sides could not 
negotiate a settlement so the matter went to arbitration. Each side made their case for 
three days. The arbitrator, Peter Seitz, decided that nothing in the reserve clause 
stipulated that a contract could be renewed for more than one year. Messermith was 
awarded free agency, which changed the institutional rule that kept baseball players 
exploited. The owners appealed the decision to the federal district court in Kansas City 
but lost and decided not to appeal to the US Supreme Court. Messermith was officially a 
free agent and essentially, so were hundreds of other players who did not sign contracts 
for the 1976 season (Berry et al., 1986, p. 56-57; Miller, 1991). 
 Shortly after the Messermith decision, the owners locked the players out of spring 
training. They wanted to negate the impact of the decision meaning that no players would 
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become free agents whether or not they signed contracts for 1976. The owners were mad 
that almost 350 players opted for free agency. They proposed that players be allowed to 
become free agents after 9 years of service and only if the existing club refused to pay 
them $30,000 per year. In addition, the new club would have to give the old club 
compensation. This would pretty much negate free agency and was not a realistic way to 
negotiate a player’s salary (Miller, 1991). 
 The players were willing to negotiate free agency but were not prepared to give it 
up, which is essentially what the owners proposal illustrated. The 1976 lockout ended 17 
days in when it was apparent that the players were uniting and not dissenting and 
negotiations commenced for present and future free agency eligibility requirements 
(Miller, 1991).  
 Miller did not believe it was in the best interests of the players to all be free 
agents. This would create a huge supply and surely keep salaries down which is why 
another provision in the new CBA had to be a prohibition against collusion. There was no 
precedent to go on as no professional sports league ever had free agency. Miller’s feeling 
suggested four to six years with a preference for five. After the owners’ committee 
suggested six, Miller proposed five. He then agreed on six only if a player with five years 
of service could demand a trade while designating up to six clubs of which he would not 
accept a trade to, as well as the right to free agency should his team not trade him by 
March 15.  Free agency was upon baseball (Miller, 1991). 
 The owners tried to combat free agency in 1980-81 by refusing to bargain in good 
faith with the MLBPA. The owners would not provide evidence of the money they 
claimed to be losing and instead instituted an equalization plan without the authorization 
of the union. A long strike was averted and the 1980 season played on with the agreement 
to negotiate free agency over the following year. It was not solved though and the players 
had no choice but to strike in June of 1981 otherwise the owners compensation plan 
would take effect (Miller, 1991).  
 Again, the players would not back down and would continue to fight for the 
principle of something that took 100 years of punishment and hardship to win. Miller and 
the union were not simply trying to turn the players into millionaires. They just wanted a 
fair working environment whereby the owners could not maximize profits by only paying 
the players what they absolutely had to. The owners’ compensation scheme and the way 
they went about it angered Miller and he wanted complete and unconditional surrender 
from them (Miller, 1991).    
 The strike lasted about 50 days and the owners gave in. Miller’s proposal 
mandated that the owner’s compensation scheme, which did not in fact go into effect, be 
stricken from the basic agreement. The compensation negotiated saw a “pooled” plan 
instead whereby teams losing free agents would draw compensation from a pool of funds 
created by the conglomerate of franchises (Miller, 1991). 
 In the 1980s, the owners decided to restrict the movement of players on their own 
by acting in collusion with one another and agreeing to limit the number of free agent 
signings to a bare minimum. Arguably, the main purpose was to curb the actions of New 
York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, who was said to spur the rise in salaries with 
his signing of Catfish Hunter to a huge contract in 1975 which included a $1 million 
signing bonus, $150,000 salary per year for five years, life insurance benefits worth $1 
million and a substantial amount of deferred compensation (Berry et al., 1986, p. 54). The 
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players filed two grievances throughout the decade. In the end the owners were forced to 
pay players disadvantaged by the collusion $280 million while some players were also 
offered the chance to become free agents again (Miller, 1991). 
The players maintained their strong stance against restricted free agency 
throughout the 1990s of which the owners locked the players out in 1990 and the players 
struck in 1994-95. The league constantly tried to restrict salary arbitration and abolish 
free agency. They wanted a salary cap in the form of a fixed scale when they had been 
working under individual negotiations for 100 years because all of a sudden the current 
system was not working for them. However the union stuck to their guns. Miller had 
stepped down by 1990 but acted in the capacity of a consultant to the union during the 
lockout (Miller, 1991). 
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Appendix N 
Conflict Among Owners 
 
 Ed Snider, the owner of the Philadelphia Flyers, referred to the signings of Wayne 
Gretzky and Scott Stevens mentioned earlier and suggested that some owners had opened 
the floodgates and the NHL had gone the way of their brothers in baseball and basketball 
in terms of overspending (Fischler, 1995, p. 31). His general manager, Bob Clarke, 
essentially said the same thing after the lockout of 1994-95 and added the league would 
be alright if the owners were smart and tough enough to hold the line on salaries until 
revenues increased (Fischler, 1995, p. 164). 
 The owner of the Boston Bruins, Jeremy Jacobs and his general manager, Harry 
Sinden, try to follow the same philosophy. Jacobs wants to win and he’ll spend whatever 
it takes however he spends for value. If a certain player is needed to get the job done, 
he’ll let the general manager sign him. Therefore, unnecessarily expensive signings by 
his other general managers angers Harry Sinden (Fischler, 1995, p. 158). One deal that 
particularly annoyed him was Vancouver’s decision to sign defenceman Jeff Brown to a 
four-year, $7.8 million contract, “Although the Canucks had a lousy year, they ended up 
getting to the Stanley Cup finals (1994), they didn’t make any money doing it, but now 
they’ve signed a player for more money than Ray Bourque who’s won 15 All-Star berths. 
How can I have sympathy any more? I give up.” (Fischler, 1995, p. 160) He also 
mentioned how he was displeased with the New York Rangers and the St. Louis Blues in 
terms of their high spending habits (Fischler, 1995, p. 160). 
 But while both the owners of the Flyers and Bruins talk about controlling salaries, 
they were both guilty of spending quite lavishly themselves. Ed Snider paid $15 million 
for the rights to Eric Lindros (Fischler, 1995, p. 31) and the Boston Bruins signed former 
Pittsburgh Penguin Kevin Stevens to an expensive deal shortly after Pittsburgh won the 
Stanley Cup (Matheson, 2003, February 18). Boston also signed rookie Joe Thornton to 
an incentive-laden contract that drove his salary up to an unprecedented level, especially 
for rookies (Friedman, 2003, February 1). To Boston’s credit though and Philadelphia for 
that matter, Howard Baldwin, who use to own the Penguins did credit Sinden and Jacobs 
for their ability to hold the line on players salaries. Of course that was right before they 
signed Stevens (Matheson, 2003, February 18). 
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Appendix O 
Self-Serving Interests 
 
 The cohesion within the board of governors was quite low in 1991, one year 
before the strike, and the owners were still a fractious bunch, undermined by internecine 
squabbles (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). Jim Lites, the vice-president of the Detroit Red 
Wings admitted that self-interest was the biggest problem faced by hockey. The league 
was creeping along powered by 21 different approaches, all of who were paying lip 
service to the league’s best interest. Lites said, “They are being deceitful if they say they 
have the League’s best interest at heart. To a degree they do, but they are really worried 
about their own ass first. We are no different in that regard. We have the League’s 
interest first – after our own!” (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991 p. 327) 
 It is apparent that even the owners with money who vow to hold a line on salaries 
have trouble following their own philosophy and Gary Bettman has said that is the fault 
of the system which causes 30 different owners to spend in pursuit of a championship 
(Friedman, 2003, February 1). However after the 1994 lockout of which a solution to 
introduce substantial revenue sharing was not met, one owner said, “We are united by our 
problems and divided by our solutions.” (Sheehan, 1996, p. 127) The owners can only 
agree that players should be paid less and not how to split revenues to ensure the viability 
of small market teams (Sheehan, 1996, pp. 125-127). 
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Appendix P 
Television – An Early Dependency 
 
 In the 1950s, hockey was one of the first pro sports to be televised and was fairly 
even with other sports in terms of revenue (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991) however the 
popularity waned. When a local television station asked the Boston Bruins to give up five 
seats to accommodate a better camera angle, the team flatly refused and told the station 
they were in the business of selling seats and not helping out TV (Cruise & Griffiths, 
1991; Houston, 2003, January 20). The networks also wanted the NHL to cooperate in 
scheduling and marketing but the NHL considered those suggestions to be meddling and 
did not want the networks telling them how to run their sport (Berry et al., 1986, p. 223). 
 After the expansion of 1967, the NHL did little more than they had done before to 
actually cater to television (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991) and only received a paltry $2 
million a year from CBS compared to the NFL’s $14 million in 1965. Three years later, 
NBC bought the rights for slightly more however ratings remained consistently weak 
(Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 1997). Weekly television coverage was dropped in 1974 
due to a huge fall in the ratings (Radar, 1984, p. 145). 
 Infrequent scoring during the same era due to expansion made the game less 
appealing to the novice viewer especially. Because the league doubled in size in 1967 
with an additional nine teams in the 1970s, the dilution of talent became apparent. As a 
result, without the ability to score, many teams resorted to a defensive style of play 
designed to neutralize and slow down the quick and talented players. Checking and 
toughness became more important than offensive skills but the league did not want to 
widen the gap any more between the strong and weak teams so they took a passive stance 
to violence and did little to give the offence more weapons (Radar, 1984, p. 145).  
 Even when the league could have increased it following by marketing superstar 
Wayne Gretzky or the New York Islanders dynasty of the early 1980s to all of the US, 
they did not take advantage (Houston, 2003, January 20). Instead, John Ziegler, probably 
acting on the information of his vice-president in charge of television, Skip Prince, who 
suggested that hockey was merely an amalgam of local markets working in concert to 
have a league and from a broadcasting standpoint was little more than a loose 
confederation with limited US interest, recommended a league policy of focusing on 
cable outlets and local markets directed at pursuing the attention of viewers who already 
had a keen interest in the sport (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994, pp. 75-76; Houston, 2003, 
January 20; Staudohar, 1996, p. 137). In the late 1980s, the NHL lost out on a contract 
with ESPN when they refused to lift local blackouts or provide exclusive rights to games 
covered by the station (Staudohar, 1996, p. 138). 
The league received a decent television package going from $5 million a year 
with Sportschannel in 1991-92 (Stein, 1997) to about $16 million a year with ESPN, 
beginning in 1992 and eventually extended until 1999, on the agreement that local 
blackouts would be lifted for the last two rounds of the playoffs and ESPN would have 
exclusive rights to certain games (Staudohar, 1996, p. 138). 
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Appendix Q 
Television – A Later Dependency 
 
 Gary Bettman took over as commissioner one year after Gil Stein negotiated the 
contract with ESPN and his leadership accelerated the change to promote hockey on 
national television. Bettman wanted to get more exposure for the NHL on TV in order to 
build a fan base. It was his understanding that the knowledgeable hockey fan had little 
trouble watching the game on TV because they were familiar with its rules and strategy. 
He wanted the game to become user-friendly for the casual fan, which would readily 
expand the fan base and audience (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994 p. 77). He was particularly 
interested in marketing the marquee players, something suggested for years by several 
people in the hockey world (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Fischler, 1995, p. 55).  
 In 1995, the commissioner reached a deal with FOX whereby the NHL would 
receive $155 million over five years. Camera angles were added making it easier to see 
the puck and rules were instituted to decrease fighting. Things looked promising and 
shared revenue increased dramatically (Staudohar, 1996, pp. 138-139).  
Three years later, the NHL under Bettman signed a five-year deal with the Walt 
Disney Company that paid the league $600 million for national television rights. ESPN 
would retain all cable rights for $350 million and ABC received the broadcast rights for 
$250 million (Kagan, 2001b). The fact that Disney owns a team probably accelerated this 
deal however another aspect might have been the NHL’s involvement in the 1998 
Olympics. NHL president Gil Stein came up with the idea shortly before the 1994 Winter 
Games. Realizing that competitive players in the NHL come from all over the globe, 
showcasing them in a world-class event would create an atmosphere of parity and 
perhaps turn the American audience onto the sport. The logistics were too complicated to 
allow the players compete in 1994 however they did in 1998 (Stein, 1997) and a 
blockbuster national television deal was reached the following summer. 
 Even with these national television deals, critics still complain about the fact that 
players in the NHL do not get expelled for fighting. As a result of this factor combined 
with others, the league has yet to expand its viewer base to attract the casual viewer like 
the NFL has done, and that is what advertisers are really looking for (Houston, 2003, 
January 20).  
 25 years after Hockey Night in Canada’s Ralph Mellanby suggested it in 1978, 
the NHL has finally sped up the game with quicker line changes and they have also been 
trying to crack down on the obstructive, defensive play by calling more penalties away 
from the puck particularly in the neutral zone (Houston, 2003, January 20). According to 
Bettman, the fans are telling the league they like what they see and he thinks the game 
does not require any radical changes (Friedman, 2003, February 1). However, in terms of 
national American broadcast revenue, hockey still remains sixth behind the other three 
major sports leagues, NASCAR and the PGA. In addition, the Stanley Cup final usually 
only attracts about 3.3 million US households while the NBA final and the World Series 
attract over 10 million and the Superbowl, close to 40 million (Houston, 2003, January 
20). 
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Appendix R 
TV and Monday Night Football 
 
 In order to attract a larger following and boost shared revenue even more, Rozelle 
worked with television networks to utilize the internal resources of NFL football more 
efficiently and increase the technical quality of the game. 
After the 1958 championship game that generated countrywide excitement after 
going into overtime, the NFL discovered they had a genuine national TV audience and 
Rozelle would use this as a major focus for a financially successful league. Along with 
Bill McPhail, the president of CBS Sports, Rozelle went around to different television 
affiliates throughout league cities in 1960-61 and got to know the big stations. Pete 
created friendships with the affiliates and did things to help sell them on NFL broadcasts. 
A lot of people throughout the whole country did not know about the NFL and Rozelle 
knew that television broadcasts would change this in a hurry (Harris, 1986).  
ABC accepted Rozelle’s offer to broadcast NFL Football in prime time, Monday 
nights (Chandler, 1991; Harris, 1986), and paid the NFL $8.5 million/year for the first 
four years. The station had little to lose and in return Rozelle convinced the league to 
schedule the best match ups for Monday nights. All the commercial slots were sold for 
$65,000/minute by May of 1970 and the first game was broadcasted in the fall of 1970. 
The station sold the broadcast by using two production units and focusing on the human 
drama inherent in the game. They personalized it and it was a hit. They were even able to 
convince advertisers that women did not mind football on a Monday night by way of an 
interview study directed at females. Ratings continued to increase throughout the 1970s 
and so did commercial slot prices. In 1974, ABC charged $100,000/minute and by 1982 
that price increased to $185,000 for 30 seconds (Chandler, 1991). Ratings were down 
slightly throughout the 1980s but ABC continued with the show and in 1989, a 30-second 
advertising time slot time cost between $225,000 and $250,000 (Chandler, 1991). 
Monday Night Football made the NFL accessible to millions who had never really cared 
about or understood the game (Chandler, 1991; Harris, 1986). Aspects of the sport such 
as manliness, discipline, complexity and athleticism were heightened so the audience 
could become aware of the delicate intricacies apparent in Football. The public reveres 
football and that equals viewer-ship (Chandler, 1991), which equals revenue and since 
it’s nationally televised, it equals more shared revenue.   
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Appendix S 
The NBA’s External Market 
 
In the mid-1950s, with the birth of TV, broadcasting became a very important 
source of revenue for professional basketball teams. Compared to football and baseball, 
the game was not particularly adept to radio broadcast as the play is too quick and 
continuous however television improved the output and subsequently technical quality of 
the game for fans (Noll, 1991). 
 The league also made an early commitment to constantly improve the attraction of 
the sport to fans. In its early years, a 24-second shot clock was introduced to speed up the 
game. The three-point shot was brought over from the ABA and since then shorter time-
outs have been introduced along with tougher officiating to reduce the violence. The 
NBA figures that almost everything except the 10-foot hoop is untouchable and continues 
to look for ways to improve the attraction of the sport (Rifkin, 1997).  
 The league also works with the networks by participating in weekly meetings 
aimed at improving the telecasts. They provide input to the stations on everything from 
what players to feature on NBC’s weekly “Inside Stuff” to new and different camera 
angles for the games (Rifkin, 1997).  
 As a result, national television broadcasts grew with local broadcasts. The NBA 
negotiated league-wide contracts with CBS of $39 million in 1986-87 and $47.5 million 
in 1989-90. In addition, Turner Broadcasting paid the league $12.5 million in 1986-87 
and 1987-88 (Noll, 1991). By 2002-03 that number had jumped to $766 million for all 
national television revenue (Houston, 2003, January 20).  
   
David Stern was the founder of NBA Properties, the league’s licensing division. 
He also established a trading card relationship early on, which has since reached out to 
four major trading card companies (Rifkin, 1997). 
David Stern also knew that if his star basketball players were showcased in the 
world’s largest sporting event, the Olympics, that would set the stage for worldwide 
recognition of the NBA. With the growing number of players coming into the NBA from 
outside the US, Stern’s goal is to raise international competition to the point that three or 
four nations will send teams to the Olympics entirely composed of NBA players (Rifkin, 
1997).  
The NBA no longer depends on only its patrons that attend the games to generate 
revenue and keep the league healthy. They have opened up their market to literally 
include the whole world. David Stern sells the league worldwide (Rifkin, 1997). 
The league now has offices in Geneva, Hong Kong, London, Melbourne, Mexico 
City, Latin America, Paris, Tokyo and Toronto. This gives the NBA a better record of 
media and television placement along with retailers and just a greater overall presence. 
NBA games are broadcasted in 180 countries and recognized all over the world (Rifkin, 
1997). This kind of exposure brings in league revenue to help the whole organization 
remain financially and competitively viable. 
The league also pushes itself through joint efforts with sponsors like McDonald’s. 
Top teams from around the world took part in the McDonald’s Championship in Paris in 
1997 (Rifkin, 1997). This continued exposure to a worldwide market creates a huge 
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customer base for NBA licensed apparel of which the league generates revenue to share 
among all the teams. 
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Appendix T 
Economic Theory on Salaries 
 
Quirk and Fort (1992, p. 216-217) explain that a player’s MRP (marginal revenue 
product) is the most a team will pay a player because paying a player more than this will 
decrease team profits while anything less than MRP adds profit to the team. But the 
lowest salary a player is willing to accept is his reservation wage, which represents the 
next-best employment opportunity (taking into account locational and other intangibles). 
The final figure lies somewhere in between the MRP and the reservation wage and 
depends on a number of considerations such as the uniqueness of the player’s skills 
compared to the supply of similar players available to the owner and where the 
negotiating rights for players and owners lie on the continuum of complete unrestricted 
free agency to the reserve clause system. 
However, some owners of professional sports teams are in it for the pure 
satisfaction of winning and will work to achieve that goal at any cost. They take a “fun 
and games” approach to ownership having already generated a healthy income through 
other enterprises. Generally speaking though, it is best to assume that the majority of 
owners are motivated by bottom-line considerations, no matter how wealthy they are. 
Even the true hobbyists will pay the maximum to put together a solid team while still 
yielding a small profit (Quirk & Fort, 1999, pp. 114-115).  
Using Kagan’s (2001b) data from the season’s 1998-99 to 2000-01, it is apparent 
that some of the wealthiest and most competitive NHL owners still retain some sort of 
profit from their hockey teams. Michael Ilitch, the owner of the Red Wings and George 
and Gordon Gund, the previous owner of the Sharks were all on the Forbes 1997 list 
meaning they were each worth at least $600 million (Quirk & Fort, 1999, pp. 95-96). Gil 
Stein (1997), the former president of the NHL has suggested that both Ilitch and the 
Gunds were quite competitive and would do what it took to bring their respective teams 
the Stanley Cup. But as competitive and wealthy as these men and their teams are, they 
both maintained profits over the years 1998-2001. Ilitch and his Red Wings averaged a 
cash flow of $7.5 million and the Gunds, a cash flow of $3.1 million (Kagan, 2001b).  
The Rangers, owned by media giant Madison Square Gardens, continued to spend 
in pursuit of a championship (Stein, 1997) but with their high revenues from 1998-2001 
still maintained an average cash flow of $6.4 million (Kagan, 2001b). And Jeremy Jacobs 
was on the Forbes 400 list in 1990, had an estimated worth of $500 million (Quirk & 
Fort, 1992, p. 40), owns the Boston Bruins and yet maintained a steady cash flow over 
the same three years averaging $10.6 million (Kagan, 2001b).   
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Appendix U 
NFL Strikes of 1982 and 1987 
 
 Political dissensus among the players arose in 1982. Because the nominal factor 
of NFL salaries had only risen by a factor of two since 1970 compared to other 
professional sports leagues, like MLB, which had risen by a factor of five, the National 
Football Players Association (NFLPA) believed that the payment schedule in force at the 
time was unfair to the players and that the owners were acting in collusion. Since league 
revenue had been increasing dramatically, they demanded 55% of the gross revenues 
earned by the league so they themselves could set a salary schedule for the players based 
on experience and other criteria (Ahlburg & Dworkin, 1991).  
 The owners did not agree with the NFLPA and as a result, the players called a 
strike that lasted 57 days thereby canceling seven weeks of the 1982 season. The owners 
would not admit to collusion and were insistent that that player salaries had always been 
set through individual negotiations. The chief negotiator for the NFL Management 
Council said that giving up a percentage of the gross revenue is the same as giving up 
control which is a concept alien to America and the owners were not about to give into 
the players request for a defined percentage of the gross revenue (Ahlburg & Dworkin, 
1991). 
 The NFLPA lacked solidarity and could not mobilize enough support for their 
demand. The players remained concerned for the following five years over their 
relatively low salaries, which averaged $203,000 in 1987, half that of baseball and 
basketball players. This was up from years previous mainly due to the now-defunct 
United States Football League, a rival to the NFL at the time resulting in a bidding war 
for players. However the players wanted more from the owners. They decided to 
concentrate on free agency in 1987 negotiations hoping that freer movement among 
teams would increase their bargaining power causing salaries to rise (Ahlburg & 
Dworkin, 1991). 
 However the owners agreed to make minor modifications to the free agency 
system but were against unrestricted free agency. A settlement was not reached and the 
players struck on September 22, 1987 but only one game was cancelled as replacement 
players played in place of the regular rosters. The strike was settled and the players 
returned to their teams 24 days later however without an agreement in place. Instead they 
filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL insisting that the owners were acting in 
collusion (Ahlburg & Dworkin, 1991). 
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Appendix V 
Free Agency and the Salary Cap in the NFL 
 
The NFL’s “Plan B” free agency system, which was similar to the reserve system 
in hockey or baseball, stipulated that teams could protect a majority of their players. The 
unprotected players could become free agents and change teams without compensation 
however the protected players were limited to free agency through the old and strict rules 
of equalization thereby restricting movement especially among the superstars (Dworkin 
& Posthuma, 2002). 
Restricted free agent, Freeman McNeil, and seven other players challenged plan B 
and won. The court found that the NFL’s free agency system was in violation of the 
antitrust laws. There is no doubt that this decision put pressure on the NFL to conform to 
certain expectations surrounding the antitrust laws and paved the way for two new 
features of the 1993 CBA. First, free agency was drastically liberalized and second, a 
salary cap was imposed (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002).  
 Since the agreement in 1993, NFL players with four years experience have been 
eligible for unrestricted free agency. Teams are allowed to keep one franchise player 
however his salary has to equal the average of the top five salaries in the league for that 
position. Players with three years of accrued service can tender offers from other teams 
however the original team has the right of first refusal. Should the team elect not to match 
the new team’s offer, they are subject to compensation in the form of draft picks 
(Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002). 
Second, a hard salary cap was imposed similar to the NBA’s whereby the players 
receive a maximum of the designated gross revenues for salaries. There are fewer 
loopholes in the NFL’s cap and the percentage changes yearly. Although players have 
been able to switch teams more freely since 1993, the new teams have to remain 
conscious of the salary cap concerns (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002). 
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Appendix W 
The NBA Salary Cap 
 
 The salary cap was proposed in 1983 and called for players to receive a minimum 
and maximum of 53% of the gross revenue (Noll, 1991), which was then divided by the 
number of teams in the league. However, in order to keep a team intact, which was one of 
the objects behind the cap, teams were able to exceed the maximum in order to sign their 
own free agents. Teams could also extend the contract of one of their current players for 
any agreed amount; even it was to put them over the cap during the season covered by the 
extension. Various rules surrounded each loophole (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994).  
 After the negotiation of the 1995 CBA the salary cap percentage increased to 55% 
and would enlarge incrementally to $32 million during the last year of the contract 
however many of the loopholes so desired by the players remained intact (Dworkin & 
Posthuma, 2002). 
 One of these loopholes was the “Larry Bird exception” (Zimbalist, 2000), which 
allowed every team to sign one of its own players to any salary regardless of the effect it 
had on the cap. However salaries were escalating and the league wanted to eliminate the 
Larry Bird exception. The players did not agree and as a result the owners initiated a 
lockout on July 1, 1998. The work stoppage lasted until January 6, 1999 when a new 
agreement was finally reached (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002).  
 The NBA managed to convince players to allow for a maximum on individual 
salaries. This was an unprecedented agreement that no other professional sports union has 
ever agreed to. However, the players were happy as well because the owners agreed to 
initially increase the salary cap to 57% of defined gross revenues but it would fall to 55% 
during the last three years of the agreement (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002; Zimbalist, 
1999). Exceptions to the cap would also benefit midrange players by tying their salaries 
to years of service in the NBA (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002).  
 Maximum salaries were also tied to years of service. Players with less than 10 
years of experience could earn no more than $11 million per year and free agents 
remaining with their home team could obtain an annual increase of no more than 12%. 
The Larry Bird exception was retained however maximum increases were set at 12.5% 
while all other contracts could only be increased by 10%. Even a player with over ten 
years of experience could receive no more than $14 million per year (Dworkin & 
Posthuma, 2002). 
What the new agreement really did was to reduce the skewness of the distribution 
of NBA salaries by distributing some of the income from the highly paid superstars back 
to the average players. It showed the union’s concern for an equitable allocation of player 
salaries. A minimum sliding salary scale was instituted whereby rookies would earn no 
less than $275,000 per year and a player with 10 or more years of NBA service would 
make at least $1 million. Today, more players in the NBA are earning salaries in the area 
of $1 or $2 million while fewer than ever earns less than $1 million per season (Dworkin 
& Posthuma, 2002). 
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Appendix X 
Luxury Tax and Revenue Sharing in MLB 
 
 The owners attempted to mobilize support from the players for a salary cap 
throughout the 1990s however the solution did not fit the interests of the union and they 
refused to listen to the league. These acts of solidarity and commitment were a reflection 
of Miller’s leadership throughout his tenure.  
 Marvin Miller saw the owners as a group of men who could neither control their 
spending nor work together so they looked to the players for a solution. He believes that 
revenue sharing between owners and players is feasible however that would mean a real 
partnership with the union’s full involvement in the decisions affecting revenue. 
Basically, the owners were always more interested in negotiating a CBA whereby the 
relationship would end once the fixed percentage was negotiated (Dworkin & Posthuma, 
2002; Miller, 1991). 
 Miller blamed the owners for not distributing revenue more evenly. The haves 
maintained their stubbornness throughout the years and refused to share any income with 
the have-nots. Instead, the owners wanted to punish the players for their inability to 
maintain a partnership (Miller, 1991).  
 The CBA of 1990 was negotiated without a salary cap however when it came time 
for a new CBA in 1994, the owners insisted on it. The players would again not agree to a 
cost restraint and set an August 12, 1994 strike date. In December of 1994, after the 
cancellation of the first World Series in 90 years, the owners eventually used the same 
tactic they did in 1980 and instituted a salary cap, eliminated salary arbitration and 
introduced a restricted free agency plan without the authorization of the players. Of 
course the players filed an unfair labour practice suit again. After the general counsel for 
the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) sought out and was granted an injunction 
to reinstate all of the terms of the expired labour agreement until a new one was reached, 
the players agreed to end the strike and negotiate a new CBA during the 1995 season. 
However, it was not signed until December of 1996 (Dworkin & Posthuma, 2002).  
 The union demonstrated once again its solidarity and commitment as the players 
held onto free agency and salary arbitration however they did give up a slight concession. 
A payroll tax was introduced which would see any team exceeding a specified payroll 
pay a certain percentage of their salary costs to a central pool. The funds would then be 
distributed to the smaller market teams. It was not a lot of money but the concept of 
revenue sharing and cooperation among franchises was finally addressed (Dworkin & 
Posthuma, 2002). 
 The owners have continued to increase cooperation among them. In 1996, the 
American League split gate receipts on an 80-20 basis whereby the home team kept 80% 
and the visiting team, 20%. The National League gave $0.42 off each ticket to the visiting 
team amounting to a number between 2.4% and 3.8% (Sheehan, 1996). By 2003, the 
American League was splitting gate receipts on a 60-40 basis and the National League, 
95-5 (Naylor, 2003, January 21). In addition, the new revenue sharing plan implemented 
during the negotiation of the 2002 CBA sees each team contribute 34% of their local 
revenue to a central pool whereby the money is essentially distributed to the smaller 
market teams. Smaller markets also receive increased revenue from the central fund 
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composed of national network television revenue and licensed MLB products (MLB 
CBA, n.d.) 
 Finally, the payroll tax introduced during 1995-96 negotiations will continue until 
2006 with the threshold increasing from $117 million in 2003 to $136.5 million in 2006. 
Tax rates for teams above the threshold rise incrementally as well starting at 17.5% in 
2003 up to a possible 40% in 2006 but only if the team went above the threshold the 
previous two or three years. Rates in between vary depending on how many times and 
during what years a team breaks the threshold (MLB CBA, n.d.) 
 So, while the players did give into a form of luxury tax, it is clear that the owners 
finally learned how to cooperate and did not just look to the players to solve their 
problems. Even though Donald Fehr was the executive director of the union for the last 
two sets of negotiations, the actions Marvin Miller took over the previous thirty years 
deinstitutionalized the economic system of baseball to one where the owners learned to 
share among themselves and the players are given the chance to be paid what they are 
worth. 
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Appendix Y 
The Option Clause 
 
 Limited free agency was sanctioned by the courts therefore in 1973 the NHL 
replaced the perpetual reservation system with a one-year option clause in standard player 
contracts, beginning with the 1974-75 season. Simply put, teams could only hold players 
for one year after their contracts expired. It gave the player the option of extending his 
old contract by one year and then becoming a free agent or becoming a free agent 
immediately before the next season began. If the player and the owner did not exercise 
the option clause, a new agreement under a standard players’ contract was formed using 
the same terms, however salary was to be determined by an arbitrator. Compensation was 
still required for free agents though and this significantly restricted movement resulting in 
lower salaries (Berry et al., 1986; Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
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Appendix Z 
The Early Attempt to Form a Union 
 
The players were growing tired of their paltry pension fund, lousy benefits and 
low salaries so in 1956, representatives from all six teams including Ted Lindsay along 
with Doug Harvey, Bill Gadsby, Gus Mortson, Fernie Flaman and Jimmy Thomson 
attempted to form a players association. They collected dues from every player except 
Ted Kennedy and kept it a secret from the owners until February 11, 1957 (Cruise & 
Griffiths, 1991). 
 Once the players brought the association to light, the owners were furious. Jack 
Adams, who ran the Red Wings, asked each player in his locker room if he was behind 
the union. Most of them just declined to say anything. The owner of the Red Wings, 
Bruce Norris, traded two of his best players in Ted Lindsay and Glenn Hall to Chicago 
and claimed it was a “youth movement.” The governor for the Maple Leafs, Conn 
Smythe, was also mad and treated Jimmy Thomson, the union rep, terribly during 1957 
eventually releasing him from the team. Other owners saw it as just another 
inconvenience. Clarence Campbell threatened to terminate the pension contract if the 
players stepped out of line. After that, for the most part, it was business as usual in the 
NHL and the league refused to acknowledge the existence of the association anticipating 
that it would eventually fall apart once the players realized they would have to hire a 
couple of lawyers to run it and it would cost some money (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
The players demonstrated a backbone at first during the 1957-58 season and did 
not buckle under the owners’ pressure. They also did not publicly criticize the NHL. The 
owners, on the other hand, kept the pot boiling. Smythe claimed that the association was 
a smoke screen to enable a small group of players to get control of the pension fund with 
no intention of sharing any gains with the other players (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
The players also filed an antitrust suit in 1957 claiming that the owners had 
obtained complete domination and control and dictatorship of hockey since 1926. Two 
weeks before the Ontario hearing, Conn Smythe, along with Stafford Smythe, Clarence 
Campbell and the Maple Leaf Gardens, Ltd. solicitor, Ian Johnston, went into the Leafs 
dressing room. Conn Smythe, outraged again, asked the players if they really wanted to 
be led by outsiders from New York who were trying to destroy hockey and put them out 
of jobs. Ian Johnston then read a document outlining that the players were throwing away 
their right to bargain individually. After two hours, Smythe called for an immediate vote 
urging the players to withdraw from the association but the players voted 10 to 7 to wait 
until they could talk to their lawyers before making a decision. Eventually they voted 
unanimously to be certified by the Ontario Labour Relations Board as a bargaining unit 
(Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
However, in Detroit, Jack Adams, by way of a manipulating newspaper article 
full of non-truths, convinced his team that Ted Lindsay was only looking out for himself 
and was in fact a cancer on the team never intending to share the benefits of the new 
association with anyone else. Obviously Lindsay was no longer a member of the team 
and could not defend his stance. Norris claimed that owning the Red Wings was no more 
than a hobby and any money made was put right back into the club. The players believed 
the management and as a result felt ashamed. On November 13, 1957, the Wings 
withdrew from the association (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
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Subsequently, The association began to lose money and commitment. Ted 
Lindsay was about the only player with any fight left in him however he played for 
Chicago. Jimmy Norris told Lindsay that he wasn’t particularly against the association 
however he had so many other things to worry about that if the whole business with the 
PA did not end soon, he’d shut down the money losing Blackhawks (Cruise & Griffiths, 
1991). 
The association lost all its momentum and on February 5, 1958 the players agreed 
to shut it down in exchange for a measly $7000 minimum salary, a marginally increased 
playoff pool and moving expenses for a traded player. The owners continued to keep all 
TV revenue and said they would tell the players if they started to make money off 
television. They never did. The players thought they would stay in the loop with 
management at annual meetings but the owners still wielded the power and even 
maintained control of the pension fund (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). 
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Appendix AA 
Alan Eagleson 
 
In early 1967, Alan Eagleson traveled to cities around North America to tell 
professional hockey players how they were being underpaid and mistreated. His youth, 
aggression and ease in the sports world convinced the players to form an association to 
protect themselves from the owners’ backlash. And since most of the players were 
already well aware of how they were being mistreated, Eagleson had carte blanche almost 
immediately to negotiate on their behalf (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
 The owners put up little resistance this time maintaining that the time had come 
for a union. Along with the fact that Eagleson wore the hats of a player agent and at 
times, a representative of management personnel thereby creating obvious conflicts of 
interest (Stein, 1997), the owners knew this young lawyer was hardly worth getting 
excited over. After all, the owners were relieved that he did not display the militancy 
evident of union leaders like Marvin Miller who gathered 16 years of negotiating 
experience with the United Steelworkers of America before becoming the executive 
director of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) (Cruise & Griffiths, 
1991). 
 Some general managers like Punch Imlach still did not condone the union and 
tried to scare the players out of it however they eventually all joined the association 
which was effectively kept together by Eagleson’s assistant, Jim Blaney, for the first six 
months. He managed to keep the players low key and sane while Eagleson only devoted 
about 20% to 50% of his time to the job of executive director (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
 Eagleson usually only showed his face to the players during training camp and 
would relay a quick speech to each team’s dressing room then he would disappear until 
the following year leaving little time to answer any of the players’ concerns (Houston & 
Shoalts, 1993, p. 125). And when he was around, particularly at NHLPA meetings, 
Eagleson acted as a dictator.  
 He used to hand pick the player reps to hold offices of president and vice-
presidents. The players appeared to be in awe of Eagleson but feared him at the same 
time (Stein, 1997). He would treat the players like his labourers and talk down to them in 
a mixture of profanities, legalese and insults. As former player rep Basil McRae put it, 
the players were not necessarily stupid but they could not keep up with a lawyer 
(Houston & Shoalts, 1993, p. 124). Since he used to ream out any player reps daring to 
question his judgment, challenges by the players were virtually non-existent (Stein, 
1997).  
 What really frustrated the players during Eagleson’s reign was his inability to 
negotiate a more liberal free agency agreement with the owners. He used to complain 
about the reserve clause but it was the competition with the WHA that cause it to fall. 
Even when he had the opportunity to set a precedent in the NHL for free agency, he 
refused. Brian Smith, a Detroit lawyer, obtained a US federal court order for Dale 
McCourt of the Red Wings blocking his move to the Kings when he was traded to them 
as compensation for Rogatien Vachon in 1978. The NHL ended up winning the suit 
however Smith threatened to appeal under US anti-trust laws so the NHL decided to 
arrange a different trade that kept McCourt in Detroit. A victory by McCourt would have 
helped the players to receive unrestricted free agency at an earlier age but Smith received 
 157 
                                                               
no help from Eagleson who maintained the restriction was necessary to continue 
receiving “wonderful” benefits such as international hockey of which the players were 
never sure how much Eagleson kept for himself (Houston & Shoalts, 1993, pp. 127, 129-
130, 157-158)   
 And after the 1982 negotiations, the owners were happier with Eagleson than the 
players were. The amendments talked about earlier thrilled the owners especially since 
Marvin Miller had managed to negotiate unrestricted free agency in baseball, which was 
sure to bring higher expenses in the form of salaries to the game (Houston & Shoalts, 
1993, pp. 129-130). Of course, high priced hockey stars could become free agents but the 
new teams still had to give up two first-round draft choices or a first-rounder and any 
player they wanted from the other team’s roster, excluding a protected list of two (Cruise 
& Griffiths, 1991). 
 Right before negotiations for a new CBA in 1986, Eagleson’ contract was up and 
he notified the players that a new one was necessary before he would represent them. 
Worried that Eagleson might take offers to work on the other side of the table and they 
would be left without a leader, the players were at a disadvantage and hastily put a new 
multi-year contract together for him (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991) including many benefits 
the players themselves were not receiving (Houston & Shoalts, 1993, p. 180). 
  Eagleson happily agreed to this new contract requiring only about 65% of his 
time and led the players blindly into negotiations. He hired no experts nor did he provide 
any financial stats to refute the owners’ claims that players’ salaries had increased 18% 
from 1984-85 to 1985-86 and that operating costs had increased dramatically. He said 
that he did not want to waste the players’ money and instead hired outside consultants 
such as Tony Esposito, a former goalie with no labour, business or legal expertise, and 
Sam Simpson, the NHLPA’s office manager (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
 In the end, the players did gain concessions in their pensions and slightly less 
compensation for the loss of a free agent. Active players would no longer be used. 
However these gains were far less than those received in other sports and the players 
doubted their leader (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991). They were also tired of his cushy 
relationship with Bill Wirtz, the NHL’s chair of the board, along with John Ziegler and 
wondered exactly who he worked for when they would see him show up on Wirtz’s yacht 
(Houston & Shoalts, 1993, p. 126; Stein, 1997). 
 Aside from Eagleson’s obvious conflicts of interest, the players were also 
growing tired of his arrogance and autocratic style (Houston & Shoalts, 1993, p. 123). 
Eagleson’s lackluster performance as head of the union was only hurting their business 
and probably played a role in agents Ron Salcer and Rich Winter’s desire to have 
Eagleson removed. They hired former NHLFA executive director, Ed Garvey, and the 
three of them gathered the support of the players in an attempt to oust the executive 
director (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
 When Ed Garvey was scheduled to speak on behalf of the NHLPA in June of 
1989, several players were still not convinced that Eagleson should be ousted. 
Nevertheless, Garvey spoke for a good part of June 4th while Eagleson sat subdued, like a 
man who faces the rope and has run out of hope. Gone were the obscene and jocular 
repartee, the confident strut and the viscous put-downs. The ego that had surrounded him 
like a permanent halo had shriveled (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
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 On the agreement that he would be able to retain a role as a consultant until the 
end of his contract, Eagleson stepped down. Ironically enough, the union voted to keep 
Eagleson as their executive director however that was because the NHLPA reps as well 
as a player from each team voted. Had it been one team, one vote, Eagleson would have 
been ousted (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991).  
Eagleson’s technical victory that day might have helped his morale however the 
real victors were the players. In trying to unseat Eagleson or at least hold him 
accountable, the men underwent a subtle, psychological transformation. They would 
never again let their executive director terrorize them as a group (Cruise & Griffiths, 
1991).   
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Appendix AB 
Labour Negotiations Behaviour 
 
During the 1980s, labour negotiations in the NHL were quite placid and geared 
towards integrative bargaining. The representatives, comprised of an owner-player 
executive committee would meet twice a year in order to consider proposals intended to 
fine-tune the CBA. The parties seemed to trust and respect one another making outside 
mediation unnecessary while avoiding strikes or lockouts (Berry et al., 1986, p. 228; 
Stein, 1997).  
This concept of continuous bargaining that ran counter to generally accepted 
principles of labour relations proved effective in specific circumstances as the parties 
were able to revise the contract readily in situations where discussions of initial 
provisions were not successful. The era of continuous negotiations has the ability to 
forestall strikes because parties were not dealing with multiple and complex issues at one 
time. Berry, Gould, & Staudohar (1986, p. 209) also state that while this may have been 
due to factors other than negotiation practice, there is no evidence that it produced 
negative results. 
As Berry, Gould, & Staudohar (1986, p. 228) illustrate, the early years of 
collective bargaining saw the players showing a greater sense of compromise than the 
owners. As discussed later, the owners were all too happy to deal with Alan Eagleson 
who did little to progress the rights for his union. Ziegler and Eagleson were quite close 
and would usually discuss ahead of negotiations what concessions the players and owners 
would have to make in order to arrive at a solution. As the owners would always bring up 
the precarious financial picture of the league, the NHL would always attempt to keep free 
agency restricted. During the actual negotiations, Eagleson would show some restraint in 
front of his player representatives and Ziegler would do the same in front of the owners 
but in the end the solution was usually similar to what the league wanted all along (Stein, 
1997). 
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Appendix AC 
John Ziegler 
 
 John A. Ziegler Jr. took over from Clarence Campbell as president of the NHL on 
September 4, 1977. He immediately began to formalize the NHL office by hiring finance, 
legal, television and marketing experts as vice-presidents. Ken Sawyer brought order to 
the league’s accounts and budgets while Steve Ryan helped the league’s marketing arm, 
newly named NHL Enterprises Inc., go from a $600,000 annual loss to a $10 million 
profit. Joel Nixon brought years of US network broadcast experience over from Madison 
Square Garden and Gil Stein came over from the Philadelphia Flyers to take the job as 
VP in charge of legal counsel (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 1997). 
 Ziegler was calm and polite, quite opposite to that of Allan Eagleson, however he 
was particularly skilled at negotiations and could usually lead his committee to a 
consensus of what he wanted the NHL’s position to be (Cruise & Griffiths, 1991; Stein, 
1997).  
 However Ziegler’s downfall was that he thought too small. Even though the 
league brought in various VPs under Ziegler’s leadership, his non-focus in the area of 
marketing and television kept the league from appearing as more of a single entity. 
During Ziegler’s reign, Wayne Gretzky, perhaps the best hockey player ever, had the 
chance to appear on The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson however his plane was stuck 
in Chicago. Gretzky offered to pay half the bill for a private jet but Ziegler refused to 
fund the other half (Fischler, 1995, p. 40). As a result, the league missed the chance to 
introduce Wayne Gretzky to a US national audience for a small fee and perhaps expand 
the market of the NHL.  
Eventually, the owners grew weary of Ziegler’s failures in the area of television 
and marketing. He was often indecisive and sometimes invisible regarding problems that 
called for strong leadership. Some of the owners argued that he did not use the skills of 
his different owners effectively causing committees to become stale and redundant. Even 
his collective bargaining skills seemed to desert him during the strike of 1992 and 
Goodenow received most of the concessions proposed by the union. This led to Ziegler’s 
firing and the subsequent appointment of Gil Stein as interim president. Then, in 
February of 1993, Gary Bettman took office as the NHL’s first commissioner (Cruise & 
Griffiths, 1991; Staudohar, 1996, p. 146; Stein, 1997). 
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Appendix AD 
The 1995 CBA 
 
 During the strike of 1992, Ziegler, alluding to some kind of cost certainty, uttered 
a statement that did not sit too well with his governors, “We need someone to protect the 
owners from themselves!” (Fischler, 1995, p. 50) What the governors wanted was a 
system that would stop owners from being fiscally irresponsible. For example, John 
McMullen of the Devils was particularly annoyed when the St. Louis Blues offered his 
defenceman, Scott Stevens, $17.05 million over four years. In order for McMullen to 
keep his player in the interest of the franchise, he had to match the offer but admitted it 
was a financial mistake. McMullen blamed the system that was operating without a salary 
cap and many owners such as the new owner of the Hartford Whalers, Peter Karmonos, 
echoed his sentiments (Fischler, 1995, p. 115, 150 & 182).  
The union would not budge on their stance though therefore a new CBA was not 
negotiated during the 1993-94 season and of course a lockout ensued at the beginning of 
the 1994 campaign (Stein, 1997). Bob Goodenow was not interested in any type of 
solution that called for an NFL-style or NBA-style cap, a salary-pyramid format or a 
rookie salary cap. He would not conduct negotiations so long as that was the league’s 
initial point (Fischler, 1995, p. 119). However Bettman was adamant the league needed 
some kind of system, possibly one yet to be invented, that was fair to the players and 
owners; a solution jointly arrived upon by both parties with the ability to make the sport 
stronger so revenues and salaries could grow. He was bound and determined to work 
something out with Bob Goodenow and insisted the issue was not about holding down 
salaries (Fischler, 1995, pp. 57-58 & 119). 
The owners’ proposed solution that sat on the table for some time was designed to 
limit salaries by requiring high-spending teams to contribute to revenue sharing through a 
“payroll tax” system. This would reduce the rate of salary escalation in order to help 
small-market teams with the ability to sign and retain top quality players (Staudohar, 
1996, p. 152).  Brian Burke suggested this was the only possible solution as cost certainty 
had solved the competitive balance problem in two other leagues and the players could 
not bring enough to the table to avoid it. Some kind of mechanism was essential to 
combat the financial and competitive disparities due to individual player contract 
negotiations combined with widely diverse revenue streams and since the players were 
dead set against a cap, this might provide for a better solution (Fischler, 1995, pp. 139).  
Some players such as Jeremy Roenick figured that Bettman was hired strictly to 
impose a salary cap and he would press until he got it for fear of being fired by the 
owners however Goodenow was not about to accept a proposal of which there was no 
joint committee formed to discuss. Roenick was happy that Bettman’s intention was to 
turn the league around financially but was convinced the players would not let him do it 
with a salary cap (Fischler, 1995, p. 115). 
Although there were some players such as Kelly Buchberger who thought a 
rookie salary cap was not such a bad idea. Considering he only made $60,000 a year 
when he broke into the league, Buchberger thought that unproven players did not deserve 
multi-million dollar contracts (Fischler, 1995, p. 116).  
By January of 1995, about half way through the standard NHL season, the players 
finally countered to the owners’ offer of a luxury tax scheme with a plan of their own. 
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Perhaps, for reasons outlined by Beamish in his (1991) article, The Impact of Corporate 
Ownership on Labor-Management Relations in Hockey and discussed earlier in this 
paper, enough players desired to start the season as their future income was decreasing by 
the day and that resulted in a majority vote partially agreeing to the owners’ suggestion. 
The union proposed that the top four spending teams pay a tax of 7%, the next four pay 
5%, the next four pay 3% and the next four pay 1% on their total payrolls. All of this 
money would then go towards helping small market teams (Staudohar, 1996, p. 152). 
Had this plan been instituted, $36.9 million would have been generated in 2002-03 to 
help the small markets (Kagan, 2001b).  
However neither party could mobilize enough support from the other side for their 
respective ideas and the payroll tax scheme was dropped. The owners wanted an 
increased percentage deducted from the higher spending teams but the union would not 
agree. Some teams would not have survived a prolonged work stoppage (Friedman, 2003, 
February 1) so the owners dropped their request for a luxury tax and proposed a rookie 
salary cap along with some restrictions in the area of salary arbitration and free agency 
(Staudohar, 1996, pp. 152-153). The union agreed and a 48-game season commenced.  
The players did take a step or two backwards in the area of collective bargaining, 
as the 1995 agreement did not allow free agency to players who only finished one 
contract and compensation for free agents aged 25 to 31 was enhanced. Even eligibility 
for unrestricted free agency was increased to age 32 for the years 1994-95 to 1996-97 
however it was reduced again to 31 from 1997-98 onwards (Staudohar, 1996 p. 157-158). 
Eligibility for salary arbitration was also restricted. Players between the ages of 18 and 20 
cannot arbitrate their salary until age 27 while players entering the league between the 
ages of 21 and 25 are eligible at 26 (Staudohar, 1996, p. 154).   
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Appendix AE 
The 2004 CBA 
 
A former NHL club owner maintains that current owners see a salary cap as the 
only solution to curb rising salaries and they will do whatever it takes to gain support 
from the union including initiating another prolonged work stoppage. And the 
commissioner continues to call on the union to form a partnership in order to strengthen 
the game (Shoalts, 2003, January 18). 
Bettman has neither confirmed nor denied that his plan is to propose a salary cap 
in the area of $35 million however if that was the case, it would bring salaries down to 
about 50% of the average club’s revenue, similar to that of the NBA (Shoalts, 2003, 
January 18). According to the commissioner, this would allow teams that already have 
payrolls in that area to retain their playing talent and remain financially viable with the 
ability to attract new equity. Inflationary pressures would disappear because all the teams 
would remain on an even keel (Friedman, 2003, February 1; Shoalts, 2003, January 18).  
In echoing the words of John Ziegler, Bettman thinks it is okay if a salary cap is 
needed to save the owners from themselves because fans want to watch competitive 
teams at a reasonable price. While he is not totally against revenue sharing at this point, 
he does not understand how it could work without cost certainty. In saying this, Bettman 
believes it is necessary to align revenues with expenses to control inflation but that does 
not necessarily mean a salary cap (Brender, 2003, January 3; Friedman, 2003, February 
1). Canucks General Manager Brian Burke agrees with Bettman and is adamant that the 
economic system has to be redesigned to control labour costs, as that is what would 
happen in any other business. Burke, along with many owners, is not sold on revenue 
sharing as a solution and is uncertain as to how well the new system will work in MLB 
(MacDonald, 2003, January 27). Owners, especially in large markets, are afraid that 
sharing in local revenue will severely reduce the value of their team while increasing the 
value of a small market team (Shoalts, 2003, January 18).  
Bob Goodenow and the players’ union have given know indication that they will 
agree to a salary cap and argue that the current system, which ties a player to his team 
through restrictive measures until the age of 31, allows owners to pay players only what 
they feel is necessary. Any problems that ended in the bankruptcy of franchises were 
caused either by the league admitting undercapitalized teams or by the financial 
institutions, which rushed to lend these teams money throughout the 1990s (Shoalts, 
2003, January 18).  
In addition, the union finally agreed to and proposed an amended luxury tax 
system in 1995 however the owners opted for other controls restricting entry-level 
income and salary arbitration of which the union has had to live under for eight years 
(MacDonald, 2003, January 27; Talalay & Russo, 2003, February 3). Therefore, the 
players association believes that a fair and equitable marketplace should dictate salaries. 
Goodenow understands that markets can go up and down but thinks the players should 
receive a salary based on their worth to the league and if the market fluctuates resulting in 
lower salaries, that is fine, but his union does not want an artificial restraint. They do not 
ask for minimum payrolls and salaries should reflect the values that smart business 
people attach to the contribution of the players (Brender, 2003, January 3; Hyman, 
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December, 2002; MacDonald, 2003, January 27; Shoalts, 2003, January 18; Talalay & 
Russo, 2003, February 3).  
Instead, Goodenow and his union look at the problem from a revenue standpoint 
and suggest that if a disparity exists between franchises, it is well within the league’s 
power to change the distribution of said revenue to aid small market teams. Revenue 
sharing in the NHL is insignificant and currently sits at 9% of all revenues while the 
NBA shares 35%, MLB shares 34% and the NFL shares 63% (Brender, 2003, January 3; 
MacDonald, 2003, January 27; Naylor, 2003, January 21). The owners control the 
income that comes in and the expenses that go out and no team is ever forced to pay or 
keep a player (Brender, 2003, January 3).  
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Appendix AF 
Expansion Effects 
 
Gorman and Calhoun (1994, p. 228) suggest that professional sports are in an age 
of which the fans demand instant gratification however expansion teams generally take a 
long time to become consistent winners. In saying this, Gary Bettman’s expansion 
mandate when he first took the commissioner’s chair was to see the newest teams quickly 
gain a competitive edge (Fischler, 1995, p. 54). Florida and Anaheim started play the 
September after Bettman took office in February of 1993. Florida started out quite well 
and while Anaheim struggled they still had a respectable record of 33 wins and 46 losses 
compared to Ottawa’s dismal first start of 10 and 70 or even Tampa Bay’s first year 
record of 23 and 54 (Klein & Reif, 2001).  
Table 12 illustrates the attendance by capacity starting from 2000-01 however 
attendance figures from 1992-93 to 1999-00 to illustrate the following point were also 
gathered (Attendance Figures, 2002; Kagan, 2001b). Other than a winning record, there 
are other intangibles that might bring people to the venue of a new sports team including 
just the novelty of a fresh form of entertainment. However it is interesting to note that 
during Florida’s first six years of existence of which they had a record of 183 wins and 
192 losses and also made a trip to the Stanley Cup final (Klein & Reif, 2001), regular 
season attendance averaged almost 97% and then as the team slowly declined to a record 
of 111 and 161 up until 2002-03 (Klein & Reif, 2001; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003; 
NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002), so did attendance to an average of about 81%. 
  Conversely, Florida’s other team, Tampa Bay started out with a record of 157 
and 252 over six years (Klein & Reif, 2001) and saw attendance average only about 68%. 
During the years to follow up until 2002-03, their record mirrored a similar 125 and 225 
(Klein & Reif, 2001; NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 
2003) while attendance improved slightly to 73.4%. 
Professional hockey was new to this area of North America and it appeared as 
though the people of Florida appreciated the game as long as their team was winning. 
However as Florida’s record fell and Tampa Bay continued to struggle, the teams became 
somewhat loosely connected to the NHL because there was no prior attraction to hockey 
or die-hard fans so to speak of. The game by no means has been imbedded into the 
society. Miami (the city Florida plays in) is also the smallest city to house all four major 
sports teams as the Dolphins of the NFL, Marlins of MLB and the Heat of the NBA also 
play there (Gorman & Calhoun, 1994, p. 223) which is ultimately competition for the 
entertainment dollar. In fact, the NHL Panthers have resorted to giving tickets away in 
order to sell people on the game (Matheson, 2003, February 1). 
On the other hand, Attendance Figures (2002) reveal that Ottawa, a city that had 
an NHL team years ago, enjoyed an attendance average of 96% over the first three years 
of its modern day existence but saw that number drop to 86% over the next three years 
however their record was absolutely dreadful over that time at 116 and 293 (Klein & 
Reif, 2001). With a record of 224 and 126 over the past five seasons (Klein & Reif, 2001; 
NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003; NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002), attendance has 
gone back up to average 94%. Being in Canada, Ottawa is privy to the knowledge of 
affluent hockey fans and the first three years attendance figures probably represents the 
city’s excitement over a new hockey team. However, even die-hard hockey fans prefer to 
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watch a winning team and it is no surprise that with their atrocious record, the attendance 
did drop off a little. 
Finally, Table 12 illustrates the attendance records of the NHL’s four newest 
teams, Atlanta, Nashville, Minnesota and Columbus. While Minnesota is said to be the 
United States’ hockey hotbed, Columbus is not far off and even with sub .500 records, 
each team has enjoyed excellent attendance. However Nashville and Atlanta (with the 
exception of housing the Flames in the mid 1970s), like Tampa Bay and Florida, 
represent greenfield sites with very little hockey tradition and the attendance shows it. 
Both teams started out strong probably due to the novelty of a new form of entertainment 
however with sub par records there is really nothing left to attract the fans back (Klein & 
Reif, 2001; NHL Standings, 2002-2003, 2003; NHL 2001-2002 Standings, 2002). Cliff 
Fletcher, the vice-president of the Phoenix Coyotes, another southern US location fairly 
new to hockey tradition said it himself, “A lot of the markets today are performance 
driven. When the teams become more competitive, then you’ll see the stands fill up in a 
hurry.” (Shoalts, 2003, January 22) 
In 2002-03, seven of the ten bottom teams in terms of attendance were either 
expansion or relocated franchises in the southern US (see Table 12) and these were the 
areas deemed vital to attracting new US television deals (Shoalts, 2003, January 22). In 
2000-01 six of the bottom fifteen teams in terms of local media revenue (see Table 10) 
were also southern US cities. Along with the Canadian teams and small market US teams, 
the expansion teams are clearly unable to generate the necessary revenue to ice a 
competitive team. Because expansion into non-traditional hockey areas caused the league 
to become locally differentiated, the NHL has to use this opportunity to find a 
cooperative mechanism that will benefit the overall league (Usher & Wolfe, 2001, 
August) thereby increasing the competitiveness of the southern US teams. This would 
probably attract more fans to these games and increase their local revenues, which could 
potentially increase the US national viewer base and ultimately league revenue. 
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Table 1 
 
Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Level of Analysis Political Pressures Functional Pressures    Social Pressures 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Organization  Mounting  Changing economic    Increasing social 
performance  utility      fragmentation 
   crisis 
Organization  Conflicting   Increasing technical    Decreasing  
   internal   specificity     historical continuity 
   interests 
Environment  Increasing  Increasing      Changing  
   innovation   competition     institutional rules 
   pressures  for resources     and values 
Environment  Changing  Emerging events    Increasing structural 
   external  and data     disaggregation 
   dependencies 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. From “The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization,” by C. Oliver, 1992, 
Organization Studies, 13, 4, p. 567. Copyright 1992 EGOS. 
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Table 2 
Payroll/Winning Percentage Rank Correlation for each year 1990-96 in the NHL, NBA 
 
and NFL 
________________________________________________________________________ 
League 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
________________________________________________________________________ 
NHL 0.06 0.28 0.40 0.41 0.45 0.35 0.44 0.34 
NBA 0.70 0.34 0.36 0.27 0.58 0.53 0.56 0.48 
NFL 0.39 0.07 0.47 0.46 -0.24 -0.12 -0.02 0.14 
 
Note. From Hardball: The Abuse of Power in Pro Team Sports (p. 205), by J. Quirk &  
R. Fort, 1999, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Copyright 1999 by Princeton 
University Press.  
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Table 3 
Payroll/Winning Percentage Rank Correlation for each year 1997-03 in the NHL, NBA 
 
and NFL 
________________________________________________________________________ 
League 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average
________________________________________________________________________ 
NHL 0.46* 0.39* 0.27 0.52** 0.45** 0.64** 0.42* 0.45 
NBA 0.40* 0.68** n/aa 0.44** 0.47* 0.18 0.46** 0.44 
NFL n/ab 0.50** 0.24 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 
 
alockout. bdata unavailable. 
*p<0.05. **p<0.01.  
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Table 4 
NFL Team Revenues for 2000-01 (in millions of dollars) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Team Gate Arenaa Shared Loc Med Total  Expenses Cash 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Washington 35.0 40.8 74.5 8.5 158.9 134.8 24.1 
Dallas 23.0 42.2 74.5 6.6 146.3 104.2 42.1 
Tampa Bay 27.5 31.7 74.5 4.2 137.9 110.3 27.5 
Tennessee 26.5 30.3 74.5 3.4 134.7 110.7 24.1 
Baltimore 21.6 30.2 74.5 5.0 131.3 109.9 21.4 
Cleveland 21.0 28.2 74.5 6.8 130.4 92.1 38.4 
Carolina 26.3 22.4 74.5 5.6 128.9 101.6 27.3 
New England 19.9 16.2 74.5 8.6 119.2 93.6 25.7 
Jacksonville 23.2 18.3 74.5 2.6 118.6 107.5 11.2 
Miami 22.5 17.5 74.5 3.7 118.2 100.7 17.5 
Kansas City 23.1 17.4 74.5 2.0 117.1 91.7 25.4 
St. Louis 20.9 17.7 74.5 3.7 116.8 97.0 19.8 
Cincinnati 21.6 18.7 74.5 1.6 116.4 93.6 22.9 
NYG 23.6 11.5 74.5 5.1 114.7 81.9 32.8 
San Francisco 22.3 10.4 74.5 5.8 113.1 88.9 24.2 
Green Bay 21.0 15.2 74.5 2.3 113.0 83.5 29.6 
Philadelphia 20.6 12.7 74.5 4.6 112.4 95.6 16.9 
Buffalo 22.3 13.9 74.5 1.4 112.1 111.1 1.0 
NYJ 25.2 7.1 74.5 4.3 111.1 96.1 15.0 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
Team Gate Arenaa Shared Loc Med Total  Expenses Cash 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Seattle 20.5 10.4 74.5 4.1 109.4 122.2 -12.7 
New Orleans 18.9 15.9 74.5 1.8 108.8 93.2 15.7 
Indianapolis 19.7 12.8 74.5 1.8 108.8 107.6 1.3 
Oakland 20.8 10.9 74.5 2.5 108.8 97.8 11.0 
San Diego 21.7 9.2 74.5 2.5 108.0 90.3 17.7 
Pittsburgh 18.8 11.0 74.5 3.3 107.6 86.9 20.7 
Minnesota 21.0 9.8 74.5 2.0 107.4 82.4 25.0 
Denver 23.3 4.8 74.5 4.6 107.2 92.1 15.1 
Detroit 23.3 4.8 74.5 4.6 107.2 92.1 15.1 
Chicago 20.8 5.7 74.5 5.9 106.9 91.9 15.0 
Atlanta 17.4 11.1 74.5 2.1 105.2 90.4 14.8 
Arizona 16.6 7.4 74.5 0.2 98.6 83.2 15.4 
Average 22.3 16.7 74.5 3.9 117.3 97.9 19.4 
 
aincludes luxury suite, concessions and parking, arena sponsorship, signing and naming 
and miscellaneous revenue 
Note. The data was calculated using Kagan: The Business of Football 2002: Pro Team 
Economics 1991-2002, by Kagan, 2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 
2002 by KWM. 
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Table 5 
NFL Team Payrolls 2000-01 to 2002-03  
(in millions of dollars) 
__________________________________ 
Team 2001 2002 2003 
__________________________________ 
Washington 92.4 76.8 96.0 
Buffalo 90.7 86.2 98.2 
Detroit 78.4 95.0 86.2 
Seattle 77.6 82.5 89.3 
Jacksonville 77.0 81.1 92.4 
Tampa Bay 76.8 76.4 95.5 
Indianapolis 76.1 83.4 92.4 
Carolina 73.1 65.6 82.0 
Miami 72.4 71.9 89.9 
Baltimore 71.2 80.3 100.4 
Philadelphia 70.6 73.1 91.4 
Chicago 70.3 71.9 89.8 
Oakland 69.8 82.8 92.7 
NYJ 69.7 77.7 97.1 
Tennessee 69.7 69.8 87.2 
Kansas City 69.3 67.6 84.5 
Cincinnati 68.6 70.8 88.6 
Atlanta 66.8 72.4 90.5 
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__________________________________ 
Team 2001 2002 2003 
__________________________________ 
San Diego 62.5 65.4 81.8 
New Orleans 62.4 59.0 73.7 
Cleveland 62.1 73.1 91.4 
Denver 61.2 95.0 86.2 
Pittsburgh 61.1 57.6 72.0 
San Francisco 60.2 65.8 82.3 
St. Louis 59.3 71.1 88.9 
Minnesota 59.2 59.3 74.1 
Dallas 57.9 50.7 96.3 
New England 57.5 61.0 76.2 
NYG 57.3 66.3 82.8 
Green Bay 55.7 63.4 72.3 
Arizona 55.3 55.0 68.8 
Houston   - 
Average 68.1 71.9 86.8 
 
Note. Houston was a new team in 2002-03. Payroll figures were unavailable. 
Note. From Kagan: The Business of Football 2002: Pro Team Economics 1991-2002, by 
Kagan, 2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2002 by KWM. 
 
 174 
                                                               
Table 6 
NFL Attendance by Percent Capacity  
2000-01 to 2002-03 
___________________________________________ 
Team  2001  2002  2003 Average
___________________________________________ 
Tennessee 102.2 100.0 100.0 100.7 
St. Louis 100.1 100.2 100.1 100.1 
Minnesota 100.1 100.1 99.9 100.0 
Chicago 100.0 94.4 81.9 92.1 
New England 100.0 100.0 100.6 100.2 
Philadelphia 99.9 100.8 100.1 100.3 
Baltimore 99.8 100.4 100.4 100.2 
Carolina 99.6 98.5 93.0 97.0 
Kansas City 99.3 97.1 98.4 98.3 
Cleveland 99.3 99.6 100.1 99.7 
Denver 99.3 98.6 99.3 99.1 
Tampa Bay 98.9 99.8 100.0 99.6 
Indianapolis 98.6 100.4 101.0 100.0 
Green Bay 98.3 95.7 101.8 98.6 
NY Giants 98.2 98.0 98.2 98.1 
NY Jets 98.1 98.0 98.2 98.1 
Miami 98.1 97.3 96.9 97.4 
New Orleans 97.1 102.4 99.2 99.6 
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___________________________________________ 
Team 2001 2002 2003 Average
___________________________________________ 
San Francisco 96.5 97.2 97.5 97.1 
Dallas 96.0 96.3 96.1 96.1 
Buffalo 95.0 85.3 92.6 91.0 
Washington 94.8 90.2 93.1 92.7 
Detroit 94.4 93.6 94.2 94.1 
Pittsburgh 92.4 96.8 95.1 94.8 
Oakland 91.6 93.5 96.0 93.7 
Cincinnati 89.6 86.7 80.8 85.7 
Seattle 87.6 83.2 94.1 88.3 
Jacksonville 82.6 82.8 77.1 80.8 
San Diego 75.8 83.6 87.1 82.2 
Atlanta 74.3 76.2 96.7 82.4 
Arizona 61.3 52.4 55.8 56.5 
Houston   100.6 100.6 
Average 94.2 93.5 94.6 94.1 
 
Note. The data in column 1 is from Kagan: The Business of Football 2002:  
Pro Team Economics 1991-2002 (p. 505), by Kagan, 2001, Carmel, CA:  
Kagan World Media. Copyright 2002 by KWM. 
Note. The data in column 2 is from 2001 NFL Attendance 
(http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0905961.html). Copyright 2000-2003 by Family 
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Education Network, Inc. 
Note. The data in column 3 is from NFL Attendance 
(http://www.kenn.com/sports/football/nfl/). Copyright 2003 by Kenn Tomasch.  
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Table 7 
NBA Team Revenues for 2000-01 (in millions of dollars) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Team Gate Arenaa Shared Loc Med Total Expenses Cash 
__________________________________________________________________ 
New York 74.0 38.4 26.1 21.0 159.5 109.4 50.1 
LA Lakers 67.9 23.6 26.1 23.0 140.6 104.0 36.6 
Portland 58.3 17.6 26.1 11.0 113.0 119.0 -6.0 
Chicago 46.7 18.7 26.1 15.5 107.0 60.9 46.1 
Miami 38.4 18.9 26.1 13.0 96.4 96.8 -0.4 
Utah 43.0 14.0 26.1 12.3 95.4 84.5 10.9 
Philadelphia 39.6 16.7 26.1 12.5 94.9 85.8 9.1 
Indiana 38.8 11.8 26.1 9.5 86.2 80.0 6.2 
Phoenix 37.3 9.6 26.1 13.0 86.0 84.4 1.6 
Sacramento 39.3 10.9 26.1 9.7 86.0 72.9 13.1 
Washington 37.7 11.7 26.1 10.0 85.5 84.0 1.5 
Detroit 23.2 18.9 26.1 13.0 81.2 68.7 12.5 
Boston 29.7 10.7 26.1 12.5 79.0 80.9 -1.9 
Toronto 40.0 8.3 26.1 3.3 77.7 71.9 5.8 
San Antonio 33.7 8.3 26.1 9.0 77.1 79.4 -2.3 
Seattle 34.9 5.1 26.1 10.0 76.1 83.5 -7.4 
Cleveland 28.1 11.7 26.1 9.0 74.9 73.5 1.4 
Atlanta 25.5 11.1 26.1 11.5 74.2 69.9 4.3 
Houston 34.1 3.4 26.1 9.5 73.1 69.2 3.9 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
Team Gate Arenaa Shared Loc Med Total Expenses Cash 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Orlando 28.6 7.6 26.1 10.5 72.8 67.3 5.5 
Golden State 25.0 11.3 26.1 9.6 72.0 73.3 -1.3 
New Jersey 31.8 7.4 26.1 6.0 71.3 83.0 -11.7 
Minnesota 27.4 9.0 26.1 7.5 70.0 73.8 -3.8 
Denver 22.4 10.9 26.1 8.0 67.4 69.1 -1.7 
Dallas 24.3 4.5 26.1 11.5 66.4 80.1 -13.7 
LA Clippers 24.6 6.7 26.1 7.5 64.9 53.6 11.3 
Milwaukee 21.7 5.5 26.1 6.0 59.3 69.2 -9.9 
Charlotte 20.9 4.4 26.1 6.0 57.4 62.6 -5.2 
Vancouver 19.4 5.0 26.1 2.0 52.5 76.8 -24.3 
Average 35.0 11.8 26.1 10.4 83.4 78.9 4.5 
 
aincludes luxury suite, concessions and arena signage revenue  
Note. The data was calculated using Kagan: The Business of Basketball 2001, by Kagan, 
2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 179 
                                                               
Table 8 
NBA Team Payrolls 2000-01 to 2002-03  
(in millions of dollars) 
__________________________________ 
Team  2001  2002  2003 
__________________________________ 
Portland 87.2 83.8 106.0 
New York 68.5 85.5 92.2 
Miami 65.8 52.6 55.5 
LA Lakers 63.0 53.5 61.2 
Phoenix 57.1 56.2 53.5 
New Jersey 56.2 75.2 55.2 
San Antonio 56.0 45.7 47.5 
Washington 54.9 54.8 35.4 
Utah 54.4 52.6 48.4 
Seattle 53.4 45.4 53.4 
Philadelphia 53.2 58.1 54.2 
Dallas 49.9 57.4 66.4 
Cleveland 49.4 45.6 42.5 
Memphis 49.0 50.9 53.9 
Indiana 48.5 53.2 53.9 
Sacramento 47.3 54.9 68.3 
Minnesota 46.9 54.6 59.4 
Boston 46.7 47.5 52.4 
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__________________________________ 
Team 2001 2002 2003 
__________________________________ 
Milwaukee 45.4 56.2 56.9 
Denver 43.5 54.4 41.3 
New Orleans 42.6 50.0 43.6 
Detroit 41.1 42.4 43.6 
Atlanta 40.5 51.2 53.9 
Houston 39.7 49.2 47.6 
Golden State 39.5 47.7 46.3 
Toronto 39.0 52.3 53.7 
Orlando 37.7 45.8 44.8 
Chicago 25.9 42.6 41.1 
LA Clippers 25.2 33.8 26.6 
Average 49.2 53.6 53.7 
 
Note. The data in column 1 is from Kagan: The Business of Basketball 2001 (p. 261), by 
 Kagan, 2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
Note. The data in column 2 is from 2001-02 NBA Attendance 
 (http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0779885.html). Copyright 2000-2003 by Family 
 Education Network, Inc.  
Note. The data in column 3 is from NBA Attendance 
 (http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/attendance?sort=away_avg&year=2003). Copyright 2003 
 by ESPN Internet Ventures. 
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Table 9 
NBA Attendance by Percent Capacity  
2000-01 to 2002-03 
__________________________________________ 
Team 2001 2002 2003 Average
__________________________________________ 
San Antonio 108.3 108.0 97.2 104.5 
Portland 101.5 97.4 97.2 98.7 
New York 100.0 100.0 96.2 98.7 
Sacramento 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Chicago 100.0 87.2 90.4 92.5 
Toronto 97.7 99.8 95.8 97.8 
Utah 97.0 93.8 96.3 95.7 
Indiana 96.7 91.3 89.1 92.4 
Philadelphia 96.1 100.6 96.3 97.7 
LA Lakers 94.7 100.0 98.4 97.7 
Phoenix 94.6 85.8 85.5 88.6 
Minnesota 92.1 93.9 82.6 89.5 
Dallas 91.9 102.0 103.7 99.2 
Seattle 91.6 90.5 91.0 91.0 
Milwaukee 89.0 97.1 86.8 91.0 
Orlando 85.6 87.8 85.7 86.4 
Miami 84.3 96.9 78.2 86.5 
Boston 82.4 88.1 92.9 87.8 
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__________________________________________ 
Team  2001  2002  2003 Average
__________________________________________ 
Denver 78.2 80.9 77.6 78.9 
Houston 77.7 72.1 84.6 78.1 
Cleveland 77.2 70.7 55.9 67.9 
Washington 75.3 99.0 97.6 90.6 
Golden State 73.7 73.8 79.0 75.5 
LA Clippers 73.1 96.6 90.8 86.8 
Memphis 71.6 74.5 74.0 73.4 
New Jersey 68.9 68.6 75.7 71.1 
Detroit 67.5 84.0 92.7 81.4 
Atlanta 67.3 63.4 66.3 65.7 
New Orleans 63.1 47.4 91.0 67.2 
Average 86.1 88.0 87.9 87.3 
 
Note. The data in column 1 is from Kagan: The Business of Basketball 2001 (p. 342), by
Kagan, 2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
Note. The data in column 2 is from 2001-02 NBA Attendance 
(http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0779624.html). Copyright 2000-2003 by Family 
Education Network, Inc. 
Note. The data in column 3 is from NBA Team Salaries 2002-03 
(http://www.fullsportpress.com/salaries.html). Copyright 2003 by Full Sport Press, Inc. 
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Table 10 
NHL Team Revenues for 2000-01 (in millions of dollars)  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Team Gate Arenaa Shared Loc Med Total Expenses Cash 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Torontob 52.8 22.4 13.2 18.5 106.9 68.9 38.0 
NYRb 49.1 28.6 13.2 3.5 94.4 90.9 3.5 
Philadelphia 49.8 26.0 13.2 2.5 91.5 68.0 23.5 
Dallas 39.3 18.3 13.2 16.0 86.8 76.2 10.6 
Detroit 42.9 20.4 13.2 8.5 85.0 81.3 3.7 
Coloradob 46.6 14.8 13.2 9.5 84.1 80.7 3.4 
LA 35.4 29.8 13.2 3.5 81.9 60.5 21.4 
Montrealb 30.9 24.6 13.2 10.5 79.2 70.1 9.1 
Chicagob 28.8 32.6 13.2 2.5 77.1 67.1 10.0 
St. Louisb 36.0 18.7 13.2 9.0 76.9 69.7 7.2 
Boston 30.1 20.0 13.2 10.5 73.8 72.5 1.3 
Minnesota 36.9 18.7 7.0 9.0 71.6 44.4 27.2 
San Jose 33.8 15.7 13.2 3.4 66.1 58.2 7.9 
Vancouverb 31.7 14.7 13.2 6.2 65.8 66.5 -0.7 
Atlanta 31.6 19.4 7.0 6.5 64.5 52.6 11.9 
Anaheim 27.6 12.0 13.2 9.5 62.3 68.6 -6.3 
Pittsburgh 31.4 8.7 13.2 7.3 60.6 43.8 16.8 
Tampa Bay 25.6 13.7 13.2 7.5 60.0 42.0 18.0 
New Jersey 32.0 10.3 13.2 4.0 59.5 60.9 -1.4 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
Team Gate Arenaa Shared Loc Med Total Expenses Cash 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Buffalo 28.6 13.9 13.2 3.5 59.2 67.4 -8.2 
Washington 23.2 14.5 13.2 7.5 58.4 68.0 -9.6 
Nashville 27.7 16.8 7.0 5.9 57.4 51.2 6.2 
NYI 15.5 12.4 13.2 15.0 56.1 48.2 7.9 
Florida 27.3 11.6 13.2 3.5 55.6 55.6 0.0 
Columbus 33.8 10.4 7.0 4.0 55.2 36.0 19.2 
Ottawa 30.7 7.6 13.2 2.0 53.5 52.4 1.1 
Phoenix 22.2 11.1 13.2 6.0 52.5 67.9 -15.4 
Carolina 21.8 10.3 13.2 3.9 49.2 48.4 0.8 
Edmonton 21.4 7.5 13.2 6.5 48.6 49.4 -0.8 
Calgary 22.1 10.1 13.2 1.5 46.9 47.9 -1.0 
Average 32.2 16.5 12.4 6.9 68.0 61.2 6.8 
 
aincludes luxury suite, concessions and parking, arena sponsorship, signing and naming 
 revenue and Canadian Currency Assistance Plan revenue when applicable 
bteam owns arena 
Note. The data was calculated using Kagan: The Business of Hockey 2001, by Kagan, 
 2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
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Table 11 
NHL Team Payrolls 2000-01 to 2002-03  
(in millions of dollars) 
________________________________________ 
Team  2001  2002  2003 
________________________________________ 
NYR  60.3  67.4  69.0 
Detroit  55.4  65.9  68.0 
Colorado 52.2  59.6  60.0 
Dallas  51.0  50.5  62.0 
Phoenix 47.1  32.9  45.0 
Philadelphia 44.3  57.0  55.0 
Toronto 43.1  48.9  55.0 
Florida  42.7  30.6  33.0 
St. Louis 42.4  57.5  63.0 
Anaheim 41.6  35.8  39.0 
Washington 41.3  40.6  51.0 
Buffalo 39.6  32.4  31.0 
Boston  38.2  41.3  37.0 
LA  37.7  41.0  43.0 
New Jersey 36.8  40.0  52.0 
San Jose 36.4  48.3  48.0 
Montreal 35.3  39.1  49.0 
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________________________________________ 
Team  2001  2002  2003 
________________________________________ 
Chicago 34.3  42.0  44.0 
Pittsburgh 32.6  32.5  31.0 
Calgary 30.2  26.3  33.0 
Vancouver 29.8  30.6  33.0 
Ottawa  28.4  28.5  30.0 
Carolina 28.3  32.4  38.0 
Edmonton 28.1  25.9  31.0 
NYI  25.3  35.2  42.0 
Nashville 22.9  19.5  26.0 
Columbus 22.3  20.8  29.0 
Atlanta 21.8  20.4  26.0 
Tampa Bay 21.0  25.8  29.0 
Minnesota 16.9  18.0  21.0 
Average 36.2  38.2  42.4 
________________________________________ 
Note. The data in column 1 is from Kagan: The Business of Hockey 2001 (p. 386), by 
 Kagan, 2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
Note. The data in column 2 is from 2001-02 Team Payrolls 
 (http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0779885.html). Copyright 2000-2003 by Family 
 Education Network, Inc.  
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Note. The data in column 3 is from NHL Salaries, 2002-2003  
(http://www.faceoff.com/nhl/salaries/printer-salaries.html.) Copyright 2003 Faceoff.com. 
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Table 12 
NHL Attendance by Percent Capacity  
2000-01 to 2002-03 
_________________________________________ 
Team   2001   2002   2003  Average
 
    
_________________________________________ 
St. Louis  102.6 99.7 97.6 100.0 
Toronto 102.3 102.5 102.2 102.3 
Minnesota  101.5 102.2 102.4 102.0 
Philadelphia 100.3 100.2 99.0 99.8 
Colorado 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NYR 100.0 99.1 99.7 99.6 
San Jose 99.8 99.6 99.2 99.5 
Detroit 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.9 
Calgary 96.9 91.6 94.6 94.4 
Columbus 96.3 100.0 97.8 98.0 
Pittsburgh 96.3 92.3 87.0 91.9 
Ottawa 96.2 91.5 93.0 93.6 
Buffalo 95.5 92.1 73.5 87.0 
Montreal  94.5 94.1 97.2 95.3 
Edmonton 92.7 98.5 98.9 96.7 
Nashville 92.5 86.4 77.3 85.4 
Vancouver 92.4 96.1 99.9 96.1 
Dallas 91.7 100.0 100.0 97.2 
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__________________________________________ 
Team  2001  2002  2003 Average
__________________________________________ 
LA 88.6 92.5 97.0 92.7 
Boston 87.9 87.7 85.6 87.1 
Phoenix 87.7 81.2 81.6 83.5 
Washington 83.2 92.9 84.6 86.9 
Atlanta 82.3 73.7 72.7 76.2 
New Jersey 82.2 83.6 78.0 81.3 
Anaheim 78.6 69.9 81.5 76.7 
Florida 75.6 83.6 80.2 79.8 
Tampa Bay 75.4 79.6 83.7 79.6 
Chicago 73.2 75.9 72.2 73.8 
Carolina 71.3 82.8 83.7 79.3 
NYI 68.0 89.3 91.6 83.0 
Average 90.2 91.3 90.4 90.6 
 
Note. From NHL Attendance Leaders (http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/attendance). 
Copyright 2003 by Microsoft Corporation. 
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Table 13 
NHL Revenue Sharing Plans Using 2000-01 Total Revenue Figures 
(in millions of dollars) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Team Revenue   Shareda 
34% 
Shared 
40% 
Shared 
Shareda 
w. tax 
34% w. 
tax 
40% w. 
tax 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Toronto 106.9 95.3 93.7 91.3 93.1 91.5 89.2 
NYR 94.4 90.0 85.4 83.8 85.8 81.2 79.6 
Philadelphia 91.5 87.3 83.5 82.1 85.1 81.3 79.9 
Dallas 86.8 80.8 80.4 79.3 77.2 76.8 75.7 
Detroit 85.0 80.7 79.2 78.2 76.8 75.3 74.3 
Colorado 84.1 78.2 78.6 77.7 74.5 75.0 74.0 
LA 81.9 82.2 77.2 76.3 81.8 76.8 76.0 
Montreal 79.2 78.2 75.4 74.7 80.4 77.6 76.9 
Chicago 77.1 80.0 74.0 73.5 82.2 76.2 75.7 
St. Louis 76.9 74.8 73.9 73.3 73.5 72.6 72.1 
Boston 73.8 73.1 71.8 71.5 72.7 71.4 71.1 
Minnesota 71.6 69.2 70.4 70.2 71.4 72.5 72.4 
San Jose 66.1 67.0 66.7 66.9 66.6 66.4 66.5 
Vancouver 65.8 66.3 66.5 66.7 68.4 68.7 68.9 
Atlanta 64.5 64.9 65.7 65.9 67.1 67.9 68.1 
Anaheim 62.3 62.8 64.2 64.6 61.6 63.0 63.3 
Pittsburgh 60.6 60.7 63.1 63.6 62.9 65.3 65.8 
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__________________________________________________________________ 
Team Revenue  Shareda 
34% 
Shared 
40% 
Shared 
Shareda 
w. tax 
34% w. 
tax 
40% w. 
tax 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Tampa Bay 60.0 62.0 62.7 63.2 64.2 64.9 65.4 
New Jersey 59.5 60.7 62.4 62.9 60.4 62.0 62.5 
Buffalo 59.2 61.8 62.2 62.7 60.6 61.0 61.5 
Washington 58.4 61.2 61.6 62.2 60.0 60.4 61.0 
Nashville 57.4 59.3 61.0 61.6 61.5 63.2 63.8 
NYI 56.1 58.5 60.1 60.9 60.7 62.3 63.1 
Florida 55.6 58.6 59.8 60.6 56.5 57.7 58.4 
Columbus 55.2 55.8 59.5 60.3 58.0 61.7 62.5 
Ottawa 53.5 56.0 58.4 59.3 58.2 60.6 61.5 
Phoenix 52.5 56.3 57.8 58.7 53.9 55.4 56.3 
Carolina 49.2 53.9 55.6 56.7 56.1 57.8 58.9 
Edmonton 48.6 52.4 55.2 56.4 54.6 57.4 58.6 
Calgary 46.9 52.5 54.1 55.3 54.7 56.2 57.5 
 
aSharing based on 50% of local media from each team and 60-40 home-visitor gate  
sharing scheme after 15% deducted from home side for administration purposes. 
Note. The data was calculated using Kagan: The Business of Hockey 2001, by Kagan, 
2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
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Table 14 
NHL Revenue Fluctuations as Attendance 
Increases Using 1999-00 Revenue  
Figures (in millions of dollars) 
__________________________________ 
Team Revenue Shareda 
Shareda 
100% Att
__________________________________ 
Toronto 97.4 84.9 82.7 
NYR 90.6 85.9 83.9 
Philadelphia 84.1 80.4 79.5 
Detroit 79.1 74.7 74.0 
Colorado 78.8 73.0 71.9 
Montreal 77.1 72.9 73.7 
LA 76.0 76.7 78.7 
Chicago 73.8 76.3 82.7 
Dallas 73.1 66.8 66.9 
Boston 73.1 70.4 72.1 
Atlanta 69.5 67.4 68.8 
St. Louis 69.3 66.5 69.0 
San Jose 59.1 60.2 61.1 
Nashville 58.6 59.4 61.2 
Anaheim 58.5 56.7 60.6 
Florida 54.9 57.8 61.6 
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__________________________________ 
Team Revenue Shareda 
Shareda 
100% Att
__________________________________ 
Vancouver 54.6 56.8 61.7 
Buffalo 54.0 56.8 58.8 
Pittsburgh 53.3 54.1 57.3 
Washington 53.1 55.8 61.9 
New Jersey 52.9 54.8 59.6 
Tampa Bay 50.6 54.0 61.0 
NYI 50.6 52.1 60.2 
Phoenix 50.3 52.7 55.5 
Carolina 47.6 51.3 59.6 
Ottawa 47.1 50.5 52.5 
Edmonton 44.9 48.0 51.0 
Calgary 36.3 43.4 47.2 
 
aSharing based on 50% of local media from each team and 60-40 home-visitor gate  
sharing scheme after 15% deducted from home side for administration purposes. 
Note. The data was calculated using Kagan: The Business of Hockey 2001, by Kagan, 
2001, Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM 
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Table D1 
Average NHL Ticket  
Price in 2000-01  
___________________ 
Team  Price($) 
___________________ 
Toronto 67.01 
NYR  65.82 
Colorado 63.11 
Philadelphia 62.31 
Dallas  56.43 
LA  54.03 
Detroit  52.39 
Atlanta 51.29 
New Jersey 51.12 
Anaheim 50.66 
Boston  49.36 
Minnesota 49.26 
Columbus 48.65 
Pittsburgh 48.45 
Florida  47.71 
Chicago 47.57 
San Jose 47.22 
Vancouver 46.80 
St. Louis 45.02 
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___________________ 
Team  Price($) 
___________________ 
Nashville 43.48 
Ottawa  43.05 
Carolina 41.26 
Tampa Bay 40.56 
Buffalo 40.39 
Phoenix 38.73 
Washington 38.42 
Montreal 38.36 
Edmonton 34.85 
NYI  34.68 
Calgary 32.86 
Average 47.70 
___________________ 
Note. From Kagan: The Business of Hockey 2001 (p. 483), by Kagan 2001,  
Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
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Table D2 
2001 NHL Luxury Suites by Number, Prices  
(in thousands) and 2001 Revenue (in millions) 
__________________________________________ 
Team Number low high  Revenue
__________________________________________ 
Chicago 216 60.0 300.0 19.4 
Philadelphia 126 81.5 170.0 15.8 
LA 160 197.5 307.5 13.5 
NYR 89 400.0 400.0 11.9 
Toronto 152 53.6 234.5 10.9 
Montreal  135 57.6 93.8 10.2 
Tampa Bay 80 125.0 150.0 10.2 
St. Louis  91 71.0 150.0 10.1 
Boston 108 181.0 280.0 10.0 
Detroit 83 100.0 140.0 9.3 
Atlanta 90 135.0 225.0 8.1 
Minnesota  74 75.0 140.0 8.0 
Columbus 74 58.5 138.5 7.3 
Nashville 72 80.0 120.0 7.2 
Carolina 58 100.0 140.0 7.0 
Florida 74 70.0 120.0 7.0 
Colorado 95 90.0 185.0 6.5 
Buffalo 80 55.0 100.0 6.2 
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__________________________________________ 
Team Number low high  Revenue
__________________________________________ 
San Jose 65 82.0 150.0 6.0 
Washington 110 110.0 200.0 5.7 
NYI 32 84.0 260.0 5.0 
Anaheim 84 86.0 140.0 4.7 
Vancouver 88 67.0 127.3 4.3 
Phoenix 88 43.0 48.0 4.0 
Pittsburgh 54 72.5 87.5 2.2 
New Jersey 29 170.0 229.0 2.0 
Calgary 72 26.8 83.8 1.6 
Edmonton 66 21.8 83.8 1.0 
Ottawa 147 44.2 83.8 0.9 
Dallas 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Note. From Kagan: The Business of Hockey 2001 (pp. 495-496), by Kagan 2001,  
Carmel, CA: Kagan World Media. Copyright 2001 by KWM. 
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Political  Entropy                           
pressures             pressures 
 
 
 
Functional  Dissipation   Deinstitu-  Erosion or       
pressures  or rejection  tionalization  discontinuity                       
 
 
 
Social   Inertial                
pressures          pressures                      
 
 
Figure 1. Pressures for Deinstitutionalization 
 
Note. From “The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization,” by C. Oliver, 1992, 
Organization Studies, 13, 4, p. 567. Copyright 1992 EGOS. 
 
